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Abstract
This research was performed to investigate public participation in highly technical policy
scenarios and the outcomes of this participation. A detailed evaluation of community
involvement at Superfund sites (via the Technical Assistance Grant, or TAG, Program) was
performed by researching a specific type of complex, highly-technical policy problem, using a
mixed methods approach, incorporating a quantitative econometric evaluation and qualitative
multiple case study of selected Superfund sites.
The existing literature on public participation argues that citizen involvement is central to
democratic decision-making and is an important part of the policy process. This study was
rooted in a series of research questions about public participation in technical settings. These
questions addressed the attributes of successful participation, the characteristics of technical
policy issues that could lead to gaps in successful participation, the expected impact of the
Superfund TAG program in addressing these gaps, and questions about the specific impacts of
the TAG program at Superfund sites on outcomes (schedule, remedy selected, and community
perceptions and satisfaction with the outcomes).
The Superfund program has the hallmark characteristics of a highly technical, complex
policy situation – it is characterized by technical complexity, solutions to the problems are
expensive, public involvement is expensive, the process is slow, and the technical parties
typically have better access to information than does the public. The quantitative research herein
identified several drivers for obtaining a TAG and demonstrated the impact of a TAG on
schedule and remedy. The case studies provided support for the expectations about barriers to
public participation in complex, technical settings, and expectations about the ability of the
TAG program to address some of the participation gaps. The research also identified areas for
public participation improvement, through providing independent technical advisors, support for
establishment of community networks, support for citizen advocates, and agency support for
capacity building.
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1

Chapter 1 - Introduction

This research was performed to investigate the impact of public participation in highly
technical policy settings. In twenty-five years of environmental engineering consulting, I have
had the opportunity to directly observe (and participate in) public participation in action in highly
technical settings. Through this experience, I have witnessed citizen involvement in many
technical programs and seen the apparent frustration on the part of all parties. This frustration
was partially the result of a sense of exclusion (on the part of the public) and not understanding
how to address community concerns (on the part of public administrators). My interest in
understanding, and providing ideas for potential improvement, arise from this experience in
technical programs.
Previous studies have suggested that the involvement of the public in policy decisions, in
the Superfund program and elsewhere, results in more desirable outcomes, where desirable is
sometimes defined differently by scholars and practitioners and may vary by program.
Identification of the drivers and impact for public participation and the areas to improve the
process, therefore, should yield valuable information to be used to improve community
involvement programs. This study examines the driving factors and outcomes for a specific and
underutilized type of formal public involvement – the Technical Assistance Grant (TAG)
program at Superfund, a specific type of complex, highly-technical policy problem. The
research was performed utilizing a mixed methods approach to evaluation of the program – a
quantitative component that utilized a nationwide database of information on Superfund sites and
a qualitative, multiple case study that provided in depth research at six Superfund sites in Central
New York.
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The existing literature on public participation argues that citizen involvement is central to
democratic decision-making and is an important part of the policy process. This study was
rooted in a series of research questions about public participation in technical settings. These
questions addressed the attributes of successful participation, the characteristics of technical
policy issues and how these characteristics could lead to gaps in successful participation, the
expected impact of the Superfund TAG program in addressing these gaps, and questions about
the specific impacts of the TAG program at Superfund sites on outcomes (schedule, remedy
selected, and community perceptions and satisfaction with the outcomes). The specific research
questions (RQ) are:
Research Question 1: What are the hallmarks or attributes of successful public
participation?
Research Question 2: What are the characteristics of highly technical and complex
policy decisions that could impact successful public participation and how do they impact
participation?
Research Question 3: What are the characteristics of the Superfund Technical
Assistance Grant (TAG) program that could address participation gaps resulting in this
highly technical setting?
Research Question 4: Is the Superfund TAG program successful in addressing these
gaps?
Research Question 5: What factors determine the rate of utilization of TAGs at
Superfund sites?
Research Question 6: Does the presence of a TAG at a Superfund site have an
impact on the schedule for completion of remediation for Superfund sites?
Research Question 7: Does the presence of a TAG have an impact on the remedy
selected to address environmental issues at a Superfund site?
Research Question 8: Are there findings from the research that can be applied to
improve the TAG program implementation, and more broadly improve participation in
other highly technical policy settings?
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This document is organized as follows; Chapter 2 discusses the Superfund program,
which was established to address the toxic and hazardous waste sites in the U.S. with the greatest
potential risk to human health and the environment. The chapter includes a history of the
Superfund program, an overview of the process for identifying, addressing and remediating
Superfund sites, and a discussion of the evolution of public participation within Superfund.
Chapter 3 presents a review of the literature on public participation. It begins with a
detailed look at theories regarding public participation from the perspectives of the governmental
agencies and citizens in the process and includes a discussion of the theories that address the
design and performance of public participation programs. The chapter also discusses the existing
literature on the history of participation in governmental decisions, the goals and drivers for
public participation, and the cost, benefits, and barriers to public participation. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the requirements of successful participation and a review of
public participation in environmental policy decisions.
Chapter 4 brings together the concepts of Superfund and participation and provides the
foundation for my research. It defines highly technical and complex policy issues, identifies the
desirable attributes of public participation in these settings, and discusses the expected impact
public participation. The chapter also discusses the attributes of the TAG program and the
anticipated impacts of the TAG program components on specific participation criteria.
Chapters 5 presents my research questions and outlines the framework of the research. In
addition to the questions related to the qualitative case study that flow from the previous chapter,
Chapter 5 presents my hypotheses on public participation that were addressed in the quantitative
study. These hypotheses address the expected characteristics of communities that will obtain a
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TAG as well as the anticipated outcomes related to schedule and decisions about solutions at
Superfund sites with a TAG.
Chapter 6 then presents the details of the methods used in the quantitative and qualitative
pieces of the study. The quantitative research utilizes data from individual Superfund sites and
the U.S Census in a series of econometric studies to assess TAG utilization, schedule impacts of
TAGs and remedy decision impacts at TAG sites.
Chapters 7 and 8 present the findings of the quantitative and qualitative research,
respectively. The quantitative evaluation provides answers to environmental outcome based
questions with measurable results, such as the attributes of communities that obtain TAGs, and
the schedule and remedy impacts of a TAG. The qualitative assessment provides more detailed
understanding of the “why and how questions” and addresses topics of process outcomes and
community satisfaction and gains beyond the environmental outcomes. The case studies added
significant insight into the reasons for and results of TAG awards based on factors that were not
measurable in the quantitative data set (such as trust, experience and relationships of community
advocates, desires to change the remedy, and previous activity of the community at the site).
The case studies also added knowledge about outcomes: capacity building within the
community, credibility gains for EPA and the community, and increased acceptance of the
agency decisions.
Chapter 9 presents a synthesis of findings across the quantitative and qualitative studies,
identifies results that can improve participation in technical policy settings, and identifies areas
for future research. The findings of the quantitative study – the importance of wealth and tenure
in the community, the complexity and perceived risk of a site, and the presence of powerful
potential adversaries in the process – were supported in the qualitative study. The case studies
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also revealed a number of factors that were not observable in the quantitative dataset; the
importance of trust, communication, credibility and the presence of a strong community leader.
The importance of this study is underscored by two points. First, if public participation
in policy decisions yields better outcomes, as many public administration scholars have posited,
then efforts to improve the participatory process will facilitate improved outcomes. Second, this
study yields significant information regarding the factors that are important in determining
whether a community will choose to pursue participation programs. These factors shed light on
efforts that policy makers and their agents can take to improve the community involvement
process.
While this research focuses on the Superfund program, there are policy implications for
many complex and highly-technical policy areas, including environmental and energy policy
areas, such as brownfield redevelopment activities, community revitalization programs and
decisions regarding the location of energy infrastructure. The findings of the study identify
numerous areas for improvement of the public participation process, including capacity building
within communities and public agencies, support for and investment in developing community
advocates, and policies to support the growth and reach of community networks.
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Chapter 2 – Superfund
This section provides background information on the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA’s) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
also referred to as Superfund, with a focus on elements that are important to my evaluation of
public participation at Superfund sites. Superfund was established to provide solutions to
environmental concerns at what were referred to as the nation’s worst hazardous waste sites.

2.1

A brief history of Superfund
The late 1960s and the 1970s were a time of growing awareness of environmental and

health and safety issues and increased Congressional response to threats to human health and the
environment. A flurry of major Federal laws was passed to address the impacts of major projects
on the environment - National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969; air pollution - Clean
Air Act (CAA) of 1970, water pollution - Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974 and Clean
Water Act (CWA) of 1977, worker health and safety - Occupational Health and Safety Act
(OSHA) of 1970, among numerous other laws aimed at environmental improvement.
In 1976, Congress passed legislation to address the environmental impacts of production
of potentially dangerous chemicals - the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the
environmental impacts resulting from the management of hazardous wastes - the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). By the late 1970s, it was obvious to Congress and the
EPA that RCRA and TSCA had not addressed a major area of environmental and human health
risk – inactive former industrial facilities that, although no longer operational, were ongoing
sources of potential environmental impacts.
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In response to this regulatory gap, and as a response to the damages at high-profile waste
sites such as Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, Congress passed CERCLA (or Superfund)
legislation in 1980 to address these inactive former industrial operations. Superfund was
promulgated to address the most dangerous, abandoned hazardous waste sites in the US. The
name Superfund refers to the funds, primarily sourced from a tax on chemical producers as part
of the legislation, that are used for EPA expenditures. In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) to address many concerns that were apparent in
the original legislation, including public involvement (Barnett, 1994). As of 2007, over 12,000
sites had been identified by EPA for initial assessment to determine whether they should be
included in the Superfund program. A summary of the major milestones in the Superfund
program are presented in Table 2-1 1.

1976
1978
1980
1982
1982
1983
1986
1986

Congress passes RCRA and TSCA laws
State of Emergency, Love Canal in NY
Congress passes CERCLA (Superfund) into law
EPA establishes Hazard Ranking Score (HRS)
process to prioritize sites
EPA develops regulations for implementing
Superfund
EPA publishes first National Priorities List (NPL),
formally identifying Superfund sites
First site deleted from NPL
Congress passes SARA, which includes the
Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) Program

Table 2-1. History of EPA’s Superfund Program.

1

Information from EPA website, EPA.gov/Superfund.
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2.2

The Superfund Process
CERCLA, and its implementing regulations, provides a detailed and prescriptive process

for addressing inactive hazardous waste sites. A simplified schematic of the Superfund process
is presented in Figure 2-1, with the number of sites that had reached the critical stages in January
2008 shown in parentheses.

Site Discovery
Preliminary Assessment/Site Inspection- PA/SI
Hazard Ranking Score - HRS
National Priorities List - NPL (1564 sites)
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study - RI/FS
Record of Decision - ROD (1396 sites)
ROD Amendment(s)
Remedial Design/Remedial Action - RD/RA
Contruction Completion
Post-Construction Completion
Deletion from the NPL (315 sites)
Note: lighter shading and bold text indicates steps incorporated into this study.

Figure 2-1. Schematic of the Superfund Process

The first step in the Superfund process is site discovery. A site can be nominated for
assessment (or discovered) by EPA, by state or local officials, or by members of the public.
When a site is identified, EPA (or its contractor) performs a Preliminary Assessment/Site
Inspection (PA/SI). The PA/SI includes review of operational information for the site, a site
visit to preliminarily assess hazards, and calculation of a Hazard Ranking Score (HRS) used to
prioritize sites based on severity and type of environmental hazard and the potential (or actual)
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impact on human health and the environment. The HRS is a screening measure and considers
aspects such as population within a certain distance of the site, potential (or documented)
releases of hazardous chemicals to air, soil, surface water or groundwater, the toxicity and
quantity of hazardous chemicals presents at the site, the presence of sensitive populations (such
as the elderly or the very young), and other factors to estimate the overall risk associated with the
site. A site with an HRS of greater than 28.5 is proposed for the National Priorities List (NPL).
This proposal is published in the Federal Register and a public comment period is initiated. If
EPA deems that the NPL designation is appropriate after reviewing public comments, the NPL
designation is finalized. Of the more than 12,000 sites identified as potential Superfund sites,
1564 had been placed on the NPL as of January 2008.
Once a site is placed on the NPL, a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) is
completed to determine the nature and extent of contamination and to evaluate potential site
remediation alternatives. The RI/FS is typically a multi-year investigation, engineering
evaluation and human health and ecological risk assessment effort that can be performed by
private entities that were deemed responsible, in some manner, for previous site activities and
environmental impact or by EPA, if no such viable parties are identified.
Utilizing the data and results of evaluation from the RI/FS, EPA prepares a Proposed
Plan of Action presenting the evaluation of potential remediation alternatives and the details of
the selected remediation measures to address site risks, followed by another public comment
period. EPA evaluates the public comments, revises the proposed remedy, if warranted, and
issues a Record of Decision or ROD. Two components of the ROD are important to the public
participation (and information) process; the Administrative Record and the Responsiveness
Summary. The Administrative Record is a listing of all available documents pertaining to the
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site. The documents generated through the Superfund process are made available at a central
local location (typically a public library or government building), referred to as the records
repository. The Responsiveness Summary provides all comments received on decision
documents and EPA responses to the comments.
The next step in the process is the Remedial Design/Remedial Action. During the RD/RA
process, detailed engineering design is performed, remediation contractors are selected and site
cleanup is performed. In some instances, changed site conditions are encountered during the
RD/RA that warrant changes to the selected remedy. If the changes are major, a ROD
Amendment may be issued by EPA. For lesser changes, the modifications are documented
through an Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD).
Construction Completion marks the point where the remediation activities are fully
implemented. Depending on the type of remedy chosen, there may post-closure activities to be
implemented. It is common for long-term groundwater treatment or monitoring to demonstrate
the effectiveness of remediation to continue for several years (sometimes a decade or more) after
completion of remediation. These activities are considered Post-Construction Completion
actions.
Once EPA is convinced that the remedy is complete and no unacceptable risks remain for
the site, the site is Deleted from the NPL, and site activities under Superfund are complete. Of
1564 sites on the NPL in January 2008, 315 had progressed successfully through the process of
remediation and been deleted from the NPL.
For the purposes of my quantitative study (see Chapters 5 and 6), the important phases in
the process are 1) discovery, 2) inclusion on the NPL; 3) issuance of the ROD; 4) construction
completion; and 5) deletion from the NPL.
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In addition to the Superfund laws and regulations, EPA has produced technical guidance
documents that specify the procedures to be utilized in accomplishing the steps in the Superfund
process. Some of these guidance documents detail the requirements of the RI/FS, human health
and ecological risk assessment, laboratory analytical procedures, and data validation procedures
and identification of “presumptive remedies” based on general site characteristics.
It is common for EPA to identify several operable units (OUs), or discrete areas of
concern, at a Superfund site. EPA may divide the site into OUs based on differences in
contaminants present (solvents or metals), physical properties (an impoundment or landfill),
contaminated media (soil or groundwater), or remediation approach or schedule. EPA may
divide a site into an OU consisting of site soils and an OU that includes site groundwater. The
processes can proceed independently and on different schedules for the two OUs. In this
manner, lower complexity problems can be investigated and remediated separate from more
complex problems that may take a much longer time to address. A simplified depiction of a site
with three operable units is presented Figure 2-2.

Operable Unit 01
(e.g., landfill)

OU 03
(e.g. groundwater)

Operable Unit 02
(e.g. impoundment)

Figure 2-2. Depiction of Operable Units (OUs) at a Superfund site.
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It is also possible for there to be multiple RODs issued for a complex site. This can occur
when there are multiple OUs as discussed above. In addition, multiple RODs may be issued for
a single OU if there is the discovery of new data regarding the severity or type of contamination
after the issuance of the first ROD. For instance, EPA may revise a remedy decision based on
the availability or newly discovered viability of new remediation technology, or based on valid
input from the public, industry, or State regulators after issuance of the initial ROD.
Responsibility for investigation, evaluation and cleanup at an NPL site can reside with
one of three parties; private companies (or potentially responsible parties , PRPs) can perform
the investigation and cleanup under the direction of EPA, EPA can perform the work if viable
private parties are not located or are not willing to accept responsibility, and other governmental
agencies (such as the Department of Energy or Department of Defense) may perform the work
under the direction of the EPA. Data regarding activities that are performed at Superfund sites,
and the approximately 12,000 sites that are identified for evaluation but are not added to the
NPL, are compiled by the EPA and maintained in the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Information System (CERCLIS) database. This database is
periodically updated by EPA and publicly available. Information from the CERCLIS database
was utilized in this study.

2.3

Public Participation and Superfund
The Superfund program, through the original CERCLA legislation in 1980, incorporated

community involvement requirements that included public notice and comment periods at
various stages of the process, as well as informal communication between EPA site managers
and members of the community. In 1986, with the passage of SARA, Congress expand the
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citizen involvement process of the Superfund program, including the addition of two
mechanisms for formal community involvement. SARA expanded the public participation
aspect of the Superfund program by encouraging and recognizing Community Advisory Groups
(CAGs) and providing Technical Assistance Grants (TAGs) to successful applicants to
encourage community involvement in decisions related to Superfund sites.
Per Applegate (1998, pp. 911-913), Congress made the "deliberate choice to focus
cleanup decisions on technical issues and limit delay in implementation by limiting public
participation" and placed public comment in a "narrow time frame after the remedial decision
was made". The adoption of SARA added the Proposed Plan of Action (essentially a draft
ROD), increased public comment (written and oral), and added the TAG program to the
Superfund public participation process. EPA awards up to $50,000 to a community group to
hire technical advisors to assist citizens with technical issues at the site. To receive a TAG, the
community group must be incorporated or willing to incorporate, submit a proposal, represent
the community near the site, not be a municipality, and provide funds (or services) to cost share
in the process. Some of these requirements, as well as the administrative burden of accounting
and reporting, can make eligibility and compliance significant barriers to the TAG program (see
Chapter 8 for additional discussion of this topic).
An Office of Inspector General Report on the performance of the TAG program (OIG,
1996) found that program was “in general compliance with … regulatory requirements”, but a
low number of TAGs were awarded and the program was not successful in “affording local
community groups access to technical advisors”. This failure was attributed to poor definition of
program needs, poor dissemination of information to the public and inconsistent implementation.
There are two primary sources of this inconsistency; regional differences and individual
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leadership. The TAG program is implemented by EPA regional personnel in EPA ten different
geographical regions; it is essentially a federal policy that is implemented ten different ways. In
addition, like many policy initiatives, the program depends on agency managers to drive and
focus implementation. The strength of the leader is expected to impact the success of the
participation program.
The TAG program is the focal point of my evaluation of public participation under
Superfund. Public participation in the Superfund process is an important topic, as approximately
26% of the U.S. population lives within 4 miles of an NPL site (Golden, Yetman, & Chai-Onn,
2008). I investigate the reasons that citizens pursue a TAG and the impact of TAGs on outcomes
at Superfund sites, in the form of schedule impacts and remedy selection.
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review
This chapter presents a review of the literature on public participation with a focus on
citizen involvement in policy setting and implementation in the environmental policy arena. It is
important to understand the previous research that has been performed on public participation to
properly formulate this research and build on the previous work. I identified the following
questions as important to this understanding and the literature review provides a summary of the
previous work in the field:
•

What is the theoretical basis for public participation from the perspective of the agency
or public official? What is the theoretical basis for the citizenry to engage in policy
decisions? What are the theoretical bases for performance (success and failure) of public
participation processes?

•

What is the history of public participation and how has the involvement of citizens in
public decisions evolved with time?

•

What does the literature say about the goals and drivers for public participation?

•

What benefits are realized by agencies and the public from citizen involvement in policy
processes?

•

What are the barriers that keep the public from becoming involved in the policy process?

•

What are some of the costs associated with increased public participation in policy
decisions?

•

What is required for “good” public participation processes?

•

What methods of public participation are available and used in public decision-making
processes?

•

What are the outcomes of public participation in policy decisions?
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•

What has evaluation of public participation efforts revealed about the impacts in specific
policy settings?

•

How is public participation evolving and what are the recent advances, especially
collaborative governance and deliberative democracy?

•

How has public participation been implemented in environmental policy decision
making, especially in the federal Superfund program, brownfields and community
development programs, and facility siting programs (specifically waste disposal
facilities and energy infrastructure)?

3.1

Theories of public participation
Citizen participation in the development of public policy and its implementation is

explained by theories rooted in public administration, law, economics, management, behavioral
psychology, sociology and organizational theory. I examine citizen participation in public
administration and policy decisions and summarize the theoretical literature to address three
questions. Specifically, (1) why are government agencies and administrators prone (or reluctant)
to use participatory processes in policy and public administration settings? (2) Why do individual
citizens and groups of citizens choose to participate in policy and administration decisions? (3)
How does public participation impact performance in policy decisions (and as an extension how
does it impact the individual or group participating)?

3.1.1 Theories from the Agency Perspective
This section presents the theoretical basis for public participation from the perspective of
the agency or the public administrator. There are drivers that speak positively to the occurrence
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of participatory processes – administrative law theory, democracy (and deliberative democracy)
theory, managerial theories, and diffusion of innovation theory – as well as theories (primarily
organizational and behavioral) that predict a reluctance or negative likelihood of engaging the
public in the policy process – institutional theory, transaction cost economics, and scientific
management. While the research questions in this study focus on the reasons that community
groups decide to engage in public participation, understanding the theoretical underpinnings of
involving the community provides useful information for understanding the acceptance and
barriers to such participation.
Figure 3-1 depicts the theories applicable to agency decisions related to public
participation processes. It should be noted that there is overlap in the theoretical constructs
described in the following sections. As an example, the concept of procedural justice could be
characterized as a subset of administrative law or democracy theories.

Administrative Law Theory
Administrative law is “the body of rules and procedures that organizes government and
provides mechanisms for redress of grievances as a result of decisions or actions of government”
(Stewart, 2006). Administrative law theory explains the legal and administrative requirements
that govern the inclusion of citizens and the methodology to perform such inclusion.
Most rulemaking and program implementation policies include some manner of direct
public involvement. These may take many forms: public notice and comment on rulemaking or
implementing policy, public meetings to inform or garner information input from the public,
regulatory negotiation procedures, the formation and use of citizen advisory boards, and more
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direct and inclusive deliberative processes (Applegate, 1998; L. Bingham, Nabatchi, & O'Leary,
2005; Charnley & Engelbert, 2005; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010).
Administrative law theory also incorporates the concept of procedural justice, or fairness
of the process. The direct (as opposed to representative) participation of citizens in policy and
implementation processes “complies with the administrative law concept of the ‘right to be
heard’” (Ellis & Disinger, 1981). According to some, procedural justice has more of an impact
on the inclusion of participants and their satisfaction with the process than with measurable
environmental outcomes (Beierle, 1998). Efforts to more substantially involve the community in
environmental decisions can increase the citizens’ perception of justice and fairness in the
process (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; Rowe & Frewer, 2000), result in consensus building
(Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014), and increase the public’s acceptance of the final decision (Herian,
Hamm, Tomkins, & Zillig, 2012; Hourdequin, Landres, Hanson, & Craig, 2012).
Administrative law theory, in summary, predicts that the agency and agency officials will
pursue and support public participation, at least to the degree required by law or policy, or to
design and implement a process that meets the mandates of fairness.

Democracy Theory
Public participation in policy setting and implementation has long been recognized in the
public administration literature as an important democratic principle (Frederickson, 1982). The
ability of the citizenry to voice its collective and individual opinions on governmental decisions
that affect them is a valuable part of the policy process (Depoe & Delicath, 2004) and is core to
democracy.

20

Democracy theory presents three power distribution scenarios in the democratic state;
pluralistic (with multiple groups expressing their desires for governmental actions), elitist (where
a more powerful group controls decisions of the governing body at the expense of other less
powerful groups) and hyper-pluralistic (where multiple groups exert extreme power with
differing ends in mind which can lead to decision gridlock). In the first two instances, the need
for the agency to design, oversee and implement a participatory process is paramount to assess
the input from the public and ensure that the ultimate decision incorporates the preferences of the
public. In the latter scenario, pressures from multiple powerful influencers may lead to gridlock
in the decision-making process. Schumaker presents a more granular modeling of community
power including orthodox pluralism, elitism, representative democracy, populism, activismdominance, hyperpluralism and democratic rule (Schumaker, 1993).
Democracy theory, and its application in public participation, is normative in nature. It is
seen as a fundamental right of citizens in a democracy to express their opinions and concerns and
weigh in on decisions that directly impact them (Beierle, 1998; Folk, 1991; Frederickson, 1982;
Innes & Booher, 2004; Nabatchi, 2012a; Renn, Webler, Rakel, Dienel, & Johnson, 1993). The
primary question then is to what degree and in what form public participation occurs or should
occur. Direct democracy, and the specialized form deliberative democracy, hold that impactful
and meaningful involvement by citizens in decisions of the government agencies and
administrators is the desirable manifestation of democracy (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004;
Nabatchi, 2010). This contrasts with strict representative democracy in which the agency (via
the power given by elected officials) makes the decisions with less (or no) direct public input.
Delli Carpini and colleagues contend that participatory democracy is not an alternative to
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representative democracy, but rather an expansion of it. A more detailed discussion of
deliberative democracy is presented in Section 3.4.
Democracy theory holds that public participation is an “ideal of democracy” (Folk, 1991)
and results in a more active citizenry (Barnes, Newman, Knops, & Sullivan, 2003). Furthermore,
public participation can address power imbalances (Barnes et al., 2003; Beierle, 1998; Schroeter,
Scheel, Renn, & Schweizer, 2016), expand the scope of democracy (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et
al., 2005; Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Fung, 2006; Petts & Leach,
2000), and restores and strengthens democracy (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; Halvorsen,
2003; Lowndes, Pratchett, & Stoker, 2001; Moynihan, 2003; Tuler & Webler, 2010). It is also
viewed as the administrator’s obligation under democracy (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005),
and is considered a basic human right in a democracy (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Citizen
involvement in government decision-making also provides an opportunity to address issues of
environmental justice (Beierle, 1998; Brulle, 2010; Ferris, 1994; Probst, 2006; Schweitzer &
Stephenson, 2007; Tuler & Webler, 2010) and results in capacity building among individual
citizens and communities (Nalbandian, 1999). Citizen participation is a normative ideal under
democracy theory and “is an accepted foundation of democracy” and fosters legitimacy,
transparency and accountability (Nabatchi, 2012a). Democracy theory predicts that public
officials will support public involvement measures out of sense of inclusion and fairness, and to
address power imbalances.

Managerial Theory
Managerial theory addresses the performance of the public official’s job and the and the
efficient and effective performance of activities to achieve agency goals and objectives.
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Different aspects of the theoretical perspectives can predict increased motivation for the manager
to include the public in decision making as well as built in barriers to citizen involvement.
Managerial theory concepts of new public management (NPM), public service motivation (PSM)
of the administrator, and decision theory are discussed in the following sections.
New Public Management (NPM) is a broad spectrum of initiatives based on the
“Reinventing Government” movement of the 1980s and 1990s. NPM called for “fixing a broken
government by running it like a business” (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015). NPM includes
goals to reduce or reverse governmental growth, privatize as many functions of government,
increase entrepreneurial actions of public officials, automate government service delivery
through the increased use of technology, and institutionalizing government processes with a
focus on globalization of methods (R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Hood, 1991). Specific
components of NPM include performance measurement and allocation of resources based on this
evaluation, disaggregation of service delivery, competition within the agencies of government,
management styles that are like those of private organizations (including performance
incentives), and a focus on discipline (Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, & Tinkler, 2006; Hood,
1991). The concept presented in the seminal work Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector is one of “steering rather than rowing
the boat” (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The concept is that an administrator can help an agency
more effectively reach the desired endpoint by controlling the destination rather than the day-today means of production. According to Denhardt and Denhardt, what is lost in this scenario is
“who owns the boat?” and they suggest serving versus steering. The focus on efficiency,
production, performance evaluation and allocation clouds the picture of public involvement.
Citizens tend to make the business of governing a messy one. The alternative approach is one
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that includes service to the citizen as a key component of public administration (J. V. Denhardt
& Denhardt, 2015; R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). Denhardt and Denhardt (2000, pp. 553556) propose that NPM be modified to include the following approaches:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

“Serve, rather than steer …
The public interest is the aim, not the by-product …
Think strategically, act democratically …
Serve citizens, not customers …
Accountability isn’t simple. (e.g. Performance evaluation must include more
than a market analysis of service production) …
6. Value people, not just productivity …
7. Value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship …”

New Public Management theory predicts that the agency would be less likely to involve
the public in decision making, but the concepts of Denhardt and Denhardt, and like-minded
public administration scholars that followed, provide a powerful counterbalance to that approach.
Public Service Motivation (PSM) theory addresses the role of the individual manager in
delivery of public services. PSM incorporates the “public values, altruism and prosocial
behavior” (Andrews, 2016) to predict and describe the methods used by administrators in
delivering government services. The underlying concepts are that public servants are, at their
core, predisposed to “serve” and the efficient running of government becomes less important
than ensuring that services provided meet the needs of citizens. PSM theorizes that
administrators who are selected, trained and incentivized to incorporate citizen preferences into
the decision making and policy implementation processes will be even more likely to support or
even champion enhanced forms of public participation (Coursey, Yang, & Pandey, 2012; Huang
& Feeney, 2016). A nuanced view of this theory, from the perspective of the citizen, is
presented by Vigoda (2002), who claims that “neomanagerialism and NPM encourage a
passivity among the citizenry” (p. 533).
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Decision theory is an economics-based schema that addresses the manner in which
rational players will determine the optimum behavior in making choices (Zaccour, 2013). The
rational participant, in this case the agency or the agency manager, will make decisions based on
the established goals and objectives of a program, the information available to them and their
own assessment of the best outcome in each situation. The degree to which the managers
chooses to incorporate public participation in the process is dependent on the complexity of the
question or issue, the value that the public organization places on such involvement and their
own assessment of whether public participation will lead to a better outcome. The view on
public participation leading to a better outcome is especially salient for complex or highlytechnical decisions, where many managers and some citizens feel that the difficult decisions are
best left to experts (Folk, 1991).
Overall, the managerial theories are a bit of a mixed bag when it comes to predicting
agency desires and actions when it comes to public participation. Classic managerial theories
predict lower incidence or less energy to the participatory efforts, while public service and public
values predict a higher likelihood that the manager or agency will diligently pursue public input.

Diffusion of Innovation Theory
Diffusion of innovation theory (Abrahamson, 2013), for the most part, is a positive
predictor for an agency to include public participation efforts into policy implementation
decision. The manager (or agency) sees the efforts and outcomes for similar undertakings and
implements similar methods in their own projects. The manager (or agency) is part of a
community of practitioners (or organizations) that provide services (similar or not) to the public.
Through communication and direct observation within their work sphere, the methods employed
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by others or are part of an information distribution system that acknowledges and publicizes the
successful efforts to involve the public in the decision-making process. They then mimic and
adopt procedures or adapt the procedures to fit their circumstance. Similarly, a manager (or
agency) can feel the pressure to keep up with other agencies with which they are compared for
evaluation purposes. This diffusion can occur horizontally - from locality to locality or state to
state - or vertically - from federal agencies to states or states to municipalities (Daley, 2008).
Diffusion of innovation can have a positive effect on the growth of participatory processes as
well, when advancements are made with each iteration of the involvement process. This concept
of learning by seeing and improving by doing can be a mechanism for continual improvement.
Innovation includes adoption by others, advanced rates of adoption with time, development and
adoption of improved methods, and the adoption of methods by unexpected participants in the
process. This adoption can be increased if the agency (or others) put in place mechanisms or
incentives in place to induce innovation (Popp, Newell, & Jaffe, 2010) or increase the range or
rate of diffusion.
There is a potential deterrent within this theory; if the original public participation effort
was deemed a failure, there is a likelihood that the observing manager or agency will eschew
efforts to more actively engage the public. In whole, the diffusion of innovation theory predicts
an increased use of participatory methods and continual improvement of the methods employed.

Organizational Theories
Classic organizational theory speaks to public participation in policy decisions and
implementation through the lenses of hierarchal bureaucracy theory, scientific management,
institutional theory, resource dependence theory, and transaction cost economics. Most, but not
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all, of the theoretical concepts of organizational theory would predict a lower likelihood of
involving the public; it is “messy”, inefficient and potentially unproductive (Roberts, 2008).
Hierarchal bureaucracy theory dates to the beginnings of public administration
scholarship and is founded on the concepts of professional administration of government where
the administrator is the expert in implementing policy decisions and implements policy through
discretion (Frederickson, 1982; O'Leary, 2010). Specialization, departmentalization of decisions
and roles, and compliance to established rules and regulations govern the performance of the
administrators duties (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; Hood, 1991; Nabatchi, 2010; Vigoda,
2002). With the many uncertainties that come from citizen participation in decision-making, the
security of organizational procedure will reduce the propensity for the administrator to actively
involve the public in more than a cursory manner.
Scientific management theory, which dates to the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
outlines the “optimal” relationship between workers and management, presents a methodology
for division of labor and specialization, proposes the use of science as opposed to “rules of
thumb” for achieving efficiency in management (Taylor, 1911). The concepts presented were
ground breaking at their time, proposing that more efficient processes could result from more
cooperative, although structured and prescriptive, relations between management and workers,
rather than the harsh approaches normally invoked during that time period. The methods
presented would be considered Draconian by today’s standards, but were revolutionary when
presented. While Taylor’s audience was primarily the private firm, the principles were adopted
by many early public officials and scholars for the performance of public administration (Hood,
1991; Nabatchi, 2010). Modern organizational theory has modified or even rejected many of the
principles of scientific management; nonetheless some foundation principles of scientific
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management have been incorporated into business practice such as management by objective
(MBO), total quality management (TQM) and even some of public administration’s New
Performance Management (NPM) movement (Wagner-Tsukamato, 2013). While scientific
management theory does not preclude the inclusion of public preferences, the focus on efficiency
and a well-defined bureaucracy and a mechanistic division of labor would predict less
involvement in decision making.
Institutional theory attempts to explain organization behavior based on concepts that are
sometimes contrary to conventional economic theory. Institutional theory predicts
organizational actions that will result in organizational stability and survival (Suddaby, 2013).
Underlying concepts of institutional theory (and its successor neo-institutional theory) that
inform actions related to public participation are those of organizational values, formal structure
and the concomitant rules and norms of behavior, “rational myths” that bely activities as opposed
to reasoning behind organizational behavior, maintenance of organization legitimacy, ceremonial
activities that are rooted in previous behavior without proper context in the moment, and
“isomorphism” or conformity of action and structures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert &
Zucker, 2013).
A prime 2 example of institutional theory is the “institutional pot-roast”. A newlywed
couple was preparing their first Sunday lunch together when the husband proceeded to cut both
ends off the roast and set them aside. When his bride asked why he did this, he replied “I’m not
sure, but that’s the way my mother always did it.” Upon asking his mother the next time he
spoke about the rationale behind it, she stated “I don’t know, but that’s the way my mother
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Pun intended.
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always did it.” The next time he spoke with his grandmother, he asked her too about the origins
of the practice. She couldn’t recall having done this before and after a while recalled “Oh yes,
when we were first married the only roasting pan we had was too small for the roast that the
butcher always sold and I had to cut off the ends to fit it in the pan.” This is too often how
organizational behaviors are passed down to subsequent managers.
While institutional theory has continually evolved to better explain organizational
adaptation and change (Suddaby, 2010), the core concepts of institutional theory point to an
organization that is slow to change, slow to give up accumulated power and less likely to involve
outsiders (i.e., the public) in problem definition and solving and decision making.
All organizations interact in some manner with other organizations to achieve their goals
and objectives. Resource dependence theory describes the way organizations and individuals
will modify or adapt their behavior to gain resources from outside sources for effective
achievement of goals, or even for survival. Resources include legitimacy, funding, inputs for
production, and distribution systems (Pfeffer, 2013). In the context of public participation, the
most important resources are legitimacy and information. By involving citizens in decisionmaking, the agency can increase its legitimacy with the public and thereby increase the chances
for public support of the decision. In many instances, information from the public (either
technical information or community preferences) may be a key component to crafting a
successful solution. Additionally, outside resources (funding or organizational support) may
depend on the agency incorporating public preferences in a meaningful way. This dependence
can be subverted by powerful agents with an agenda for excluding the public. While there are
usually procedures in place to counteract these methods, it is possible that one party in a process
can provide disincentives to public involvement in exchange for their continued participation in
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the process. Resource dependence theory predicts a higher likelihood that the agency will adopt
an inclusive attitude to the public in decision making.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) addresses the methods by which an organization goes
about the business of performing its work in an efficient manner. The founding principles of
TCE lie in a firm’s decision to produce their own goods and services or to outsource them,
considering the cost of entering transactions (Williamson, 2010). The absolute, or perfect,
application of TCE can predict whether governance (not to be confused with governing or
government) of the organization and the production of goods and services will occur through
either hierarchy (internal production) or markets (transactions).

There are numerous hybrids

that exist between markets and hierarchies, especially in public organizations. The application of
TCE to public organizations applies different analytical lenses because of the nature of the public
bureaucracy, the existence of different incentives in public bureaucracies, different goals for
public entities, the presence of “probity” (or loyalty to the cause), and the fact that outsourcing
may not be an option for some outputs (Williamson, 1999). In the context of public
participation, the fundamental TCE question is whether the cost of public involvement (in terms
of process efficiency and a potentially suboptimal decision) is greater than the increased benefit
from public participation in the process. The costs incurred by the manager or agency in public
participation can be real dollars, time, inefficiency or the stress or uncertainty introduced into the
process.
Since many of the costs and benefits of participatory programs are difficult (if not
impossible) to quantify, managers have difficulty in assessing the value of the added interaction.
TCE predicts that agencies and managers will be less likely to accept and promote public
involvement into decision-making processes.
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3.1.2 Theories from the Citizens’ Perspective (Internal)
This section presents the theoretical bases for public participation from the viewpoint of
the community or citizenry. There are theoretical concepts that predict an increased willingness
of citizens to pursue participatory processes – democracy (and deliberative democracy) theory,
certain economic and organizational theories (rational choice theory, and contingency theory),
certain sociological theories (social movement and legitimacy theories), and diffusion of
innovation theory. There are also theories that predict a reluctance or negative likelihood of the
public to engage in the policy process – economic theories (transaction cost economics and
principal/agent theory). In addition, some theories include concepts that positively predict
citizen action as well as concepts that predict a reluctance to participate – resource dependence
theory, social capital theory and network theory.
Figure 3-2 depicts the theories applicable to citizen group or community decisions related
to public participation processes. As with theories that are applicable to the agency side of the
decision, there is overlap in the theoretical constructs described in the following sections, such as
social capital and network theory. Several of these theories were described in Section 3.1.1 and
the discussion in this section focuses on the aspects that apply to the citizenry.

Democracy Theory
Democracy Theory from the perspective of the agency was discussed in Section 3.1.1.
From the citizens’ perspective, democracy theory addresses imbalances of power between the
citizenry and private interests or between groups within the public that are presenting different
preferences (Barnes et al., 2003; Beierle, 1998; Schroeter et al., 2016), allows the public to
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express their preferences in a policy setting (Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014), can result in a better
educated and more active public (Hourdequin et al., 2012), increase civism (Frederickson, 1982),
address issues of inequity and injustice (Schweitzer & Stephenson, 2007), and build the capacity
of citizens to participate in democratic decisions (Nalbandian, 1999). It can also build trust in
the government where trust is fragile or non-existent (Halvorsen, 2003) as well relieve the
frustration that have with bureaucratic agencies and managers (Moynihan, 2003).
Nabatchi (2010) identifies two fundamental concerns with the future of democracy,
public administration and citizen faith in government – the citizenship deficit and the democracy
deficit - that can be addressed through a diligent development and inclusion of deliberative
democracy. Deliberative democracy is a specialized form of public participation and the ways
that public participation can address democracy and citizenship deficits are discussed in detail in
Section 3.4. The citizenship deficit is “an erosion of civil society and civic engagement and
more specifically to an erosion of civic skills and dispositions among the general public” (p.378).
Public participation also addresses issues such as the citizenship deficit and the democracy
deficit. The democracy deficit is “a situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and
governments, are seen as falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices
or operation” (p.378).
Frederickson (1982) identified the concepts of “high citizenship” and low “citizenship”
(p.503). In high citizenship “citizens are free, equal, and engaged with one another in pursuing
matters of high and distinctive import”. Low citizenship is a setting that fails to achieve these
ideals, and he states that many scholars propose that high citizenship is an unattainable ideal. He
surmises that the growth of direct democracy (public participation) is needed to move citizenry
toward high citizenship.
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Economic and Organizational Theories
Transaction Cost Economics with respect to the agency is discussed in Section 3.1.1.
Transaction cost economics, from the public’s perspective, predicts a lower likelihood of
participation in policy decisions as there are sometimes significant costs to participate. First,
there is typically a large gap in the information needed to participate and the information
available to the public (Laurian, 2003). Obtaining this information requires an investment on the
part of the citizen. Second, the participatory process can be time consuming and citizens may be
reluctant to invest in the process. Third, the outcomes of the process are typically unknown and
the lack of trust in government to utilize public input in a meaningful way will present a barrier
to participation that many citizens are not willing to overcome.
Resource dependence theory is discussed in Section 3.1.1. Community groups often lack
the resources to come together and present preferences on policy issues and, in this way, can be a
negative predictor of public participation when communities lack the necessary resources
(Mitchell, O'Leary, & Gerard, 2015). This lack of resources can include time, funds, expertize,
or even basic information on the issue. Participatory programs (such as the TAG addressed in
this study) can provide many of these resources and increase the likelihood of public
participation. The lack of such a support and incentive program, or significant co-funding
requirements (as with the TAG program), can present resource barriers to participation.
Principal agent theory in public administration is focused on the relationship between
elected officials (the principal) and the implementing body or individual (the agent) (Worsham,
2011). The agent acts on behalf of the principle to carry out the work of government. Issues
arise when the agent is either unable (because of poor selection, training or goal communication)
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or unwilling (based on a conflict between the agent’s self-interest and the principal’s objectives
or information asymmetry). The problem with public participation is that the citizen does not
overtly appear in either side of the principal-agent paradigm. Therefore, it is unlikely that the
citizen or community group has faith that the agency (or manager) will act on their behalf and
will be more likely to participate in policy decisions.
Contingency theory is based on the central theme that an organization (in this case the
public or a community group) will adapt in such a way that its needs are met or goals can be
achieved (Lorsch, 2013). In this case of public participation, this means that if a policy decision
is important enough to the public then the group will participate in the policy process.
Contingency theory not only predicts that citizens will participate if the stakes are high enough,
but can also predict the way they will choose to participate. Contingency theory contends that
there is no best way to organize or operate and is used to describe organizational adaptations to
environment, including the policy type, governmental actions, opposing viewpoints in the
process and degree of severity of the issue.
Rational choice theory governs the ways that actors and organizations will behave and
make choices in given situations. Rational choice theory states that an actor (in this case the
public or an individual) will act in a self-interested manner (within the constraints of information
and options available) and will choose to act to derive the highest benefit to cost ratio for
themselves (Jin Lee & Sang Yoo, 2012). Many times there is there is a conflict between the
interest of the individual and the interest of the community at large (Delli Carpini et al., 2004).
If such an individual is altruistic, then the choice will be made to increase the overall benefit to
the organization or community. For the organization, rational choice theory suggests that the
organization will take resource inputs (information, rules, materials) and convert them into
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outputs (goods, services, policies) in as efficient a manner as possible (Suchman, 1995).
According to Nabatchi (2012), “deliberation is seldom so neat and structured because of
emotional, values-based, and other non-technical reactions” (p.8) presenting a barrier to rational
decision making. Rational choice theory for the public or potentially impacted community
predicts that, as long as the issue is big enough and the benefit high enough, then citizens will
choose to invest in the decision process, voice their preferences and be a part of crafting
solutions. As a counterpoint to rational choice, Koontz and Thomas (2006) state that individuals
tend to exaggerate the positives of participation to rationalize their participatory efforts.

Sociological Theories
Social movement theory describes the drivers and impact of group mobilization to act to
challenge the status quo, take on more powerful adversaries, or affect change in their
environment. In addition, it presents the settings in which social movements will be impactful
(B. G. King & McDonnel, 2013). Social movement theory also incorporates the concepts of
collective behavior, issue framing, mobilization of resources, rational choice and actions to
address real or perceived injustices. Social movements consist of committed citizens to “identify
problems, develop solutions and pressure governments” and allow citizens to take actions in line
with public preferences (Brulle, 2010). Social movement theory predicts that citizens will
participate in policy decisions if three conditions are met; 1) the issues are hand are concrete and
defined in manner that is clear, 2) the issues are significant and will have a direct impact on the
citizens, and 3) the citizens feel that their voice will be heard and they can make a difference
(Webler, 1999).
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Social capital theory speaks to relationship issues that apply to growth and involvement
of groups in common endeavors. It includes concepts of reciprocity, trust and cooperation.
Social capital theory can speak to precedent; if you have existing relationships, credibility, a
history of successful relations and trust then you are more likely to engage in a participatory
process (Ansell & Gash, 2007). Similarly, low social capital (trust or previous experiences)
reduces the ability to resolve conflicts (Beierle, 1998). Social capital theory can speak to
outcomes; participation in citizen engagement helps to build social capital, which in turn
strengthens democracy (Cooper et al., 2006). More inclusive, discursive, and frequent forms of
participation help to build social capital (relationships and trust) and improve the participatory
process (Barnes et al., 2003; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).
Legitimacy theory addresses the concept of an organization (in this case the group
desiring to represent the community) performing in a manner that is acceptable and recognized
within its operating environment (Bhattacharyya, 2015). Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values and definitions” (p. 574).
With legitimacy, community groups have credibility and continuity and will be more impactful
in policy decisions if they are recognized by the larger community and government agencies to
make valid claims on policy or implementation strategies. A single individual, in the absence of
legitimation, can be seen as “a troublemaker” or a “rebel” and have little to no impact on agency
decisions. A group of citizens, organized for action and with more legitimacy, can have
significant impact on policy decisions.

Diffusion of Innovation
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Diffusion of innovation theory (discussed in Section 3.1.1 for the government agency)
predicts that a community group will adopt the mechanisms that have been positively utilized by
groups in a similar setting. Knowledge of these prior practices can come from other community
groups or through information provided by the public agency. This is a factor that is mentioned
in almost every case investigated in this research as discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
Communities learn not only about methods to address problems but also about issues in which
they should be interested in through diffusive means.

Network Theory
Network Theory addresses the interactions of individuals within groups and interactions
between groups in the performance of activities to do the work of the organization to achieve
goals and objectives of the organization. Core to social network theory is that “relationships
matter and structure matters” (DeJordy, 2013). The relationships provide the avenues for
interaction and structure provides the opportunity for impactful work to be performed. Network
theory describes the linkages (formal and informal) between groups and builds on the concepts
of social capital, diffusion of innovation, and resource dependence. Social capital (relationships,
trust) can be the building of networks and work to build networks where none exist or are in their
infancy (Innes & Booher, 2004).
Some of the concepts of network theory that are important to public participation are
reciprocity, the “strength” of ties, and structural holes (Lee & Kim, 2011). Reciprocity is
presented as an extension of self-interested behavior. For instance, individuals and groups may
perform actions that have no immediate benefit for the issue at hand. This can be done to build a
relationship and strengthen the network. The continued performance of such actions builds a
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relationship and enhances trust between actors that can provide the basis for long-term and
positive interaction.
The strength of ties (or connections between network members) is based on frequency
and quality of interaction, emotional bonds, and “reciprocity” between the members
(Granovetter, 1973). It was initially proposed that strong ties were more influential within
networks but later work identified the “strength of weak ties”, or the concept that higher volume
of members with less frequent interaction can provide even more network influence. Further to
this is that too many strong ties result in a necessary reduction in weak ties (after all time and
emotional energy are scarce resources) and a heterogeneity of ideas within strong ties. Many
weak ties can lead to numerous “introductions” and a contagion-like spread of networks for the
motivated community advocate.
The concept of structural holes refers to the density of a network and the number of
connections between members of the network. A sparse network with many structural holes will
have a few non-substitutable members who are at the core of interactions between the members.
A dense network with few structural holes will have multiple connections between members and
less reliance on central members (Lee & Kim, 2011). Two ideas are important here; 1) a
network with few structural holes will increase the likelihood of diffusion of information and
ideas throughout the network, resulting in a more effective network and 2) a structure with many
structural holes will result in members striving to “fill the gaps” and make connections to meet
the needs of the organization (as predicted by contingency and resource dependency theories).
In summary, vibrant and growing networks can elicit community support, provide opportunities
for resource sharing, enhancement of power, and sharing of information and ideas.
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3.1.3 Theories of Process and Performance
This section presents the theoretical bases for the process of public participation, looking
at both the process design and process performance perspectives. These theories surmise how
participation should be performed and how successful the participatory programs will be. As
discussed in Section 3.9, the concept of success is not value-neutral and most of the evaluation of
public participation has focused on normative success and not policy outcome success and theory
follows this pattern. Figure 3-3 depicts the theories applicable to design and implementation of
participatory programs.
The concepts of deliberative democracy outline the need for and drivers for success of
citizen engagement processes. Deliberative democracy has been defined (p. 384) as the process
of “infusing the government decision-making process with reasoned discussion and the
collective judgements of citizens; it connects public participation in public decision making to
the practice of deliberation” (Nabatchi, 2010). Deliberative democracy, whose implementation
is discussed in more detail in Section 3.8, expands upon indirect democracy (i.e. voting) and
other forms of direct democracy, such as public hearings, public comment hearings, and advisory
committees (Delli Carpini et al., 2004). It includes a more discursive and communicative process
that is characterized by two-way communication and reasoned processing of information, values
and preferences. Deliberative democracy presents the basis for the most inclusive and powerful
forms of public participation.
Communicative action theory outlines the requirements for attaining the "ideal speech
situation" or ISS (Palerm, 2000; Webler, 1999). The core concepts of the ISS incorporate the
concepts of inclusiveness, equality and validity of input from participants, valid challenges to
inputs from other participants and equal opportunity to participate in final decisions.
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Implementation of the ISS for public participation is discussed further in Section 3.4.
Communicative action theory identifies the design features for useful, inclusive and complete
participation.
Conflict resolution theory presents the framework for successful deliberation and solution
of issues in an adversarial situation or one in which different groups have different desired
outcomes. Conflict resolution theory is premised in effective communication, identifies different
conflict styles, is based upon development of interpersonal skills, builds upon the concepts of
identifying interest to be attained instead of focusing on positional statements, based in
consensus building, and incorporates ideas presented in deliberative democracy (Beierle, 1998;
L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005; O'Leary, 2010). Another concept within conflict resolution
theory is that the process itself leads to process improvements – the more you are engaged in
conflict resolution the better the you get at it (O'Leary & Pizzarella, 2008). This is consistent
with the deliberative democracy of thick participation, where more frequent and meaningful
interactions result in a better foundation for future deliberative encounters (Nabatchi &
Leighninger, 2015).
Collaborative governance theory defines collaborative governance as a “governing
arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a
collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that
aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell & Gash,
2007, p. 544). While only the most inclusive public participation processes are truly
collaborative governance, the concept of direct engagement and inclusion (not just consultation
or informing), building consensus, and including the public in the information gathering,
synthesis and evaluation process are all applicable to enhance the quantity and quality of public
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participation (L. Bingham, Nabatchi, et al., 2005). A collaborative governance approach to
citizen engagement is presented as the pinnacle of the civic engagement spectrum, which ranges
from adversarial and electoral to informative to deliberative to a “citizen-centered collaborative
public management” (Cooper et al., 2006).
Network theory relative to formation of community groups is discussed in Section 3.1.2.
The important concepts of network theory relative to process design and performance are says
that the concepts of collaborative learning (Ackerlund, 2011; McKinney & Harmon, 2002;
Webler & Tuler, 2006), the importance of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973; Lee & Kim, 2011) and
the ability to learn about processes from those in your network (a form of diffusion of
innovation). The presence and health of a network community enhance the chance of success of
public participation.
Managerial theories relative to agency decisions to adopt participatory methods are
discussed in Section 3.1.1. Scientific management theory, transaction cost economics and
decision analysis theory all play important roles in the development and implementation of
participatory programs. Typical bureaucratic agencies (especially technical agencies like the
Environmental Protection Agency) will be more receptive and respond better to well-designed
programs with clear goals and objectives, clear communication with links to action (Fung, 2004),
efficient implementation procedures that enhance rather than hinder the problem-solving process,
and processes that are formulated in a manner that articulates the benefits to the decision making.

3.2

History of public participation
The public having a strong and direct voice in the decisions that government makes goes

by a variety of names – direct democracy; public, resident or citizen participation; community,
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citizen or stakeholder involvement; citizen, public, community or civic engagement; public
deliberation; participatory governance; “democracy in action”, “getting democracy”, “the heart
of democracy”, and deliberative democracy (Nabatchi & Amsler, 2014; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010).
This section presents a concise history of the progression of public participation efforts in the
U.S.
The idea that citizens should have an active role in these policy decisions dates to the
founding of the country. Eighteenth century New England town hall meetings, while limited in
access, provided the opportunity for citizens to make many of the governing decisions of the
community (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). Nineteenth century advances included the
formation of numerous special interest associations to address governance issues surrounding
farming businesses (the Farmer’s Alliance), urban economic, health and environmental issues
(Hull House and the first workers’ unions), cultural division (populism and the Populist Party),
governmental accountability and reform (the Progressive reforms) and environmental
conservation, including popular literature (Thoreau and Emerson), naturist art (the Hudson River
School), and the activist movements of John Muir and the Sierra Club (Merchant, 2007;
Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).
One of the early social environmental movements was the battle over Hetch Hetchy from
the 1890s through the 1910s. Hetch Hetchy was a natural valley within the confines of Yosemite
Park and very similar to the area of El Capitan within the same park. Officials of San Francisco
proposed to dam the valley to create a much-needed water supply reservoir for the City. The
effort was opposed by preservationists and conservationists and was a catalyst to the formation
of the Sierra Club under the direction of John Muir. A decades-long battle ensued and the
damming of the valley and construction of the reservoir was approved by Congress. While many
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considered the efforts a losing battle, the community and capacity building that took place
resulted in a formation of a movement that was cohesive and powerful enough to successfully
oppose similar National Park dam proposals in the 20th century, including the proposed
construction of a similar reservoir in the Grand Canyon’s Colorado River valley.

Muir’s (left) and San Francisco’s
(right)
Hetch Hetchy Valley.

Progress in the area of public participation has typically coincided with other major
political movements in the United States (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; Roberts, 2008;
Thomas, 1995), including the aforementioned Progressive Movement of the late 1800s. Citizen
involvement in government advanced with the passage of the New Deal in the 1930s (Roberts,
2008). Urban renewal efforts of the 1940s incorporated “blue ribbon commissions”, a more
elitist form of participation, in lieu of meaningful public input by the affected populace on
community development decisions.
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 incorporated public notice and comment into
the rulemaking process (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). Significant changes in the role of the
citizenry were also found in the social changes that accompanied the Great Society and Civil
Rights movements of the 1960s (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; Roberts, 2008; Thomas, 1995).
The most significant leap forward, especially in the area of environmental policy, was
during the 1970s following the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of
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1969 and the wave of administrative responses and environmental activism that ensued (Depoe
& Delicath, 2004; Graham, 2004; Smith, 2013). The NEPA process impacted the role of public
participation on two fronts. First, it formalized the process for public involvement for most
governmental agencies and provided direction for those citizens who had an active interest in
influencing political decision-making. Second, it provided a set of rules with which
administrators were required to comply in seeking out and incorporating public opinion. These
rules prescribed a method that was more of the notice, inform, and convince variety and, while
not deliberative in nature, were an advancement of the process of inclusion (Applegate, 1998).
The 1990s presented a time of change for public involvement as the pendulum swung
from encouraging participatory efforts to a focus on administrative efficiency and back again as
public administration and public management struggle to “find itself”. With the New Public
Management (NPM) movement in the 1990s, administrators were held to higher standard of
accountability to the citizen and the citizen took on the role of client instead of subject of the
governing body (Thomas, 1995). Citizen input then took the form of New Public Involvement
(NPI) with a focal change from policy implementation to policy decision-making (ibid, pp. 3-4).
New forms of citizen groups began to emerge and the role and potential impact of the citizen was
enhanced. Within the NPM movement, there was change from citizen inclusion to a focus on
efficient service delivery, outsourcing of government functions to private organizations, and an
impersonal nature to the administrative function (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).
The 1980s and 1990s also saw the growth of community action in opposition to
environmental pollution and development of infrastructure (landfills, power plants, incinerators,
etc.) in their neighborhoods. This Not In My Back Yard or NIMBY movement, signaled a
rebirth of community activism in land use decisions (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).

46

The New Public Service movement of the late 1990s and 2000s again focused on the
enhanced the role of citizen by acknowledging that the citizen was not a consumer or client of
government, but the owner of government (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; R. B. Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2000). The move to greater citizen involvement includes concepts of collaborative
public governance that defined the citizen as one of the collaborators, deliberative democracy,
and involvement of citizens in ever-increasing roles in the decision making process (Cooper et
al., 2006; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Fung, 2015; Nabatchi, Ertinger, & Leighninger, 2015;
Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).
The current decade has seen an increase in the use of technology – the dissemination of
information through internet resources, the use of the internet for preference gathering and
community building, and the growth of social media for participation (J. V. Denhardt &
Denhardt, 2015; Fung, 2015; Huang & Feeney, 2016; Nabatchi, 2012a, 2012b; Nabatchi &
Amsler, 2014; Nabatchi et al., 2015). In addition, public administration and citizen engagement
scholars have developed advanced strategies for involvement and encouraged the move from
theory to action (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). More detail on these
recent developments is presented in Section 3.4.

3.3

Goals and drivers for public participation
The drivers, goals and objectives for public involvement in policy setting and

implementation are numerous. As stated in Section 2.1, they date back to the founding of the
country and rest on the “desire for a strong democracy” (Thomas 1995, p. 3) in which the citizen
not only had the right to influence governmental decisions but the responsibility to do so.
Beierle and Cayford (2002) state that “(t)he purpose of participation has shifted from merely
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providing accountability to developing the substance of policy" (p.5) and that in highly-technical
policy settings "(o)ne reason that participation has become more central to environmental
decision making is an expectation that it can temper the confrontational politics that typify
environmental policy" (p.5).
Beierle (1998) and Beierle and Cayford (2002) identify the following “social goals” of
public participation:
•
•
•
•
•
•

“To incorporate public values into decisions;
To improve the substantive quality of decisions;
To resolve conflict among competing interests;
To build trust in institutions;
To educate and inform the public; and
To achieve cost-effectiveness.”

Innes and Booher (2004, p.422) identify the following purposes of public participation; 1)
to understand and incorporate public preferences into decisions, 2) to obtain information from
the public that can be used to improve decision-making, 3) to address inequities in the policy
determination, 4) to provide the agency with legitimacy in decision-making, 5) because it is
legally required, 6) to build community capacity for continued participation in the work of
government, and 7) to create an “adaptive, self-organizing polity” to address more difficult
future problems.
Addition goals of public participation are to attain fairness and completeness, “getting
democracy” (C. S. King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998), to obtain justice (Fung, 2004), even if “justice is
an elusive goal” (Fung, 2015), and to get to better technically and socially acceptable decisions
(Folk, 1991). Recent advances in participatory methods (such as deliberative democracy) and
the additional expectations of these more inclusive forms of public are presented in Section 3.10.

48

Typologies and methods of public participation

3.4

The decision to enhance public participation in a policy setting may be the easy part; one
then must determine how to implement. Once the decision is made (or mandated), the design
and selection of participatory methods can make or break the process. Successful outcomes from
public participation processes - regardless of how success is defined - hinge on this selection, the
decision by administrators to fully embrace public participation, and the details of the
implementation phase.
Public participation can take many forms – public hearings, public comment on proposed
rulemaking, citizen advisory committees and more recently public involvement in regulatory
negotiations, mediations, and collaborative and deliberative efforts to engage and involve the
public in policy decisions (Beierle, 1998; Koontz, 2005; Richardson, 2003). The understanding
of participatory methods begins with Arnsein’s “ladder of participation” (Arnstein, 1971).
The ladder of participation, presented here, 3 presents a
typology of participation methods ranging from “nonparticipation”
(manipulation and therapy) to “tokenism” (informing, consulting, and
placating), to “citizen control” (partnership, delegation, and
ultimately citizen control). This early summary of methods has been
utilized by recent scholars as the starting point for discussions on the
level of involvement and control that is afforded the public in the
decision-making process. In this vein, Applegate (1998) characterizes participation as basic
review and comment, enhanced review and comment (which typically adds the dimension of
“live” discussion and response to comments), regulatory negotiation (which includes all

3

The image of Arnstein’s Ladder was reproduced from Vancouver, British Columbia’s “The Citizen’s
Handbook” website (http://www.vcn.bc.ca/citizens-handbook/arnsteinsladder.html).
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impacted parties), and includes citizen advisory boards (CABs) at the most inclusive end of the
spectrum. Applegate does not address more inclusive deliberative processes, as his study was a
legal-centric evaluation of CABs.
Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015) identify the various forms of citizen participation as
conventional, thin or thick. Conventional participation includes activities such as public
meetings with preset agendas and structured presentation and question and answer components.
Thin participation includes many online participatory efforts as well as two-way communication
methods in which citizens can quickly provide information and indicate preferences for action.
By contrast, thick participation includes deliberative dialogue between agencies and citizens
(often “large numbers of people, working in small groups”) and includes recruitment of
individuals to construct a large, diverse group of actors; allows individuals to “tell their stories,”
hear and understand the motivations of other citizens, learn about the details of the issue, and
frame the issues in ways that matter to them; and helps the assembled group to develop a
consensus on a decision strategy. “Generally, it (thick participation) is the most meaningful and
powerful of the three forms of direct participation, but also the most intensive and timeconsuming and the least common” (ibid, p. 14).
Webler and Tuler (2006) identify the following categories of participatory methods for
complex scientific policy issues:
•

Science-centered stakeholder consultation, which is action oriented and conforms
to Arnstein’s “informing” activity;

•

Egalitarian deliberation, “empowering participants and is a reaction against
dominance of the agency” (p. 711) and conforms to Arnstein’s “placation” mode;
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•

Efficient cooperation, which increases citizen involvement, allowing
recommendations on action from the public conforming to Arnstein’s
“partnership”; and

•

Informed democratic collaboration, which results in higher levels of partnership
and engenders additional trust and legitimacy in the agency decision.

None of Webler and Tuler’s methods of engagement result in any form of full citizen
control of the decision process.
The choice of method also informs the form of resultant democracy. The ensuing form of
democracy can be adversarial, such as that found in social movements; electoral or representative
democracy, with choices flowing indirectly through voting and supporting causes; democracy in
the form of administrative information exchange, including standard public hearing approaches,
civil encouragement and growth that results in capacity building of the citizenry; or deliberative
democracy, resulting in true dialogue and collaboration between the agency and the public
(Cooper et al., 2006; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015). The further
along the inclusion spectrum the method moves, the more the process moves from “hierarchy,
specialization and impersonality” toward the ideals of “equality, participation and individualism”
(Vigoda, 2002). In the absence of deliberative processes, the form of “participation” may be
more akin to convincing citizens that the announced agency decision announced is the best
decision with no true citizen input.
Methodological perspectives for public participation address both macro level (or
conceptual) and micro level (or detailed implementation) aspects. At the macro level, the key
aspects of public participation are the decision of who participates, how much power and
information is shared, how the relational component of the process will be nurtured, the role of
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consensus building in the process, how education of the public will take place, and how the
implementation phase will unfold (Cooper et al., 2006; Thomas, 1995; Weeks, 2000). At the
micro level, one key criterion is the choice of a specific method of public involvement. For
example, will the process include public notice, community advisory groups, open public
meetings, citizen panels or deliberative methodologies?
Cooper et al (2006), identify five dimensions for consideration in the design of civic
engagement (pp 84-85):
•

Who is involved? The “right public” must be identified and chosen, addressing issues of
trust, efficiency and competence as well as the cost of the participation process;

•

Who initiates the civic engagement? If the governing agency initiates (top down), citizens
themselves initiate (bottom up), or interested associations initiate (external forces) the
resultant form of the engagement process will vary;

•

Why are citizens involved? Do they want to influence the creation of policy or drive the
methods of implementation;

•

Where, in the government landscape, does engagement take place? Participatory efforts
for local decisions are different for local, state and federal agency decision-making
bodies;

•

How are citizens involved? Different methods must be employed to process questions
and comments from those to encourage deliberation to understand community
preferences and gather valuable information from the community.
The quality of the communication process is also important to the participation process.

An incorporation of Habermas’ theory of communicative action and “ideal speech situation”, or
ISS, is presented by Webler and modified by Palerm (2000, p. 586-587). The ISS for meaningful
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and discursive participation necessary to afford fair and competent decisions includes the
following elements:
“1. Anyone person or group who considers themselves to be potentially affected by the
results of a discourse must have an equal opportunity to attend the discourse and
participate.
2. Every discourse participant must have an equal opportunity to make validity claims to
comprehensibility, truth, fairness, normative rightness, and sincerity.
3. Every discourse participant must have an equal opportunity to challenge the validity
claims to comprehensibility, truth, rightness or sincerity made by others.
4. Every discourse participant must have an equal opportunity to influence the choice of
how the final determination of validity will be made and to determine discourse
closure (i.e. to decide when there is no consensus.”
The vantage point of the observer is also important. The key questions for public
participation look very different from the viewpoint of the administrator as opposed to the
viewpoint of the citizen. Thomas (1995) outlines the process of public participation from the
viewpoint of the administrator and identifies three relevant approaches to public involvement.
The public decision-making approach is a deliberative and collaborative effort and is the most
open form of public participation he considers. This approach can be employed if there is
relatively low risk to the quality of the decision by involving the public. If, however, the public
does not share the goals of the agency, he posits that a “unitary consultation approach” may be
more desirable. In this case, the public is informed and consulted, but the agency is not bound to
abide by public wishes. In the event where there exist differing views of the path forward among
groups of the citizenry, a “segmented consensus-building approach” is appropriate. Thomas’
view on selection of who participates is also organizational-centric. He claims that the choice is
usually made based on what the public can add to the process. The choice typically is between
including those who can provide additional information and including those who can assist in the
implementation of the process. Decisions regarding the role of the public in the participatory
process are also based on the agency’s interest. The choices include involving the public for
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informing them only, to engender approval for the decision, or to build strong relationships for
the benefit of future interactions.
Other scholars take a very different view of the selection processes, with a focus on the
benefit to the public not the organization (Fung, 2006). The decision of who participates (to
provide representative makeup), how communication is performed, and how the communication
is turned into decisions are at the core of the selection process and the selection criteria are
evaluated based on benefit to the public. Still others (Wang, 2001) advocate a “genuine” process
that puts the decision-making impetus squarely on the citizens, with the agency serving in a role
to “set goals, provide incentives, monitor processes, and provide information” (p. 402).
Petts and Leach (2000) identify the variety of public participation methods available to
policy makers, discuss the features of a good public participation process and present a model for
evaluating the effectiveness of the public involvement methods.
One of the themes of public participation that runs through the literature is that the
makeup of the community has significant influence on the public input process. This can be the
result of the size and activist tendencies of the community (Koontz, 2005), the preferences of the
community (Greenberg & Lewis, 2000), the unequal share of cost (in dollars or other impact) to
be borne by the local community to address a larger social issue (Richardson, 2003; Upreti &
van der Horst, 2004), or whether the community has the resources or skill set to successfully
participate.
From a micro perspective, Bartsh (2003) has written a primer on public participation in
brownfields programs that is designed to guide all stakeholders (the public, developers,
investors, city and state officials) through a successful public involvement process. The basic
steps include developing a shared community vision, encouraging community involvement
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(including defining the representatives of the community and developing the participatory
process), and overcoming barriers to accomplish the stated vision. Bartsh goes on to identify
common success factors for public participation processes to include proper identification of all
stakeholders (i.e., making sure that the broad community is involved), developing knowledge of
and thereby a trust of actors in the process (“leaders”), clear, effective and honest
communication, developing an understanding of resource difficulties, and building on small wins
to “promote successes.”

3.5

Benefits of public participation
The determination of the benefits gained from public participation in policy setting and

implementation depends somewhat on the lens through which one views the participation
process. Some scholars believe that participation is an end unto itself in striving for greater
democracy (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Folk, 1991; Frederickson, 1982; Hourdequin et al., 2012;
Nabatchi, 2012b; Vigoda-Gadot, Eldor, & Schohat, 2013). Other scholars propose that
participation (maybe additionally) is a means to an end; and that end is a more informed process,
a public that has been included to optimize the decision-making, and improved outcomes. The
benefits of public participation can include the incorporation of technical and community
knowledge from the public that may have been overlooked or not available to public officials
prior to the participation process (Petts & Leach, 2000), the identification and selection of better
solutions through the decision-making process, and the addition of diverse viewpoints and
problem solving perspectives that can improve the creativity and generate solutions that may not
have been considered in an agency-only process (Petts & Leach, 2000).
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Additional benefits include increased capacity of the public to address technical issues
and participate in a democracy (Roberts, 2008), fostering a sense of community and inclusion
that can result in building relationships and understanding fellow community member views
(Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015; Roberts, 1997), understanding of public preferences for issues
to be addressed by the process, and tapping into resources that are only available from members
of the community making citizens active solvers of problems (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).
Public participation can also build trust among citizens and between citizens and the community
and public officials, energize the community to action, help communities to identify “resources
and allies” (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015), and tap into public “passion” for the issues (Petts &
Leach, 2000). Public participation can also increase community legitimacy to the agency and
allow citizens to become trusted partners in the process (Barnes et al., 2003), increase the
legitimacy of decisions that are made by public officials can be legitimized with the public
(Roberts, 2008), and transfer power from the regulator to the regulated resulting in a sense of
ownership that enhances the potential for later success (Roberts, 2008), and create civility that
can increase citizens’ ability to hear and understanding alternate viewpoints and present their
own in structured and beneficial conversations (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015).
Public participation can also achieve justice for marginalized groups (Fung, 2006), build
a citizenry that is knowledgeable of public issues and the constraints that exist in the policy
process (Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015), support democratic decision-making and address
citizenship and democracy deficits (Nabatchi, 2010), streamline the decision-making process
(Petts & Leach, 2000); and develop leaders within the community (Nabatchi & Leighninger,
2015). Participants will grow to trust and understand the members of the community that are
passionate about the community and the issues that affect the community. They will identify
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members who are action oriented and move decision forward and push implementation.
Likewise, individuals will gain an understanding of their own passion for the issues and put forth
the effort to gain positive solutions.

3.6

Costs of public participation
Fostering an environment that is conducive to public participation is not without its costs

to the process and the public. The balance between the democratic principle of responsiveness
and the administrative pressures for efficiency while involving the citizenry in policy decisions
and implementation is a tenuous line. It has been stated that democracy was designed to “reflect
and engender an active citizenry” (C. S. King et al., 1998), while the political system in the
United States also “protects the political and administrative process from a too active citizenry”
(ibid, p. 384). Those who promote more public participation and more inclusive techniques must
do so with the recognition that there can be significant barriers (See Section 3.7) and costs to
such changes.
The potential costs associated with increased public participation or poorly implemented
participation include a loss in cost efficiency in the decision-making process because of
increased transaction costs as the number of decision makers increases (Roberts, 2008), schedule
delays associated with increased deliberation and citizen engagement (Roberts, 2008), creation
of unnecessary conflicts (Barnett, 1994; Roberts, 2008), diversion of agency resources from
other issues (Roberts, 2008), and time and financial costs of participation to the public (Nabatchi,
2012a). Community involvement can also increase the risk of poor technical decisions with
incorporation of uninformed citizen input or a participating public that doesn’t understand the
technical aspects and risks of the possible solutions. Furthermore, there can be potential negative
impacts on community members if active participants support a decision that ultimate fails to
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achieve goals or is co-opted by unpopular interests. Other potential negative consequences
include loss of credibility of the agency if the process fails or is seen as a formality as opposed to
meaningful involvement (Petts & Leach, 2000), loss of credibility of the public if the citizen
involvement is not serious, sincere and positive to the process, poor decision-making based on
self-interested behavior of participants instead of community-interested behavior (Roberts,
2008), the selection of the “wrong public” for inclusion in the process, such as a vocal minority
that dominates the process (Petts & Leach, 2000); the potential exclusion of "counter publics"
who do not fit into the mold of the established public (Barnes et al., 2003), potential instability in
the policy process caused by erratic citizen involvement (Roberts, 2008), and the selection of a
popular solution that is not in the larger public interest.
Many of these costs of participation are issues that can be addressed to a degree with
proper design and implementation of the participatory process. According to Roberts (1997, p.
130) – public participation is “not a constraint on effectiveness but an aspect of the job (of
administration) itself.”

3.7

Barriers to public participation
The barriers to public participation and the issues to be overcome through the public

involvement process are often the same. These include difficulty in the general public
understanding highly technical matters; lack of public trust in governmental officials and the
regulated community; the divergent interests of stakeholders; differing tolerances for risk for
members of the community, agencies and other stakeholders; divergent beliefs about what
constitutes “good” public participation; and potential disconnects between the bearers of costs
and receivers of benefits for policy implementation (Beierle, 1998; Green, 1997; Greenberg &
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Lewis, 2000; Petts & Leach, 2000; Richardson, 2003; Thomas, 1995; Upreti & van der Horst,
2004; Webler, Tuler, & Krueger, 2001).
Accordingly, there exist barriers to public participation and direct citizen involvement.
Some of these barriers impeded the public from pursuing participation and others provide a
disincentive for administrators to seek out or incorporate public wishes in decision-making and
implementation of policies. Roberts (2008, pp. 12-13) identifies several reasons that public
participation is opposed by administrators and politicians, including a perceived inefficiency of
processes that include citizen participation, the “naïve” and under-educated nature of the
populace, and the unrealistic expectations of the process. She also highlights several dilemmas
that come along with public involvement, including problems associated with the size of a
decision-making entity (efficiency), the lack of ability to participate for low-power groups
(equity), the lack of agency accountability if solutions selected by the community fail, the lack of
technical expertise of the public in many policy arenas, the fact that some policy decisions
require quick action and thus preclude meaningful participatory efforts, and the potential for a
citizen group to put their interests ahead of the “public good.”76
One of the significant set of constraints placed on public participation is the emphasis that
is placed on agency professionalism and expertise. The rise of the expert in policy-making has
often led to an exclusion of the citizenry in this area (Benveniste, 1977). Benveniste portrays the
average citizen, or “beneficiary”, in the following passage (p.7):
“These are the people for whom the plans are made in the first
place, the people who may support or fight planners and who may be
peaceful or violent depending on the way the play unfolds. In this
book, we call them beneficiaries. At times they are victims, in the
sense that the recommendations of experts run contrary to their
interests. But whatever the outcome, the experts rarely know them.
In most policy situations the experts do not have the time, the
resources or the know-how to communicate with their beneficiaries.”
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The increasing dependence of governmental leaders on expert input in the policy-making
and implementation phases has resulted in a wall between the citizen and the process. Who can
question an “expert”? Why would we go against the recommendations of “experts” in whom we
have invested so much time and money? Unfortunately, as uncertainty increases, the need for
experts increases and the wall gets built a little higher and a little stronger. The conflict between
organizational goals and citizen needs is often exacerbated by experts and their involvement in
the process.
The professionalism of administrators also presents a barrier to public participation. As
society (and government) become increasingly technical and complex, the dilemma of keeping
the public educated and involved falls to the administrator (Ventriss & Pecorella, 1984). This is
sometimes in direct conflict with the perception that as a professional, the administrator should
not be questioned (by a less informed public) on the decisions that are made. Furthermore, the
incorporation of public preferences into the decision-making process presents time constraints on
the manager, adds unpredictability to what may be a well-defined process, can be emotionally
draining to the administrator and, above all, can present a threat to overall quality of the decision
(Thomas, 1995).
The public involvement process itself can provide a barrier to public participation. The
language of policy and the discourse in which the issues are addressed often seem designed to
keep the public at bay (Toker, 2004). The bureaucratic response to mandated public
participation sometimes results in a process that hinders any meaningful citizen involvement.
Examples include a process filled with technical language with little or no technical support from
the lead agency, scheduling of meetings that are long and infrequently held and scheduled at
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times when public attendance is difficult, and selection of poor agency leadership for the public
participation process (Depoe & Delicath, 2004; C. S. King et al., 1998).
Additional barriers to public participation and quality discourse on policy matters include
the lack of resources for citizens that may be consumed with the “realities of daily life” (C. S.
King et al., 1998), bureaucratic procedures of citizen engagement that may discourage public
involvement (C. S. King et al., 1998), and agency managers and the regulated community who
may be reluctant to increase the involvement of citizens because of the potential loss of agency
and cost-bearers control. There may also be a lack of consensus within the community on the
preferred solution (Bartsch, 2003), community apathy toward agency decisions or a particular
issue (Bartsch, 2003), the lack of an established regulatory framework for the participation
process (Petts & Leach, 2000), the lack of public experience, or the lack of access to information
or technical support to digest available information (Petts & Leach, 2000; Roberts, 2008).
Identification of these barriers provides an opportunity for the resourceful agency or
manager committed to meaningful community engagement to design participatory programs that
incorporate measures to remove or ameliorate the impediments to direct citizen participation in
policy decisions.

3.8

Requirements for “good” public participation
To capitalize on the potential benefits and to mitigate barriers to participation, the design

and implementation of the participatory process should incorporate aspects that are core to
“good” public participation. A core set of characteristics of meaningful participation are
presented by Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015, p. 25-28). These components include:
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•

The process should be based on “adult-adult” relationships and not adult (agency)-child
(public) relationships;

•

Make sure that the participants have as much information as they want in advance of
meetings;

•

Develop the interaction around “sound group processes”;

•

Provide a forum and the time for people to “tell their stories”. Understanding why
others are interested and what their concerns are cultivates an atmosphere of listening,
learning and growing to solutions;

•

Do not try to sell a pre-established solution. Allow participants to develop or choose
from several alternative decision outcomes;

•

Make sure that participants know they are being heard to establish legitimacy of the
process;

•

Allow multiple avenues for participation that consider individual interest and
commitment to the process;

•

“Make participation enjoyable”;

•

Remove barriers to participation by recognizing schedule constraints and incorporating
technology as much as possible;
Ansell and Gash (2007) identify elements that often result in successful collaboration,

including a history of conflict resolution or cooperation between participants, the provision of
incentives to participate, and recognizing and addressing power or resource imbalances that exist
within the policy process. The active presence of a leader (or champion) of the process within
the governmental body, the design of a process that promotes interaction between participants
and addresses personality and power differences, recognizing the importance of “face-to-face
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dialogue” and incorporating this into the process, and utilizing small wins to build trust in
participants can also encourage successful collaboration. Furthermore, establishing the goals and
basis for the decision-making process upfront and developing a “shared understanding and
commitment” to the process is important to the success of collaborative efforts.
Depoe and Delicath (2004, p.3) add that “early and ongoing, informed and empowered
public participation is the hallmark of sound public policy” and further state that the citizenry
often provides necessary information that is not available elsewhere. Thomas (1995, p.36)
claims that the core theory of public participation is that “the desirability of public involvement
depends primarily on the relative need for quality versus the need for acceptability in an eventual
decision.” Additionally, effectively answering the question of “who participates?” is important
to good participatory programs (Barnes et al., 2003). Often the participation program excludes
groups that are considered marginal or “counter publics,” agency managers decide who should
participate, or legitimation of the community impedes the inclusion of needed parties in the
process. The decision-making will suffer if the “right” public is not party to the process.
Greenberg and Lewis (2000) further define a desirable public participation process as one in
which the public opinion reflects the full participation of the community, not just the active or
more vocal powerful subset.
Webler, Tuler and Krueger (2001) define “good” public participation (p. 447) as
processes that are representative and democratic, encourage dialogue among central actors, are
fair to all actors, allow a power struggle to determine the outcome, and depend on leadership to
gather, assimilate and utilize varying viewpoints and information. Some of these characteristics
are synergistic (such as representative nature, fairness and dialogue) and some are clearly at odds
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(such as democratic process and power plays), highlighting a dichotomy that often appears in
public participation in policy making.
Deliberation and democratic principles provide the foundation of good participation.
Fung (2006) presents the “democracy cube”, which can be used to assess and characterize
participation methods. The cube is a three-dimensional model that includes measures of
“participant selection, communication and decision method, and authority and power”. Good
participation includes a broad base of participants, deliberative communication processes, in
which real decision-making power rests in the citizenry. Renn (1999) identifies the ideal of
“analytic-deliberative decision-making” for technical processes (e.g. risk management). The
process requires understanding the values of the affected community, expert evaluation of
options, and evaluation/selection by citizens.

3.9

Evaluation of public participation
As outlined earlier, there are benefits and costs of public participation and barriers to

citizens and public officials fully utilizing the processes. Therefore, the evaluation of citizen
involvement programs and efforts is important to understand the balance between the benefits
and costs and to provide information to design and implement successful participation processes.
Evaluation of public policy can include studies of the implementation of the process, the impact
of the specific process, or an overall evaluation of the policy itself (R. D. Bingham & Felbinger,
2001).
The evaluation of outcomes from the public participation process depends on the goals of
citizen involvement (Rosener, 1978). Some scholars view the process as an end to a means,
where the success of the program results in an improvement in the delivery of services. Others
posit that the process is an end unto itself (J. D. Hamilton, 2004; Nabatchi, 2012b; Senecah,
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2004). In this instance, it is important that the public be engaged and involved in a manner that
promotes equity, democracy, and transparency. Rosener (1983) states that "(t)he participation
concept is value-laden; there is no widely held criteria for judging success and failure; there are
no agreed-upon evaluation methods; and there are few reliable measurement tools".
Additionally, Beierle (1998) finds that inconsistent (or non-existent) evaluations of public
participation are primarily the result of differing views of what public participation is supposed
to accomplish and differing views of democracy. The managerial view holds that the agency
gathers information from the public and decides, while the pluralist view holds that the manager
is the mediator in a deliberative process, and the populist view contends that the policy process
should consist of direct participation and decision-making by citizens. The different perspectives
suggest different participatory methods and expected outcomes which are difficult to evaluate
based on common criteria.
Chess presents a discussion of many of the approaches and obstacles to evaluation
studies of public participation. She reviews the various methods of evaluating participation
and the benefits and drawbacks of these approaches (Caron Chess, 2000), which vary by
timeframe, focus, evaluating party, and performance measures. Regarding timing of
evaluations – precursor studies estimate the impact of a program, concurrent studies attempt
to measure the ongoing effect, and studies after implementation address long-term and
lasting effects of the programs. The focus of public participation evaluations can be on
processes (does the public participation enhance the democratic nature of the overall process
and is the public given a voice) or on outcomes (does the public participation process result
in “better” results for the program). The actors that perform the study can greatly influence
the focus, with internal participants likely to focus on process and external auditors more
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likely to focus on achievement of stated goals. There is a predominance of qualitative
studies, resulting from the fact that many of the measurement parameters are difficult to
identify, measure or concurrence on the key parameters is a stumbling block.
Bixler and colleagues (2016) establish a performance matrix and utilize social network
analysis to evaluate the performance of collaborative networks. The study focuses on
measurement of network improvements such as the addition of new members, improved
exchange/transfer between members, and increased connections within the network. The
evaluation utilizes a process-oriented evaluation of success instead of the “traditional approaches
to evaluation in public administration apply a rather linear logic, where program inputs produce
(or fail to produce) measurable outcomes.”
Charnley and Englebert (2005) present an 8-year evaluation of EPA's superfund
community involvement program (CIP), with a focus on democracy of public participation
programs and success in achieving “broad social goals” (p.167), and whether public participation
is meeting specific goals of the groups engaged in the process. The study measured “citizen
satisfaction with EPA-provided information, citizen understanding of risks, citizen satisfaction
with EPA-provided chances to participate, and citizen satisfaction with EPA response to input (p.
165). The study found that (1) the public prefers to get information from EPA but more citizens
get information from media outlets; (2) more than half of the respondents were satisfied with the
quality and quantity of information that they received from EPA; (3) citizens who felt that they
were well-informed also had a positive view of EPA's effectiveness (and vice versa); (4) citizens
feel that EPA is average to below average in "understanding community concerns, using input,
explaining its decision and earning trust"; and (5) citizens that chose not to participate were
unaware of the site, lacked geographic connection to the site in question, were satisfied with the
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job EPA was doing, felt inadequate to provide meaningful input or felt that EPA would do what
it wanted regardless of input from the community.
This last finding is germane to my study as it speaks to the reasons that citizens will not
invest in public participation efforts.
Koontz (2005) finds in his research that community heterogeneity often results in
theoretical formulations that end up with almost as many independent variables as cases in the
study. Therefore, attempts to formulate quantitative analysis of public participation processes
prove to be difficult and lead the researcher to a multiple case study approach. Koontz
approached the problem of heterogeneity of community by categorizing public groups according
to a number of other characteristic parameters to perform such a multiple case study.
Bierle and Cayford (2002) perform such a multiple case study evaluation of public
participation programs in environmental decision-making. The study looks at 239 cases that
vary by context - policy setting versus site specific, positive and negative pre-existing
relationships, level of government, and lead agency; by process – participant selection, type of
output, use of consensus, and measures of agency responsiveness, participant motivation,
deliberation; and by results – with a focus on relationship and capacity building. In identifying
the key attributes of successful programs, they suggest a process for successful participatory
efforts, including needs analysis, goal identification, process design (participant selection and
type of engagement), selection and evaluation and modification.
There is not general agreement on whether public participation results in better outcomes
when looking at the effectiveness of policy outcomes. Some scholars claim that the research on
public participation in policy decisions has generally found that greater public interest and
involvement significantly improves policy outcomes, specifically in environmental policy
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(Beierle, 1998). Others (Koontz & Thomas, 2006) claim that there has been no demonstration
that collaborative public participation improves the quality of outcomes.

3.10

Recent advances in public participation – collaboration and deliberative
democracy

Early public participation processes, implemented to meet the legal requirements of
governmental mandates, have been described as the “decide, announce, and defend” approach to
citizen involvement (Depoe & Delicath, 2004). In this approach, administrators made decisions
and used the public participation phase to inform citizens what they were going to do and why it
was the right approach. This is consistent with the professionalism and expertise model
discussed earlier. This one-way dialogue resulted in what has been referred to as the
“participation gap” (J. D. Hamilton, 2004) (p. 61). In addition, Nabatchi (2010) identified
democracy and citizenship deficits that can be addressed via improved participatory methods
(see Section 3.1.2 for a discussion).
Participatory advances in the last two decades have transformed an adversarial process
under the administrative state to a deliberative and collaborative process (Cooper et al., 2006).
The transformation began with the New Public Involvement (NPI) initiatives of the 1990s
(Thomas, 1995), which focused on better addressing citizen interests and promoted the view of
the citizen as a client of the state.
King, Feltey, and Susel (1998) have also noted the change in public participation
methods over the past two decades. They note four aspects of the public participation model –
the issue, the administrative process, the administrators and the public. Historically, public
participation included the issue at the core of the debate and the process revolved around the
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administrator with the public as a peripheral actor. The new public participation process still
includes the issue at the core, but the citizen is now the central actor with the process moving to
the periphery. This change in focus (public not process) results in more deliberative and
collaborative efforts. Hourdequin, et al (2012, p.40) adds that deliberative democracy is to “get
people to think beyond self-interest and take into account the good of others”.
Vigoda (2002) also notes that public participation processes have gone through a life
cycle that began with coerciveness on the part of administrators (the decide, announce and
defend approach), then a transformation to a process that included delegation of some
responsibility to the public, and then to a process that is more responsive to public concerns, and
calls for a process that is collaborative, not just responsive. The difference between these two
modes is best represented by viewing the roles of the actors in the process. In a responsive
process, the administrator is a manager and the citizen is the client. In the collaborative process,
citizens and administrators are true partners in the process (Vigoda, 2002). Collaboration in
public participation is characterized by openness of the process and transparency in decisionmaking, methods that use innovative tools to educate and increase capacity of the citizenry, and
involve the citizenry at earlier phases of the policy process.
Nabatchi and Leighninger (2015) identify citizen engagement through deliberative
democracy as the driver for changes in how democracy is manifest and the public is empowered
to be a part of the policy process. They identify information sharing, participatory budgeting
measures and the equity in cultural differences as key components to advancement of the
democracy that citizens want.
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3.11

Public participation in environmental policy

In highly technical situations, such as environmental policy decisions, there are additional
challenges to the participatory process. The technical matters are much more complex and the
role of experts sometimes overwhelms the average citizen. Citizen involvement in these
situations can result in a better understanding of the issues by the public and a legitimation of the
decision made by the experts.
Three environmental programs are of particular interest in developing, framing, and
answering my research questions. These programs – the Federal Superfund program, the
brownfields and community redevelopment program, and facility siting arena - each present a
unique set of challenges the administrator and the citizen.
Research on public participation in environmental policy decisions has generally found
that greater public interest and involvement results in positive normative outcomes, although the
data on improved environmental outcomes is thin at best (Beierle, 1998). Evaluation of public
participation processes presents the classic public administration and economic balance of
achieving desired goals within a set of given economic and value constraints.
Public participation studies for environmental issues includes discussions on public
opinion regarding hazardous waste facilities (J. T. Hamilton, 1993), studies of the effectiveness
of sharing federal responsibilities with local stakeholders in the Superfund and brownfields
programs (Wernstedt, 2001), identification of lessons from Superfund that can be applied to
brownfields sites (Wernstedt & Hersh, 1998), the role of community preferences on brownfields
policy decisions (Greenberg & Lewis, 2000), and the effectiveness of the Environmental Impact
Assessment process (O'Faircheallaigh, 2010).

70

Hamilton (1993) studied the impact of public opinion on firms’ decisions regarding the
expansion of hazardous waste facilities. He found that firms incorporated the potential for public
collective action into their decision-making regarding waste siting. The analysis of plant
expansions indicated that firms were less likely to expand a hazardous waste facility in areas
where the likelihood of public participation was greater, as measured by voter turnout.
Furuseth (1989) performed a survey study to determine local awareness of and attitudes
towards an existing hazardous waste treatment facility. Not surprisingly, he found that residents
were significantly opposed to the presence of the facility in their neighborhood. More germane
to my research questions, he also found that proximity to the site and level of education were
accurate predictors of community knowledge of waste management operations and that such
knowledge was a precursor to negative attitudes regarding the site.
In his study of public participation in brownfields redevelopment, Bartsh (1993)
identifies barriers – differing end-use visions, outcomes uncertainties, community apathy, and
mistrust – and success factors – a broad base of stakeholder selection, knowledge and trust
among actors, clear and honest communication, acknowledgment of resource limitations, and
building on “small wins” - for public participation processes. The guiding legislation for the
TAG program does not formally incorporate these steps into the process. The case study
findings presented in Chapter 8, however, demonstrate that effective incorporation of these steps
is central to a process that is viewed as successful by the participants.
The Superfund public participation program is highly rationalized and prescriptive in
terms of methodology and required activities. In addition, the program is very confusing to the
lay public and even to environmental professionals who do not deal with the program daily. The
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process is long, tedious and frustrating to all parties involved. There are opportunities for public
involvement that are not often utilized.
A recent study evaluated the impact of public participation on remedy selection at
Superfund sites (Daley, 2007). The study found that community involvement, the presence of
either a Community Advisory Group (CAG) or the award of a Technical Assistance Grant, has a
positive and significant impact on the degree of remediation undertaken at Superfund sites. The
data also showed that formal public participation (award of a TAG) was only undertaken at 15%
of the sites, even though a grant program exists for technical assistance. This finding of
underutilization of the available participation program is core to one of the central questions
addressed in this research. If the community benefits so directly from the award of a TAG, as
Daley finds, why are there so few communities that take advantage of the program? Furthermore,
Daley’s study does not address schedule impacts of the award of a TAG, another of my research
questions. I also revisit the impact of TAGs on the remedy selection process and outcome.
The brownfields and community development program presents some similar issues as
Superfund relative to technical complexity. While Superfund is driven by a goal of reducing
risks to human health and the environment, Brownfields programs target the redevelopment of
blighted or environmentally impaired property. A Brownfields program attempts to balance
environmental concerns, with community desires for neighborhood redevelopment and the
economic drivers for a private developer to cleanup and redevelop a property. This provides the
opportunity for collaborative efforts between private parties, environmental regulators, local
economic development officials and the public.
The siting of infrastructure, such as renewable energy facilities or power transmission
lines, presents yet another opportunity to understand the public participation process. This can
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be viewed as the Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY) problem. The concerns of the local
community are often at odds with what may be perceived as the public good. The role of
collaborative public participation in this arena can provide valuable insights into this dilemma.

3.12

Synthesizing the Literature

The focus of my research is on a particular form of public participation in a highly
technical and complex decision-making process – the TAG program at Superfund sites. The
findings of this literature review as they pertain to public participation in highly technical
settings are presented in the next chapter, which discusses the characteristics of these technical
policy scenarios and identifies the expected impact on the participation process. It also identifies
the attributes of the TAG program and their anticipated impact of the participation barriers or
hurdles in complex, technical decision-making.
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Chapter 4 – Superfund, Public Participation, and Theoretical
Connections
This research investigates how the TAG program aligns with the ideals of public
participation as discussed in Chapter 2 and what impacts are observed in outcomes in the
decision-making process at Superfund sites as a result of the TAG program. This chapter
presents a synthesis of the theoretical discussions as they pertain to public participation in highly
technical and complex policy settings.
The first part of this chapter identifies the characteristics of highly technical and complex
policy issues that are expected to impact citizen involvement in either negative or positive ways.
The next section identifies the desirable attributes of public participation in these settings as
informed by the public participation theory discussed in detail in Chapter 3. This is followed by
a discussion of the specific impact of each characteristic of the highly-technical issues on the
desired participation criteria.
The next part of the chapter discusses the attributes of the TAG program that are
designed to address these gaps in the public participation process, followed by a discussion of the
anticipated impacts of the TAG program components on specific participation criteria. This
chapter concludes with a synthesis of the expected impact of the TAG program and provides the
foundation for the theoretical frame for the qualitative studies presented in Chapters 6 through 9.
The decision about how to deal with contaminated sites in the Superfund program is but
one example of a complex, technical problem whose solution is expected to benefit from
meaningful and impactful participation from affected citizens. Other examples include policies
about climate change; local, state and national energy policy; the need for and location of critical
infrastructure (e.g. bridge replacement, water supply systems, pipelines, or highways); scientific
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and medical research programs; land use planning; and Brownfields programs that determine the
future of environmentally impacted properties. As discussed in Chapter 3 and later in this
chapter, public participation in these decisions is important and often difficult to accomplish.

4.1

Characteristics of complex, technical problems
To examine public participation in highly technical policy settings, we must first

understand what is meant by these policy situations. Technically complex policies have several
characteristics that are likely to impact the success of citizen involvement programs; they address
a problem that (1) is characterized by technical complexity, (2) is expensive to evaluate and
resolve, (3) results in public participatory efforts that are also expensive to undertake and/or
require intensive involvement, (4) takes a long time to resolve, and (5) is characterized by
significant differences in information available to various parties. In addition to these unique
elements, highly technical policies also are characterized by features that are representative of
many policy decision scenarios; namely, (6) there are multiple stakeholders with competing
interests, (7) public participants involved in the evaluation of and decision-making for the
problems typically lack experience in collaboration and conflict resolution, and (8) the problem
and, therefore its solution, has a significant potential impact on the community.
The technical complexity of these problems is difficult for the average citizen, without
specialized technical education and years of experience in the field, to fully comprehend and
evaluate. In some instances, even the experts in the field disagree on the degree of the problem
and the range of potential solutions. For Superfund sites, the evaluation of site problems is
primarily performed by professionals with training in environmental science, geology,
engineering, human health assessment and toxicology. In many instances, the technical
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personnel evaluating, assessing, and solving environmental problems have advanced degrees in
these specialty fields. Community members without specialized training can be intimidated
when trying to understand the technical complexity and state their concerns about such problems.
Highly technical problems require very expensive solutions. These complex situations
often require significant investments to investigate and evaluate the problems. The solutions to
resolve these problems often require capital from multiple funding sources, and can require
consensus-building among numerous potentially affected groups. Because the solutions are
expensive to implement and the impact of the solutions are far-reaching, these are high stakes
and high-profile situations. For example, the average cost for the investigation, design and
remediation of a Superfund site can exceed $25 million (Superfund Fact Book).
In addition, it is expensive for the community to participate during the evaluation,
decision, and implementation process. Understanding and evaluating problems can overwhelm
the average citizen and can require a significant investment of time and resources. The average
citizen may not have the background or capacity for involvement at the level these situations
demand. The nature of the problems require that citizens invest significant chunks of time to
understand and impact decisions. In addition, the policy decisions may require that citizens
commit to and engage in the process for a very long time. Specifically, in the Superfund process,
citizens must access, read, and comprehend thousands of pages of technical documents and
determine how these technical studies affect them and which solutions may address the problem.
Evaluating technical problems, determining and designing a solution, and implementing a
technical solution is a slow process, often without much visible progress. In the Superfund
process, for example, it can take from 15 to 20 years for a site to move from discovery to
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ultimate closure. This can be disheartening for citizens and other stakeholders impacted by a
Superfund site.
Asymmetric availability of information is also a characteristic of technically complex
problems. The quantity and timing of information availability to technical participants and the
public varies. At a Superfund site, government personnel and PRPs may have access to more
information and earlier access to most information regarding the site assessment and remedy
decision. Furthermore, the ability of the public to process the technical documents is often
significantly less than the government agency and private company participants. There are also
numerous guidance documents and technical procedures that are intimately understood and
incorporated into the daily work of technical representatives.
Most, if not all, policy decisions involve competing stakeholders, often with different
goals for the solution of the problem. In the Superfund program, private companies that are
responsible for the cleanup may desire a less costly remedy than the community members that
live near a Superfund site. Local officials may side with industrial representatives to maintain
good relations and protect jobs or they may side with the citizens who desire more aggressive
(and expensive) solutions. Since state officials need to balance response actions at numerous
sites across the state, they may have a differing agenda for an individual site than the other
parties involved.
Public participation in policy decisions often involves inexperienced collaborators. The
evaluation and selection of solutions to problems requires the successful negotiation of
competing interests and this collaboration is enhanced when the participants have a specific
skillset or have established trust in surrogates that have the requisite skills. Community
representatives are often not trained or experienced in these areas.
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Policy decisions, including highly technical problems, have some degree of impact on the
community. The higher the real or perceived impact on the community, the more important it is
that public participation be impactful. In the Superfund program, the presence of contaminated
soil, water, and air presents a health hazard to community members. The stigma associated with
Superfund sites also results in reduced property values in the neighborhood and the sites are
often characterized as physical blights.

4.2

Attributes of Meaningful Public Participation in Technical Problems
Chapter 3 provided a discussion of the literature review on theory of public participation

in policy and decision making. This section draws upon that review to identify the core
components of successful public participation in technical policy decisions. For public
participation to be successful, it should engender trust. The public is more likely to engage in a
meaningful way and assist in problem solving if they trust the other parties in the decision
process. Principal-agent theory predicts that the public will not view government officials as
acting on their behalf (or as their agent) without first building a relationship through meaningful
interaction. Credibility is also important to the participatory process; credibility of the agency
with the public and other stakeholders and credibility of the citizen participants with the agency
as well as other members of the affected community. This credibility is important in establishing
the parties as legitimate to the decision-making process. Several scholars point to the importance
of trust, legitimacy and transparency in the process to create a positive and successful
participatory programs (Bhattacharyya, 2015; Nabatchi, 2012a; Nabatchi & Leighninger, 2015;
Worsham, 2011).
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Quality communication, through transparency, the open flow of information between the
parties, and clear communication, results in improvement in the participation process.
Transparency ensures that all participants in the decision-making process are accountable to one
another and there are no “side deals” or private discussions and negotiations that could
compromise trust in the process. Transparency will engender trust among the participants, foster
open dialog on important topics, and can result in conciliatory attitudes. The open flow of
information encompasses the full and timely transmittal of data, decision criteria and potential
solutions to the problem to the public and the willing acceptance of information provided by the
public. Clear communication is attained by presenting technical information in manner that the
non-technical public can understand it. It also encompasses the communication of concerns,
without rhetoric or hyperbole, from the public to agency representatives. The participation
process should incorporate clear communication between participants with varying levels of
technical knowledge, knowledge of the “rules of negotiation” and potentially opposing views of
the desirable policy outcome.
Satisfaction of the participants is also a hallmark of good participation. This includes
satisfaction with the process – through access to information and other participants,
acknowledgement and serious consideration of input, and meaningful impact on the decision –
and the outcome itself. Participants see the benefit of their investment in the process and are
more likely to maintain meaningful involvement. The lack of satisfaction can lead to
participants dropping out of the process, or worse, becoming a roadblock to the solution.
In many participatory ventures, there is a natural imbalance of power between
participants. Those with higher levels of knowledge, money, influence, access to information or
decision makers often have a higher level of influence on decision-making. Good participatory
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process will result in an even balance of power, ensuring that those participants with less natural
influence are afforded a legitimate opportunity to be involved in a meaningful way and
enhancing equal participation in the process.
The decision-making process is also often characterized by inherently unequal
participation. Public administrators and technical stakeholders have different access to
information and differing abilities to influence the decisions. In some cases, all of the
participants in a policy discussion, except for the community members, are technically trained
and possibly engaged in in the discussion on a professional basis. There also exists a knowledge
gap between the stakeholders, that further reinforces this unequal participation.
A low cost of participation also characterizes high quality participation. This can be
attained by assisting communities and removing resource impediments to the process and other
potential barriers to participation. Participation should also be representative, ensuring that the
participants mirror the affected community. The question of who participates is an important
one; the voice of the community should be from the whole community, not just a vocal minority
(Barnes et al., 2003; Cooper et al., 2006). Participation should be impactful, not just
perfunctory; public input should be incorporated in a manner that the process, the decision and
outcomes are improved. This type of engagement can result in growth among community
members and increase the capacity for future public participation (Frederickson, 1982). Properly
designed and implemented participatory processes will also provide education of citizens.
Community participants should be provided information and resources to understand, use and
evaluate information to make informed input. This education can include training on the process
as well as technical resources to understand the technical policy issue at hand.
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The participatory process should not be limited to experts. The process should allow for
inclusion of stakeholders with varying degrees of technical capacity. Community members are
not typically experts in the topic of the policy decision and efforts should be made to present
information and engage in dialog that allows the public to understand the issue and weigh in on
the matters that impact without feeling intimidated by the process or other participants. It is
beneficial to have a government agent with a strong public service motivation (PSM) or
competence in public participation process (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015) to assist and guide
the process and the participants in the successful completion of the participatory process.
However, a strong public participation process will have measures in place that do not rely on
this service motivated manager for success.

4.3

The impact on public participation
Understanding and evaluating technically complex problems can be a process that is at

odds with the premise of high-quality public participation. This section presents a discussion of
the impact and potential barriers that each of the policy characteristics has on the various
attributes of a quality participation process. An evaluation of the areas of intersection of the
characteristics of highly technical problems and desirable attributes of participatory processes is
depicted in Table 4-1. Areas where the technical policy problem negatively affects the
participation process are indicated by red dots, while areas where the technical problem can
enhance or encourage participation are shown with green dots. The resulting set of participation
criteria present the participation gap that exists (or potentially exists) in these policy settings –
the participation ideals that are not attained.
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Table 4‐1
Issues with public participation in
highly technical policy settings

Technical Complexity

Problems are difficult to understand;
evaluation of potential soultions requires
specialized knowledge.

Expensive solutions

Studies and solutions are high cost efforts.

Expensive involvement

Slow process

Asymmetric Information

Participation often requires intense and/or
long‐term involvement. Participation
requires resources
Gathering data, formulating options,
identifying and evaluating soultions, and
implementing remedies takes a long time
Technical participants better understand
problem than effected community, less
information provided to public.
Common to Public Participation Settings

Competing stakeholders

Private parties and citizens (and often
citizen sub‐groups) have different
objectives.

Inexperienced Collaborators

Lack of common basis (information, goals)
results in unprincipled negotiation.
Community preferences missed.

Impact on Community

The policy issue has a significant (real or
perceived) impact on the community so
that they are invested in the outcome.

Agency Competence (PSM)

Not Limited to Experts

Education

Impactful Participation

Representative Participation

Low Cost of Participation

Even Balance of Power/
Equal participation

Satisfaction

Description
Unique to Technical Policies

Credibility

Characteristic of Policy Issue

Trust

Red dot: Tension between
characteristic and goal
Green Dot: Enhances goal
achievement

Transparency/
Open Information/
Clear Communication

Participation Criteria
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The technical complexity of these policy decisions can present a number of barriers to
quality public participation. First, it can result in a lack of credibility for the community as the
members of the public are viewed as not having the background, knowledge, and experience to
understand and provide meaningful input to the process. Second, it can hamper the quality of
communication and flow of information since the government agency representative may be
reluctant to engage in information transfer with the public. The information flow is likely to be
characterized by a low signal to noise ratio – the signal being meaningful information to the
decision-making process and the noise being information that may provide no useful input for
solving the problem. Technical complexity also impedes the education process because the gap
between the knowledge base of the typical citizen and the knowledge needed to participate is
large enough that it would require an inordinate investment of time for the government agent and
the citizen. Similarly, the technical complexity overwhelms the average citizen and creates a
situation that discourages non-experts from participating.
The expensive nature of solutions can result in public dissatisfaction with the process
since the selection and implementation of solutions will typically take a long-time and, in
general, the community members do not care about the cost of the solution, only that the solution
be right and be quick. The high stakes and high profile nature can also be a deterrent to nonexpert participation, both from the perspective of the participant and the government agent.
It is also expensive for the public to engage in the process; other participants are typically
involved in the process in a professional manner – it is a part of their career - while participation
by community members is usually an activity that is extracurricular to their full-time endeavors.
This can threaten the credibility of the public, who are perceived to be ill-informed and not fully
involved, and can also raise the cost of participation. The requirement of significant personal
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investment to participate can also detract from representative participation in the community
and impactful participation. In the Superfund process, the high cost of participation includes a
commitment of time and resources on the part of the community to obtain and review highly
technical documents that are filled with analytical data, complex environmental modeling,
human health and ecological risk assessments, engineering analysis, evaluation of complicated
remedies and detailed cost estimates for remediation. Furthermore, meaningful involvement also
includes preparing for and attending numerous public meetings and providing comments on
various documents through the process.
The decision-making process for complex, technical problems is a slow process; it is
necessary to gather extensive data to evaluate these high stakes issues and the process of
formulating options, evaluating remedy alternatives and garnering the needed support to
implement remedies is time consuming. This often results in frustration (or a lack of
satisfaction) in the community since much of the work and progress toward solutions are not
seen by the community members who are participating at the fringe of the process. The
requirement for constant and long-term involvement requires a significant commitment of time
and other resources raising the cost of participation.
The different avenues by which the professional, technical participants and the general
public participate in highly technical policy matters results in an asymmetry of information. This
can result in an erosion of trust since the public does not have the same information as other
more technical participants, a reduction in credibility of the agency since the public may feel that
they are being excluded from important parts of the process, and an overall degradation in open
communication and transparency. The lack of information transfer can be rooted in the
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administrator’s lack of competence in the process, since they may not have the time, resources,
or knowledge to present the technical information in a way that the community can readily
understand. This apparent lack of full disclosure of information severely restricts the
community’s ability to have an impact on the process.
Several characteristics of the policy process are not unique to technically complex
problems, but are nonetheless important to overall success of the participation process. As
discussed in Section 4.1, policy decisions often engage competing stakeholders, with different
ideas of success of the process and success of the solution. The inherent conflict between these
competing values can result in a lack of trust and transparency, can maintain, or increase the
unequal balance of power, and can present a further deterrent for non-expert participation.
Most participation processes in technical arenas include a public contingent that is
inexperienced in collaboration.

In the Superfund process, there are often several different

solutions to address environmental concerns and a strong collaborative process is required to
understand the interests of all parties to build a solution that meets the needs of the most parties.
This type of consensus building requires extensive conflict management and collaboration skills.
The lack of collaboration experience, by the public and members of the technical community,
can result in lack of transparency (the participants don’t always understand what they can reveal
regarding information and preferences), barriers to even balance of power and equal participation
by all parties, and is often confounded by the inexperience or lack of PSM on the part of the
administrator.
A policy decision process, by its nature, will result in an impact on the community. In
highly technical policy processes, and Superfund decision particularly, the high level and
personal nature of the potential impact can encourage a representative group of community

85

members to participate, can increase the commitment of the community members to educate
themselves on the process and the potential solutions, and result in a more impactful
participation. The high stakes for the community can provide the catalyst to meaningful action.
In summary, highly technical policy decisions can present numerous barriers to high
quality, successful public participation. The most important barriers identified in Table 4-1 are
centered on aspects of information flow and understanding, meaningful and balanced
involvement in the process, and a trust in and credibility of the process and participants. These
are the result of the technical nature of the problems, the slow pace of the process, the expense of
participating and the uneven availability of information to public participants. This is especially
true in Superfund, where the decisions about site cleanup unfold over a decade or more and are
based on a high quantity of scientific data, complex environmental modeling and risk
assessments, and knowledge about the ability of treatment technologies to address site risks and
address the health concerns and stigma of a Superfund site.

4.4

Attributes of the TAG program
Congress identified numerous problems with the Superfund Program after its inception in

1980. Progress toward identification and cleanup was slow, the cost of study and response was
even higher than anticipated, the program was fraught with conflict between regulators and the
regulated community, and citizen involvement was not achieving the goals of consensus
building, support and education that were desired. Congress realized the problems with
participation and information exchange and included the TAG program in the 1986 Superfund
Amendments to encourage and improve public participation in these highly technical settings.
Congress realized that Superfund sites are complicated, expensive to address and controversial
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(expensive, slow, technical complexity, multiple and conflicting stakeholders) and that it was
difficult to please all stakeholders in the process. Congress and EPA designed the TAG program
to improve the community involvement process.
The program includes a formalized process that outlines the requirements for the EPA
project manager (PM) and the community that chooses to participate. The TAG program
identifies key points and methods for including the public in the process. Public meetings and
review of key documents in the remedy selection and implementation process provide specific
points of input. The TAG program also provides for establishment of a separate community
involvement coordinator (CIC) function to assist the EPA project manager (PM) with citizen
engagement activities.
The TAG program also provides funding (a $50,000 grant) to allow the community to
hire an independent technical representative to assist in understanding the complex nature of the
Superfund process and the technical issues related to solving the environmental problems.
There is also a fund matching requirement of twenty percent for the community group, which
can be a monetary contribution or can be provided through the provision of in-kind services.
The TAG program also includes administrative requirements for the community group to
incorporate, to perform specified accounting and recordkeeping activities, and the dissemination
of information to the entire community.
The TAG program, through its funding mechanism and ability to hire an outside
consultant, provides technical resources that can help in navigating the Superfund process. The
community group selects their own representative as an independent technical advisor, providing
an added level of influence and autonomy for the community.
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4.5

Expected Impact of the TAG Program on Public Participation
The TAG program was designed to and is expected to address some of the participation

gaps in technical, complex policy situations that were presented in Table 4-1. This section
presents a discussion of the specific impact that each attribute is expected to have on these
participation gaps. The details of the expected impact of the TAG attributes on the participation
process are summarized in Table 4-2.
The formalized process established in the TAG program is expected to enhance the
decision-making process so that it includes a representative cross section of the community,
instill trust among parties through continued and regular and transparent dialog, bring credibility
to community members and to the regulatory agency, and result in meaningful and impactful
participation. The regular and transparent communication is expected to also result in a balance
of power in the process and result in a more equitable participation program.
As the community members become regular participants in meetings and decisionmaking, they are likely to gain a level of respect and credibility that makes them an integral part
of the process. The community involvement coordinator (CIC) adds a level of competence
within the agency to specifically address community issues, reducing the reliance on the public
service motivation of the PM for meaningful public involvement, and provides a balance to the
technical bias that may be presented by the expert at the agency. The regular interaction of the
community representatives with the regulatory and technical members should enhance the
overall communication quality and flow of information.
Through the funding mechanism, the cost of participation is lowered and the potential
impact of participation is increased by providing the resources needed to allow the group to hire
an independent technical consultant. This reduces the burden of the group having to “learn
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Table 4‐2
Attributes of TAG Program and impact on public participation

Formalized process
Funding
Fund matching
Administrative requirements
Provision of technical resources
Select own representative

Agency Competence (PSM)

Not Limited to Experts

Education

Impactful Participation

Representative Participation

Low Cost of Participation

Even Balance of Power/
Equal participation

Satisfaction

Description
Information exchange and goal
communication occurs frequently; CIC
provides assistance to PM
Provides $50K to hire technical advisor to
assist group
Requires 20% match in money or in‐kind
services
Requires detailed and cumbersome
reporting of activities and expenditures
Technical advisor assists group in
understanding issues and formulating
input in a meaningful way
Allows the community to select and hire
their own technical advisor (agent)

Credibility

Attribute of TAG Program

Trust

Green dot: Positive impact
Red dot: Negative impact

Transparency/
Open Information/
Clear Communication

Participation Criteria
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Superfund” before ever starting to consume the site-specific data. The group can then have a
more impactful contribution in the site evaluation process. The fund matching requirement can
be an impediment to participation if the community has difficulty in raising the needed capital or
identifying the in-kind services that they can provide. This matching can also provide a strong
positive signal to the agency and the remainder of the community regarding the seriousness and
credibility of the group. Since the community must identify the technical expert to hire to
provide assistance, this can also present a barrier to participation.
The administrative requirements of the TAG program can be burdensome to communities
that do not have the resources, expertise or experience in dealing with such matters. It can erode
trust, since it can appear that the agency is more concerned with “checking off” administrative
boxes than with gaining meaningful input on the site. The community can become discouraged,
lowering the satisfaction with the process. However, some of the administrative requirements
can also improve the participation process. The group is required to demonstrate that it is
representative of the community as a whole, provide information and educate other members of
the community, and hold regular community meetings to make sure that information is provided
to the entire community.
The ability to hire a technical consultant with a strong background in Superfund, and to
pick this representative on their own, to review data and distill the information for presentation to
the community allows the community group to better understand the process, the environmental
data presented and the technical issues related to remediating the Superfund site. Communication
and education are improved as the technical advisor provides a mechanism for distilling
information into usable chunks for the community and translating issues to the public and the
community desires to the agency. As the community members gain a greater understanding of
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the technical issues, they are better able to formulate and communicate the community goals for
site response actions, and the negotiation process can become more principled and effective,
resulting in more representative, impactful and principled participation. Through education, free
exchange of information, constructive engagement, and transparent communications better input
into the process can be achieved. This technical representative can also serve as an intermediary
(and translator) to communicate with EPA and PRP technical representatives, in a role similar to
that of an attorney in a legal matter. They serve as an advocate for the community within the
framework of the accepted process, communicating with other technical parties in a way that
increases the signal to noise ratio dramatically. In this case, the signal is informational input that
improves the technical remedy decision-making process and is presented in the manner that the
other technical participants can use and understand. The noise is information that the technical
participants determine not to be germane to the technical issue at hand or is presented in a
manner that does not allow the other stakeholders to incorporate the information into the
decision-making.
The TAG program, while not without drawbacks, appears to have been designed and
implemented in a way to alleviate many of the participation gaps that exist in the Superfund
public participation process. The TAG program is expected to reduce the burden on the EPA
PM of educating the community by introducing an intermediary to assist in this role. In addition
to technical education, the technical consultant can also serve as intermediary between the
technical members (EPA and PRPs) and the public. Technical consultants know the unwritten
rules of engagement – how to present information to the EPA, not trying to negotiate technical
issues that cannot be changed, reducing the role of emotion in the process – improve the
communication process and trust and transparency among all parties, and streamline the
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technical decision-making process.

The TAG program is also expected to address problems

with information asymmetry by incorporating a community representative with the technical
knowledge to comprehend the data and perform a detailed analysis.

Implications and Plan for Research

4.6

Congress and EPA introduced the TAG program to improve citizen involvement at
Superfund sites, build consensus around the remedy selection process, improve community
acceptance of remediation decisions, and improve public education about Superfund sites. The
primary mechanism for attaining these goals was to provide Technical Assistance Grants for
communities to hire technical advisors to guide them through the process and provide an avenue
for public to engage in the remedy selection process in a meaningful way. The program has the
potential to successfully accomplish many of these goals.
I have evaluated the TAG program relative to the ideals of quality public participation
presented in Chapter 3. The potential gaps in the public participation process in highly technical
and complex policy settings, such as the Superfund TAG program, are presented in Table 4-1
and the expected ability of the TAG program to address these participation gaps is presented in
Table 4-2.
The TAG program is expected to result in improved trust and credibility, result in more
open and meaningful communication, improve community satisfaction with the process, and
address power imbalances in the decision-making process. However, all of these benefits arise
only if a community actual obtains a TAG. If a TAG is not obtained, the community cannot hire
a technical advisor, and the process improvements cannot be realized. The low uptake rate of
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TAGs (approximately 15 % of Superfund sites get a TAG) indicates that the costs and barriers of
the program outweigh the perceived benefits for a large group of communities.
To more fully investigate these findings, I have designed and implemented a qualitative
study of six Superfund sites. The primary component of this qualitative study is a series of semistructured interviews to address topics of the rationale behind obtaining a TAG, the benefits and
improvements from the TAG process, the drawbacks of the TAG process and the impact of the
TAG program on the Superfund evaluation process. I attempted to interview EPA project
managers (PM), community representatives and technical consultants for each of the sites (only
one EPA PM was not willing to be interviewed). The design and results of this qualitative
evaluation are presented in Chapters 6 and 8.
This research also includes a quantitative study that investigates what happens when a
community gets a TAG – investigating measures related to schedule, take up rates, and remedy
selection. This quantitative portion of the study is presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Some of
the questions that are addressed in the qualitative part of the research arose from the results of
the quantitative assessment (e.g. why is the uptake for TAG programs so low – approximately
15%).
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Chapter 5 – Research Questions and Study Framework

This research evaluates both the process and outcomes of public participation in the
Superfund TAG program. The first part of the study utilizes theoretical understanding of public
participation from Chapters 3 and 4, along with site-specific data from Superfund sites across the
United States, and demographic data for the communities near Superfund sites to evaluate
behaviors and outcomes associated with the TAG program. The second part of the study utilizes
a multiple case study approach to gain additional insight into the Superfund TAG program in
central New York.
This study addresses the research questions identified in Chapter 1 regarding formal
public participation at Superfund sites, as implemented through the TAG program. These
questions are:
Research Question 1: What are the hallmarks or attributes of successful public
participation?
Research Question 2: What are the characteristics of highly technical and complex policy
decisions that could impact successful public participation and how do they impact
participation?
Research Question 3: What are the characteristics of the Superfund Technical Assistance
Grant (TAG) program that could address participation gaps resulting in this highly
technical setting?
Research Question 4: Is the Superfund TAG program successful in addressing these gaps?
Research Question 5: What factors determine the rate of utilization of TAGs at Superfund
sites?
Research Question 6: Does the presence of a TAG at a Superfund site have an impact on
the schedule for completion of remediation for Superfund sites?
Research Question 7: Does the presence of a TAG have an impact on the remedy selected to
address environmental issues at a Superfund site?
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Research Question 8: Are there findings from the research that can be applied to improve
the TAG program implementation, and more broadly improve participation in other
highly technical policy settings?

The first four questions were partially addressed in Chapter 4 and will be more fully
addressed in the qualitative study discussed in Chapter 8. The remaining research questions,
were used to formulate the working hypotheses for the quantitative research. The first set of
hypotheses pertains to the factors that are anticipated to influence the involvement of community
groups in Superfund decision-making through the TAG program. The second set of hypotheses
relates to the effect that public participation has on outcomes at Superfund sites, specifically the
schedule for cleanup and closure of sites.

5.1

Hypotheses of TAG Application and Award
The selection of a site for inclusion on the NPL is based on the potential for unacceptable

risk to human health and the environment as described in Chapter 2. Once a site is placed on the
NPL, several site characteristics and demographic measures should have an impact on the
decision of community to apply for a TAG and the subsequent award of a TAG. The TAG
program is not competitive or resource limited; if the community meets the requirements of the
TAG program as discussed in Section 2.3, a TAG award is made by EPA. The decision to obtain
a TAG is, therefore, made by the community.
It is expected that Community Characteristics, such as community resources and social
capital, will influence a community’s decision to participate in the remedy-selection process.
Consequently, a higher relative wealth, stability and education of the neighborhood near a
Superfund should result in an increased interest in the site by the community and an increased
ability of the community to maintain and improve the quality of their neighborhood. This
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combination of knowledge, interest and capacity should, therefore, result in an increased
likelihood of citizen involvement and TAG award. Some of these factors will be based on
preferences of the citizens (education and stability), some will be rooted in constraints of the
citizens (education and wealth) and some will have components of both.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): As the relative wealth, stability, and education of the citizens near a
Superfund site increase, the likelihood that a TAG will be applied for and awarded increases.

Site Characteristics will also affect the likelihood that a community will be actively
involved, apply for and be awarded a TAG. An increase in site complexity should result in a
greater need of the community to enlist outside technical assistance and may be an indicator of
greater potential environmental impact or environmental risk. Therefore, increased site
complexity is predicted to increase the likelihood of application for and award of a TAG.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): As the complexity and perceived hazards of a Superfund site
increase, the likelihood that a TAG will be applied for and awarded increases.

The party responsible for cleanup of the Superfund site should also have an impact on the
involvement of the community and the decision to apply for a TAG. Private parties (and Federal
agencies in the case of Federal sites) were found to be responsible, either directly or indirectly,
for creating the environmental impacts at the site, while EPA is typically viewed as the party
responsible for ensuring proper cleanup of the environmental problems. Thus, the involvement
of parties in addition to EPA at a site is likely to result in a decreased trust in the process by the
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community, based on real or perceived power imbalances. Because of this decrease in trust of
private companies and other Federal Agencies and an increased desire to engage technical
support to navigate the Superfund process, performance of site cleanup by any party other than
EPA is predicted to increase in the likelihood of a TAG award.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Sites where study or remediation is performed by a party other than
EPA (either Federal Agency or private party) will be more likely to have a TAG awarded.

5.2

Hypotheses of Schedule Impacts
The Superfund process has a well-established process roadmap as discussed in Chapter 2

and shown in Figure 2-1. In the context of this study of the TAG program, the three important
milestones are the discovery of the site, the initial selection of the remedy (which occurs when a
Record-of-Decision, or ROD, is issued), and site closure. The discovery of the site is the time at
which EPA becomes aware of potential environmental concerns at the site. A preliminary
identification has been made and the site has been acknowledged as problematic.
The issuance of the ROD is the time when a policy-level decision has been made
regarding the future response activities to be undertaken at the site. Public involvement prior to
the ROD can influence this decision-making process. The announcement of a remedy decision
may also influence the decision by the community to pursue a TAG. For instance, if the
decision-making process is moving too slowly the community may choose to become more
involved to accelerate response. Additionally, if the community is unsatisfied with the chosen
remedy, they may choose to apply for a TAG and enlist technical support to obtain a more
satisfactory remediation approach.
The third event of importance is site closure at the end of the Superfund process. Two
options were considered for this event; the date of the final closure report and the date that the
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site is delisted from the NPL. Remediation is deemed to be essentially complete at the time a
closure report is finalized. However, there are numerous instances where a long period elapses
between the completion of the remedy and the delisting of the site from the NPL - such as sites
with groundwater contamination that require a long period for cleanup or demonstration of the
performance of the remedy. In these cases, the site is cleaned up although not removed from the
NPL. For this reason, the closure report date is used as the “end of the process” in this study.
This is consistent with the methodology used in previous studies of Superfund site closures,
including the previously mentioned study by Daley.
For the purposes of this evaluation, the process is divided into two phases; Phase I is
defined as the period from discovery through issuance of the ROD, and Phase II as the period
from issuance of the ROD through site closure. The impact of TAG award on the schedule of
the site is expected to be different based on the phase of the program and the timing of the TAG
award. For example, complexity theory predicts that a TAG award before the ROD will increase
the time required to complete the ROD because of the addition of another party (the public) in
the decision-making and negotiation process. However, the award of a TAG before the ROD is
expected to result in a schedule decrease for the period from ROD to closure, since potential
conflicts that may arise are likely to have been addressed among the parties prior to the issuance
of the ROD. A simplified schematic of the Superfund process indicating the various points in
the process where a TAG might be awarded is presented in Figure 5-1.
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Potential TAG award events

NPL
Proposal

Final
NPL

RI/FS

ROD

Complete

NPL
Deletion

Figure 5-1. Superfund Process and TAG
award points

Three scenarios for TAG award are considered in estimating the impact of the TAG on
Superfund process schedule. All scenarios compare the schedule impacts of TAGs relative to the
baseline condition of no TAG awarded. The first scenario addresses the award of a TAG during
the Superfund process, regardless of the timing of such an award. In this scenario, complexity
theory suggests that the overall schedule (from discovery through site closure) will be increased,
although without specifying the timing of TAG award, the impact on the specific phase is not
estimable.
The second scenario addresses TAG award before the ROD is issued at a Superfund Site.
This is predicted to result in an increased duration of Phase I and a decreased duration of Phase
II. The net effect is predicted to increase the total project duration, with the organizational
complexity of an added party driving the schedule increase.
The third scenario addresses the award of a TAG after the ROD has been issued. In this
instance, there is no impact on the schedule since this is still the baseline condition (no TAG). It
is predicted that the duration of Phase II would be appreciably increased in this scenario for two
reasons; first, complexity theory suggests that adding a negotiating party will increase the time
for decision-making. Second, the award of the TAG after the ROD suggests that the community
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was in some way dissatisfied with the progress made on the site or the remedy selected. This
increases the chance of conflict in Phase II and the potential to revisit many decisions that were
made during Phase I. Like the previous scenario, it is theorized that the overall project duration
will increase because of the inclusion of another party in the deliberations and the potential for
renegotiating previous decisions. Table 5-1 presents a summary of the predicted impacts on
schedule based on TAG award at these various points in the Superfund process.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The impact of the award of a TAG award at any time in the process
will result in an increase in the time required to progress from NPL listing to site closure.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): A TAG award before the ROD at a Superfund will result in an
increased time to issue the ROD and a shorter duration from the ROD to site closure. The
overall schedule from NPL listing to site closure will be increased.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): A TAG award after the ROD will have no impact on the time to
issue a ROD and will increase the time from ROD to site closure. The overall schedule from
PL listing to site closure will be increased.

5.3

Hypotheses of Remedy Selection
There are conflicting factors at play when evaluating remediation choices when a TAG is

awarded. Some of this predict no impact on the remedy chosen at sites with a TAG, while others
suggest that the TAG will have an impact on the remediation method.
Democracy theory suggests that the remedy would be influenced and a more complicated
or “bigger” remedy would result. If the TAG was awarded because of power imbalance or lack
of trust in agency, then the presence of the community group should influence agency decisions
in a manner that would result in a more protective (i.e. bigger remedy).
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Table 5-1
Theoretical Framework
Schedule Models
Phase I

Phase II

Phase I and II

Baseline Condition (no TAG)

0

0

0

No TAG, baseline schedule

TAG any Time

?

?

+

Predicted to increase overall schedule due
to multi-party complexity

Timing of TAG Formation

Discussion

TAG before ROD

+

-

+

Predicted to increase time to ROD
(complexity) but decrease the ROD to
closure time (reduced conflict) and increase
overall schedule

TAG after ROD

0

+

+

No impact before ROD, and increase ROD
to closure (complexity and conflict) and
increase overall schedule

NOTES:
Schedule impact is defined as the expected variation from the baseline schedule with no TAG
0 indicates no expected change
- indicates that the schedule is expected to be shorter
+ indicates that the schedule is expected to be longer
? Indicates that the expected schedule impact is unknown
Phase I defined as the time from site discovery to completion of the first ROD for a site
Phase II defined as the time from the first ROD to site closure
Phase I and II combined is the time from site discovery to site closure
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Management and professionalism of the agency, however, suggests no impact on the
remedy selection. The agency will perform its duty in the same way with or without public
input. The primary function of the process resulting from a TAG, per this theoretical
perspective, is to inform the public and make them more comfortable and accepting of the
remedy chosen.
There is likely a combination of impacts from the TAG on the remedy selected, but I
predict that the overall influence of TAG on the remedy selected will be insignificant.

Hypothesis 7 (H7): A TAG award will have no significant impact on the remedy
chosen to address environmental impacts at a Superfund site.

The seven hypotheses in this study are investigated using a combination of techniques:
(1) empirical quantitative modeling using site and community level data, and (2) a qualitative,
multiple case study for six Superfund sites in central New York. The next chapter presents the
methodologies of these studies.
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Chapter 6 – Study Methodology
This section presents the research methodology for the quantitative and multiple case
study (quantitative) components of this evaluation. This mixed methods approach allows for
broad based analysis of nationwide data to address the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4 and a
deep dive into specific cases to examine aspects of the TAG program that are not fully captured
in the quantitative dataset. Details of the evaluation methodologies are presented in the following
sections.
6.1

Quantitative Study
6.1.1

Data Utilized

The primary data used in this analysis was obtained from two sources; EPA’s CERCLIS
database and the United States Bureau of the Census data for the 2000 Census. Information
regarding site-specific characteristics and process duration was obtained from EPA’s CERCLIS
database. The data utilized cover the period from the Superfund program’s inception in 1980
through December 2007. The CERCLIS database includes a broad range of data including
information on site characteristics - location, setting type (urban, rural, suburban), number of
OUs, types of chemical contaminants, types of contaminated media, EPA region, HRS for the
site, whether PRPs or Federal agencies were involved). In addition, it includes data on numerous
activities at the site and the date of occurrence – discovery, NPL proposal and listing, RI/FS
completion, ROD issuance, remediation start and completion, TAG award, and many others.
Census tract level demographic data were obtained from the 2000 Census (US Bureau of the
Census). The census tract data were merged with the CERCLIS data utilizing GIS to provide a
master database of site and demographic data. A summary of these site and demographic
factors and the anticipated impacts, as well as the rationale, is presented in Table 6-1.
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Table 6-1
Theoretical Framework
TAG Formation

Direction of
Change

Expected Impact
on TAG
Formation
Demographics

Home Value

+

+

Residents will get involved to maintain
neighborhood home values

Income

+

+

Higher income residents more likely to
become involved

Population Density

+

-

Higher density areas less likely to view
Superfund site negatively

Percent Minority

+

-

Minority groups less likely to become
engaged

Level of Education

+

+

Higher education level necessary to
navigate TAG program and predicts
involvement

Percent Owner Occupied

+

+

Home owners will be more interested in
maintaining property values

Tenure

+

+

Long-term residents are more invested in
community

Variable

Rationale

Site Characteristics
Complexity

+

+

Complex sites more likely to pose hazard
and require technical assitance

Private Party Resposibility

+

+

Less trust in private party to address
community needs

Federal Facility

+

+

Less trust in non-EPA governmental body to
protect health and environment

104

6.1.2

Likelihood of TAG Application and Award

The likelihood of TAG award should increase as the capacity, interest and knowledge of
the community increases. Neighborhood capacity measures include demographic wealth and
education indicators, such as home value, income, proportion of non-minorities and education
level in the community. As these measures increase, community capacity increases and the
likelihood of TAG award is predicted to increase. Neighborhood characteristics that are
potential measures of interest in the community include population density, home values,
percentage of owner occupied units and average tenure in the neighborhood. As home values,
owner-occupation and tenure increase interest in maintaining the quality of the community
should also increase. As population density increases, it is hypothesized that community interest
in an NPL site will decrease, since the overall impact of such a site in a dense (urban)
neighborhood may be less likely to be viewed negatively. The level of community knowledge
about the Superfund process and TAG program should increase with the education level in the
community, resulting in a greater likelihood of TAG application and award. The theoretical
causal chain for the decision to apply for a TAG and subsequent TAG award is depicted in
Figure 6-1.
As presented in hypotheses one through three (H1, H2, H3), it is expected that the
likelihood of TAG application and award is influenced by site characteristics and the
demographic makeup of the area near the Superfund site. A logistic probability model is used to
estimate the impact of each these variables on the likelihood of TAG application and award. The
logistic probability model (or logit) is used to identify the relationship between independent
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Increased
Income

Increased Home
Value and Tenure

Increased
Education

Increased
Capacity

Increased
Interest

Increased
Knowledge

Increased likelihood of
Community Group Forming

Increased likelihood of
TAG Award

Figure 6-1. Schematic of Causal Chain for TAG Award

.
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variables and the likelihood of the dependent variable being 1 (true) or 0 (false) (Long & Freese,
2014). The dependent variable in this model is a dichotomous variable, “tagdum”, indicating
whether a TAG was awarded at a site.
The logistic model provides estimates of the incremental impact of a unit change in each
independent variable on the probability of a TAG award. The following describes the general
relationship used in the analysis:

Pr(TAG ) = f ( DC , SC )

(Equation 1)

Where
Pr(TAG) = probability of TAG Award
DC = set of demographic characteristics (normalized home value, normalized income,
population density, percentage of minorities, percent of high school graduates,
percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of residents with tenure greater
than five years)
SC = set of site characteristics (OU count, HRS score, PRP (or private party dummy,
Federal Facility dummy).

Fixed effects were included in models to control for EPA Region to address the
considerable variation in the award of TAGs across EPA regions. This fixed effect is needed
since the program is decentralized and much discretion is left to the individual EPA regions.
Controls for year of discovery (to address any year fixed effects such as funding differential or
political climate) were also included.
A summary of the key independent, dependent and control variables is presented in
Table 6-2. Model specifications for evaluating the likelihood of TAG award are presented in
Table 6-3.
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Table 6-2
Summary of key dependent, control and independent variables
TAG Study Models
Variable

Description

Included in Models

Source

Dependent Variables
Tagdum

Dichotmous; 0 if no TAG, 1 if TAG

Logits

CERCLIS, constructed

Duration (Discovery to ROD)

Calculated time in days

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Duration (Discovery to Closure)

Calculated time in days

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Duration (ROD to Closure)

Calculated time in days

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Control Variables
US EPA Region

Dichotmous; indicating USEPA Region

Logits, OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Year of Discovery

Dichotmous; indicating start year

Logits, OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Independent Variables
Home Value (Normalized)

Median value of home, normalized

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

Income (Normalized)

Median income, normalized.

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

Population Density

Measure of population per square mile

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

% Minority

Non-white population

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

% Less than Assoc. Degree

Measure of education

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

% Owner Occupied

Measure of social capital, stability

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

% > 5 year tenure

Measure of social capital, stability

Logits, OLS, Survival

2000 Census, calculated

OU count

Number of Operable Units; measures complexity

Logits, OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, calculated

HRS Score

EPA ranking score, measure of perceived risk

Logits, OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, calculated

PRP Site

Dichotomous - 1 for private company lead

Logits, OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Federal Facility

Dichotomous - 1 for non-EPA federal agency

Logits, OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

Nearby TAG Award

Dichotomous - 1 for TAG w/in 50 miles

Logits

CERCLIS, constructed

Number of RODs

Number of RODS, measure of complexity

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, calculated

Number of TAGs

Number of TAGs awarded

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, calculated

Tagdum

Dichotomous; 0 if no TAG, 1 if TAG awarded

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

TAG Before ROD

Dichotomous; 1 if TAG before ROD, 0 if no TAG or
TAG after ROD

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

TAG After ROD

Dichotomous; 1 if TAG after ROD is signed

OLS, Survival

CERCLIS, constructed

NOTES:
Logit models are the likelihood models used to predict occurrence of a TAG or remedy effect
OLS is ordinary least squares regression used to predict effect of variables on duration of schedule
Survival is Cox-distribution survival analysis used to incorporate right-censoring of data for event that had not reached completion
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Table 6-3
TAG Study Model Specifications

Model
Designation

Research
Question

Specification
Parameters

Logit 1
Logit 2
Logit 3
Logit 4
OLS 1
OLS 2
OLS 3
OLS 4
OLS 5
OLS 6
Cox 1a

Probability of TAG
Probability of TAG
Probability of TAG
Probability of TAG
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (ROD to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)

Cox 1b
Cox 1c
Cox 1d
Cox 1e
Cox 1f

Duration (DS to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)

Cox 1g

Duration (DS to Closure)

Cox 2a
Cox 2b
Cox2c
Cox 2d
Cox 3a
Cox 3b
Cox 3c

Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (ROD to Closure)
Duration (ROD to Closure)
Duration (ROD to Closure)

Cox 3d
Cox 4a
Cox 4b
Cox 4c

Duration (ROD to Closure)
Duration (DS to Closure)
Duration (DS to ROD)
Duration (ROD to Closure)

Site and Community Characteristics
Logit1 plus region effects
Logit1 plus region and year
Logit 3 plus nearby previous TAG variable
Site and Community Characteristics, no TAG variable
OLS 1 plus TAG before ROD
OLS 2 plus regional fixed effects
OLS 3 plus year fixed effects
OLS 4 plus TAG after ROD
OLS 5 for full process period
Site/Community Characteristics, fixed effects, no
TAG variable
Cox 1a with no year effects
Cox 1b plus OU2, removal action (new base model)
Cox 1c plus tagdum
Cox 1b plus TAG before ROD, TAG after ROD
Cox 1d plus probability of TAG (to address possible
endogeneity)
Cox 1e plus probability of TAG (to address possible
endogeneity)
Base model (w/ OU2, removal action), tagdum
Cox 2a plus probability of TAG
Cox 2a plus TAG before ROD instead of tagdum
Cox 2c plus probability of TAG
Base model (w/ OU2, removal action), tagdum
Cox 3a plus probability of TAG
Cox3a plus TAG before ROD and TAG after ROD
instead of tagdum
Cox 3c plus probability of TAG
Annual analysis, hasTAG, probability of TAG
Annual analysis, hasTAG, probability of TAG
Annual analysis, hasTAG, probability of TAG
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6.1.3

Process Duration Modeling

As presented in hypotheses four through 6 (H4, H5, H6), and detailed in Table 5-1, the
impact of TAG award is a complex relationship that was modeled for several scenarios. The
following general equation was used to model the relationships:

Durationphase = f ( DC , SC , TAG )

(Equation 2)

Where
Duration phase = the duration of a given phase. Value calculated based on the dates of the
two events (obtained from the CERCLIS database) defining the beginning and
end of the phase;
DC = set of demographic characteristics (normalized home value, normalized income,
population density, percentage of minorities, percent of high school graduates,
percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of residents with tenure greater
than five years);
SC = set of site characteristics (OU count, HRS score, PRP dummy, Federal Facility
dummy); and
TAG = A dichotomous variable indicating the award of a TAG. Depending on the
estimation question, this was specified as Tagdum (i.e. was a TAG awarded at any
time in the process), TAG beforeROD (i.e. was a TAG awarded before the ROD), or
as TAG afterROD (i.e. was a TAG awarded after the ROD).

As with the TAG award model (Equation 1), fixed effects were included in all duration
models to control for EPA Region and year of discovery.
Several versions of the duration model were developed to estimate the impact of TAG
award on the project schedule. Variations are as follows:
•

Methodological approaches. Two different methodologies were used to estimate the
impact of independent variables on project durations. Duration modeling was performed
using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and survival analysis methodologies as discussed
below.
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•

Schedule impacts on three distinct phases of the Superfund process were evaluated by
including different left hand side variables; 1) the duration of the overall project from
Discovery to Closure, 2) the duration of Phase I (Discovery to ROD), and 3) the duration
of Phase II (ROD to Closure).

•

The effect of the presence and timing TAG award on durations was modeled by including
either a dichotomous variable for TAG award regardless of timing (Tagdum) or a pair of
dichotomous variables to indicate whether a TAG was awarded before or after the
issuance of the ROD (TAG beforeROD or TAG afterROD ).
Duration modeling was performed using two different methods: standard ordinary least

squares (OLS) regression and survival analysis (by Cox methodology) following the methods
identified in An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using STATA (Cleves, Gould, & Gutierrez,
2004). OLS methodology has the advantage of returning estimates of schedule impact in
standard time units (in this case days) making interpretation of the results more intuitive. This
method does have a major drawback, however, and is an incomplete approach, since a large
percentage of the sites has not yet reached closure. This results in a right censoring of the data,
or dropping all observations from statistical calculations where the end of a phase has not been
reached. Survival analysis methodology (or Cox modeling) is used to address this characteristic
of the data set. By setting up the data in survival analysis format, all the data, including
observations that have not reached the end of a phase (or failure), are included. Model
specifications for Superfund process duration are summarized in Table 6-3. Descriptive statistics
for the duration of various Superfund phases for the data set are presented in Table 6-4.
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Table 6-4
Descriptive Statistics
Duration Modeling

Duration Period (1)

Units

Filter Applied

Number of
Observations

Median
Value

Standard
Deviation

Minimum
Value

Maximum
Value

TAG to ROD

days

TAG before ROD

89

1097

921

17

4776

ROD to TAG

days

ROD before TAG

129

1804

1454

1

6203

Discovery to ROD
Discovery to ROD
Discovery to ROD
Discovery to ROD

days
days
days
days

None (2)
TAG awarded
No TAG awarded
TAG before ROD

1396
220
1175
89

3770
3712
3781
4971

1827
1758
1840
1482

26
196
26
1932

10164
8854
10164
8854

ROD to Closure
ROD to Closure
ROD to Closure
ROD to Closure
ROD to Closure

days
days
days
days
days

None (3)
TAG awarded anytime
No TAG awarded
TAG before ROD
TAG after ROD

279
36
243
15
21

2276
3457
2101
2411
4204

1771
1970
1674
1325
2038

0
0
0
0
611

8022
8022
8003
4908
8022

Discovery to Closure
Discovery to Closure
Discovery to Closure
Discovery to Closure
Discovery to Closure

days
days
days
days
days

None (3)
TAG awarded
No TAG awarded
TAG before ROD
TAG after ROD

285
36
249
15
21

5376
6753
5177
6657
6821

1863
1785
1792
1852
1778

764
3637
764
3637
4237

10116
10116
9986
9410
10116

Notes
(1) TAG - Technical Assistance Grant
ROD - Record of Decision
(2) Only includes sites with a ROD issued
(3) Only includes sites where closure has been achieved
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6.1.4

Remedy Selection Modeling

As presented in hypothesis 7 (H7) the impact of TAG award on the remedy chosen at a
Superfund is predicted to be insignificant. The following general model was used to model the
relationships:

RS = f ( DC , SC , TAG )

(Equation 3)

Where
RS = Remedy Score, a constructed variable depicting the type of remedy selected
for the site. The value calculated based on whether the remediation
included treatment, containment, or institutional controls;
DC = set of demographic characteristics (normalized home value, normalized
income, population density, percentage of minorities, percent of high
school graduates, percentage of owner-occupied homes, percentage of
residents with tenure greater than five years);
SC = set of site characteristics (OU count, HRS score, PRP dummy, Federal
Facility dummy); and
TAG = A dichotomous variable indicating the award of a TAG.

An ordered multinomial logistic model approach was used to estimate the impact of TAG
award on remedy selection (Long & Freese, 2014). Institutional controls, or IC, (such as deed
restrictions or fencing) are used when site conditions are such that unrestricted use are not
achieved. Containment (C) remedies include the construction of an engineered cap or other
containment structures to isolate materials that left onsite. Treatment (T) remedies are utilized to
reduce the mobility, toxicity or volume of waste at a Superfund site. The remedy codes, and
ordered outcomes is as follows:
•

Remedy Code = 7; Treatment only, maximum remedy since site risks are addressed via
treatment without the need for institutional controls or containment;
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•

Remedy Code = 6; Treatment with containment, with no need for institutional controls.
In this case, treatment performed but constituent levels are such that risk targets cannot
be achieved without the addition of containment;

•

Remedy Code = 5; Treatment, containment and institutional controls, which required the
use of controls for protection;

•

Remedy Code = 4; Treatment with institutional controls and no containment;

•

Remedy Code = 3; Institutional controls and containment with no treatment;

•

Remedy Code = 2; Containment only; and

•

Remedy Code = 1; Institutional controls only.

The ordered logistic model is like the logistic model except that multiple outcomes (the
different remedy codes) are possible instead of the dichotomous left hand (or dependent)
variable. By ordering the outcomes as listed above, more protective remedies receive a higher
ranking and less protective remedies receive a lower ranking. The ordered multinomial logit
model is then used to estimate the effect of TAG award (and other independent variables) on the
remedy score.

6.2

Qualitative Case Studies
The qualitative study was performed at a select number of Superfund sites that received a

TAG. The purpose of the case study to obtain more in-depth information to questions about the
TAG program than the EPA CERCLIS database provided – (1) why did communities decided to
pursue a TAG; (2) what relationships and participatory capacity existed within the community;
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(3) what were the benefits and drawbacks of the TAG program; and (4) what difference did the
TAG make in the process?
The case study approach is designed to answer just such questions, especially when other
methodologies cannot be used to fully explain the phenomena of interest (Yin, 2009).
Furthermore, the multiple case study improves the credibility, transferability, dependability, and
confirmability (Trochim, 2001) of the research since multiple data observations are made to
support or refute the findings that may result from a single case study.
The important research design factors include case selection and identification of case
study methods to be employed. The selection of cases for this research was designed to provide
a range of site settings (urban, rural and suburban), a range of site complexities (from a landfill
to a barge terminal with many different types of operations), a variety of EPA project managers,
variation in the remediation outcomes (consolidation and capping, incineration, offsite disposal),
and TAGs that were awarded at different times in the process. Six cases were selected in central
New York, three near Binghamton and three near Syracuse that met these criteria. Table 6-5
presents a summary of case study site characteristics.
The methodology employed included a review of the EPA files and news coverage
related to the sites, followed by semi-structured interviews with relevant site representatives.
Interviews were conducted with one or more community representatives, one or more EPA
project managers (PMs), and the technical advisor that was hired for each site, except that for
one site the EPA PM did not agree to be interviewed.
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Table 6‐5
Descriptive Statistics
Case Study Sites (Central New York)
Site ID
Site Setting
HRS
TAG Awarded?
Number of RODs
Discovery Date
TAG Award
Discovery to NPL (days)
Discovery to NPL Deletion (days)
Discovery to ROD (days)
Discovery to ROD (years)
Discovery to NPL Proposal (days)
Discovery to Close (days)
Discovery to Close (years)
Discovery to TAG (days)
NPL to ROD (days)
Number of Operable Units
PRP Site?
TAG before ROD?
TAG after ROD?
Minority (%)
Tenure > 5 years (%)
Less than College Degree (%)
Normalized Income
Normalized Home Value
Owner Occupied (%)
Population Density (#/sq mile)
Removal Action Performed?

Site F
Rural
34.48
Yes
1
01/01/80
03/24/89
2352
5882
3284
9.0
1749
5111
14.0
3370
932
2
Yes
No
Yes
2.87
57.04
82.20
‐1.93
‐4.08
75.32
155.90
Yes

Site A
Rural
34.78
Yes
1
06/01/80
09/26/91
1194
N/A
3771
10.3
942
N/A
N/A
4134
2577
2
Yes
No
Yes
5.09
57.45
83.75
‐3.44
‐6.39
55.84
22.72
Yes

Site C
Rural
29.36
Yes
1
05/01/79
10/01/95
3622
N/A
5994
16.4
3342
N/A
N/A
5997
2372
3
Yes
No
Yes
3.13
56.51
75.97
‐3.07
‐5.20
57.92
121.37
No

Site D
Suburban
34.86
Yes
1
05/18/82
10/01/95
1891
N/A
5614
15.4
1484
N/A
N/A
4884
3723
2
Yes
Yes
No
1.83
61.95
84.11
‐2.84
‐4.65
52.63
21.45
Yes

Site E
Urban
36.5
Yes
1
05/01/82
09/30/88
495
N/A
2708
7.4
243
N/A
N/A
2344
2213
3
Yes
Yes
No
1.39
63.70
75.41
‐0.90
‐3.96
80.84
126.07
Yes

Site B
Suburban
51.35
Yes
1
05/29/84
09/30/90
1767
N/A
5046
13.8
1487
N/A
N/A
2315
3279
2
Yes
Yes
No
5.56
34.78
72.63
‐3.30
‐4.62
25.49
5808.53
Yes
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Because the case study process involved the use of human subjects, approval of the
methodology was requested and received from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Syracuse
University. One of the conditions of the IRB approval was that anonymity of the participants be
maintained. For that reason, the cases are referred to as Case A through Case F, and the labels
“Community Representative”, “EPA Project Manager” and “Technical Consultant” are used to
identify the participants.
The interviews were semi-structured; an interview script and list of questions was
established, but the responses to the questions were open-ended and participants could answer as
they chose. Follow-up questions were asked as needed for clarification. Community
representative interviews were performed in-person, except for one interview which was
performed via phone. All EPA and technical consultant interviews were performed via phone.
The interview questionnaires are included in Appendix A and covered the following topics:
background of the individuals with community involvement and Superfund; the application and
grant process in general; details of the timing and use of the TAG; benefits of being awarded a
TAG; drawbacks of the TAG program; satisfaction with the TAG program; and the perceived
impacts of the TAG on process, schedule and remedy.
The answers to the questions were accumulated and data collected relative to the key
research questions of why get a TAG, what did the TAG add or detract, and what was the impact
of the TAG, as well as general observations that were offered by interviewees. These results are
presented and discussed in Chapter 8.

117

Chapter 7 - Quantitative Findings

7.1

Data Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for Superfund sites, including EPA regional breakdowns and the mean
duration of various phases, are shown in Table 7-1. The average time from discovery to closure
for NPL sites is 14.7 years (14.2 years for sites without a TAG and 18.4 years for sites with a
TAG). This is consistent with Hypothesis 4 and is investigated further in Section 7.3.
Figure 7-1 depicts the number of Superfund sites at each stage of the process as of January
2008. Approximately 93% of sites proposed for the NPL were placed on the final NPL. Of the
sites that are on the final NPL, a ROD had been issued at approximately 89% of the sites and
approximately 20% of the NPL sites had been remediated and deleted from the NPL.

1800
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1682

1564
1396

1400
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800
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400
200
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PROPOSED FINAL

ROD

DELETED

Figure 7-1. Superfund sites by stage of
process (January 2008).
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Figure 7-2 shows the breakdown of TAG awards by the stage of the Superfund process in
which they were awarded. Approximately 15.6% of all NPL sites have been awarded TAGs.
Slightly less than half of the TAGs were awarded before the ROD (46.3%), and slightly more
than half (53.7%) after the ROD.

BEFORE NPL

10

BEFORE ROD

103

BEFORE AMENDMENT

109

BEFORE CLOSURE

19

BEFORE DELETION

3
0

Note: 84.4% of sites are not awarded a TAG.

20

40
60
Number of Sites

80

100

120

Figure 7-2. TAG award by stage of process.

There is considerable variation in the percentage of NPL sites with a TAG award by EPA
region (as shown in Table 7-1 and Figures 7-3 and 7-4). This fraction of sites with a TAG ranges
from less than 10% for Regions 5 (upper Midwest with headquarters in Chicago) and 7 (Great
Plains with headquarters in Kansas City) to greater than thirty percent in Regions 1 (New
England with headquarters in Boston), 6 (Southwest/Gulf of Mexico with headquarters in Dallas)
and 8 (Rocky Mountain region with headquarters in Denver). There a number of factors that
may influence this, including a potential mistrust of the agency in certain regions, a propensity
for some EPA regions to support or present barriers to public participation, and regional
differences in the public view of the role of government. For example, the results in Regions 1
and 8 (New England and the Rocky Mountains) may reflect the individual responsibility
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Table 7-1
Descriptive Statistics
Superfund Sites (as of January 2008)

All NPL Sites

NPL Sites w/ TAG

NPL Sites w/o
TAG

Percentage of
Sites with TAG

EPA Region
Region 1 (New England)
Region 2 (Northeast)
Region 3 (MidAtlantic)
Region 4 (Southeast)
Region 5 (Midwest)
Region 6 (Gulf Coast)
Region 7 (Plains)
Region 8 (Rocky Mountains)
Region 9 (Southwest)
Region 10 (Northwest)
Total All Regions

112
265
208
211
287
116
82
61
125
97
1564

41
37
22
29
16
37
5
26
21
10
244

71
228
186
182
271
79
77
35
104
87
1320

36.6%
14.0%
10.6%
13.7%
5.6%
31.9%
6.1%
42.6%
16.8%
10.3%
15.6%

Sites w/ ROD
Sites to reach closure
Sites w/ TAG(s)
Sites w/ PRPs
Sites w/ Federal Facilty
Sites w/ EPA lead

1396
286
244
924
191
449

220
37
--156
43
45
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characteristics, while Region 6 (Southwest/Gulf of Mexico) are decidedly distrustful of industry
and government-industry relations. The average duration from discovery to closure for an NPL
site is approximately 15 years and increases to approximately 18 years for NPL sites where a
TAG is awarded. The average duration of Phase I (discovery to ROD issuance) is about the
same for each category of site at slightly over ten years. The average time from ROD issuance to
site closure is approximately six years for all sites and increases to approximately nine years for
sites where a TAG is awarded. This implies a dissatisfaction with the remedy selected, the
remedy process, or both. This a key component to the multiple case study evaluation presented
in Chapter 8.
Table 7-2 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in
the study, including number of observations, mean values, standard deviations, and minimum
and maximum values.

7.2

Determinants of TAG Formation
The results of the logistic modeling for estimation of the effect of factors on the

likelihood of TAG award are presented in Table 7-3. The model “Logit1” includes demographic
and site characteristic independent variables only. “Logit2” incorporates EPA regional fixed
effects while “Logit3” incorporates year of discovery fixed effects as well.
An additional analysis was performed based on information obtained from the
completion of the multiple cases studies. One of the findings of the case study was the
importance of a network of experience or mentor to guide a community through the TAG
process. To model this effect quantitatively, I constructed a dichotomous variable to indicate
whether the sites had a previously awarded nearby TAG from which to draw experiences and
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Table 7-2
Descriptive Statistics - Study Variables

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

tagdum
OU Count

1555
1555

0.156
3.64

0.363
4.33

0
1

1
86

OU2
PRP site
Federal Facility
Normalized Home Value
Normalized Income
Population Density
Minority (%)
< college degree (%)
> 5-year tenure (%)
Owner occupied (%)
HRS Score
Probability of TAG
Remedy Code
Nearby TAG Dummy

1555
1555
1555
1511
1511
1510
1507
1506
1507
1504
1555
1478
1418
1555

32.0
0.59
0.12
0.00
0.00
1,184
19.7
72.6
51.2
62.8
41.2
16.1
4.97
0.41

217.5
0.49
0.33
6.97
3.99
1,967
22.1
14.9
14.5
22.0
12.06
15.5
2.08
0.49

1
0
0
-10
-10
0
-15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

7,396
1
1
70.2
26.2
23,976
100
100
100
99.2
84.9
91.0
7
1
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Table 7-3 Logit Models
Odds Ratios Reported
Logit1
No fixed effects

Logit2
Region effects

Logit3
Region and year
effects

Nearby TAG dummy
1.054**
1.048*
(0.0175)
(0.0197)
0.941
Normalized Income
0.908*
(0.0378)
(0.0434)
Population Density
1.000
1.000
(0.0000431)
(0.0000437)
Minority %
1.007
1.003
(0.00372)
(0.00436)
0.990
Less than college degree
0.983*
(0.00796)
(0.00841)
Owner Occupied %
0.994
0.994
(0.00589)
(0.00634)
Tenure > 5 years
1.025**
1.022*
(0.00810)
(0.00893)
***
OU Count
1.283
1.300***
(0.0653)
(0.0683)
**
OU Squared
0.995
0.995**
(0.00163)
(0.00160)
***
Removal Action
2.107
1.846***
(0.336)
(0.308)
HRS Score
1.007
1.007
(0.00621)
(0.00639)
PRP Site Dummy
1.528*
1.659*
(0.287)
(0.328)
Federal Facility Dummy
0.874
1.002
(0.292)
(0.351)
Constant
0.0421***
0.0273***
(0.0291)
(0.0212)
Observations
1506
1506
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Logit 1 – No regional or year effects
Logit 2 – Regional effects
Logit 3 – Regional and year effects
Logit 4 – Nearby TAG dummy
Normalized Home Value

1.041*
(0.0201)
0.955
(0.0459)
1.000
(0.0000476)
1.002
(0.00450)
0.992
(0.00870)
0.993
(0.00659)
1.023*
(0.00922)
1.314***
(0.0694)
0.995***
(0.00155)
1.888***
(0.322)
1.007
(0.00666)
1.745**
(0.374)
1.109
(0.404)
0.0540*
(0.0761)
1480

Logit4
Nearby TAG

1.511*
(0.269)
1.040*
(0.0200)
0.947
(0.0456)
1.000
(0.0000482)
1.001
(0.00456)
0.991
(0.00872)
0.994
(0.00662)
1.024**
(0.00931)
1.319***
(0.0707)
0.994***
(0.00160)
1.897***
(0.325)
1.007
(0.00668)
1.758**
(0.377)
1.072
(0.392)
0.0455*
(0.0647)
1480
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resources. The results of the logistic regression to evaluate the impact of the nearby TAG award
are shown in Table 7-3 as “Logit 4”.
Logistic model results are presented as odds ratios for each of the variables. Larger odds
ratios indicate a greater impact of the independent variable on the likelihood of TAG award. An
odds ratio greater than one demonstrates an increase in the likelihood of a TAG award as the
variable value increases, while an odds ratio of less than one indicates that as the variable value
increases the likelihood of TAG award decreases.
The results show that increasing home values and increasing percentage of occupants
with tenure of greater than five years significantly increase the likelihood of TAG award (at the
0.05 level) both with and without regional and year of discovery fixed effects. None of the other
demographic parameters (income, population density, percentage of minorities or education) are
significant influences on the likelihood of TAG award in the fixed effects model. These findings
are supportive of the wealth and stability assumptions of Hypothesis 1, but do not support the
concept that increased education results in increased TAG award.
Of the site characteristic measurements, an increase in the number of operable units at a
site (a measure of site complexity), the performance of site work by a private party significantly,
and the performance of a removal action significantly increase the likelihood of TAG application
and award (at the 0.05 level), consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 3. None of the other site
characteristic variables have a significant impact on TAG award. The fixed effects modeling
demonstrated that TAGs were more likely to awarded (and the results were statistically
significant) in Regions 1, 6, and 8 and were significantly less likely to occur in Regions 5 and 7,
consistent with the summary presented in Table 7-1.
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The evaluation of the impact of a nearby previous TAG (Logit 4) indicates that the
proximity of a previous TAG does impact the formation of a group and award of TAG. The
odds ratio indicates that the odds of awarding a TAG is 1.5 times greater than not getting a TAG;
an impact that is greater than all variables except for private entity (PRP) involvement at a site
and the performance of a removal action (an indication of potential eminent health or
environmental threat). This underscores the importance of network connection and strong
leadership and information sharing from EPA to the public.

7.3

Impact of TAGs on Superfund Schedule

7.3.1

Duration t-tests

As a preliminary estimate of the impact of TAG award, statistical t-testing was performed
for three TAG variables (tagdum, TAG before ROD, and TAG after ROD) and three process
phases (discovery-to-closure, discovery-to-ROD, and ROD-to-closure). The results of these ttests are summarized in Table 7-4 and show the following:
•

The award of a TAG (tagdum) results in significantly different average durations in the
discovery-to-closure (1573 days or 30%) and ROD-to-closure (1340 days or 63%)
intervals;

•

The award of TAG before the ROD results in significantly different average durations in
the discovery-to-closure (1347 days or 25%) and the discovery-to-ROD (1290 days or
35%) intervals; and
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Table 7-4
Results of t-tests
Durations and TAG Award

Variable

Discovery to Close

Discovery to ROD

ROD to Close

tagdum

1573.2***

-70.13

1340.6***

(4.9)

(-0.52)

(4.38)

5179.5***

3776.0***

2116.4***

(44.97)

(70.38)

(19.07)

1347.0**

1289.6***

125.1

(2.74)

(6.54)

(0.27)

5309.6***

3681.6***

2285.7***

(46.71)

(73.41)

(20.76)

1556.3***

-1035.1***

2070.4***

(3.75)

(-6.19)

(5.42)

5265.1***

3861.2***

2133.9***

(46.31)

(75.70)

(20.16)

280

1377

274

constant

TAG before ROD
constant

TAG after ROD
constant

Number of
observations

t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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•

The award of a TAG after the ROD results in significantly different average durations in
the discovery-to-closure (1556 days or 30%) and discovery-to-closure (2070 days or
97%) intervals.
These results raise some interesting questions, especially regarding the impact of TAG

award in the post-ROD period. The overall schedule impact is greater for TAGs awarded later in
the process (i.e., after the ROD), with average time from discovery to closure increasing by
approximately 165 days. Sites that are awarded a TAG after the ROD, achieve the ROD issuance
almost 3 years sooner, but that schedule gain is more than lost in the post-ROD phase. It may be
that a rush through the process yields a remedy that is not acceptable to the community resulting
in group formation and TAG award. The process does not meet the needs of the community, the
TAG is a method for restoring trust and efficacy to process, and the resulting conflict results in
re-work of the earlier stages and corresponding delay. Statistical t-tests were not performed for
the TAG after ROD dichotomous variable in the discovery-to-ROD phase since the TAG award
occurs after the endpoint of interest.

7.3.2

Duration Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Modeling

OLS modeling was performed as another preliminary and illustrative evaluation method.
It includes only those sites that have completed the given phase (i.e., it is right censored).
Interpretation is relatively simple, but the right-censoring introduces error into the analysis that I
address using survival analysis (Section 7.3.3).
The results of the OLS modeling for estimation of the effect of TAG award on the
schedule at Superfund sites are summarized in Table 7-5. Models OLS1 (no TAG variable),
OLS2 (with a TAG before ROD dichotomous variable), OLS3 (adding EPA Region fixed
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Table 7-5. OLS Duration Models
Duration in days
OLS1

OLS2

OLS3

OLS4

OLS5

OLS6

DS to ROD

DS to ROD

DS to ROD
Region Effects

DS to ROD
Region/year

ROD-Close
Region/year

DS-Close
Region/year

1,270.7***
(197.1)

1,341.7***
(199.8)

1,302.0***
(194.1)

-9.183

-13.95

-14.19

-13.59

184.5
(480.1)
1,142.8*
(452.6)
72.29

1,145.3*
(501.9)
1,003.5*
(473.7)
50.71

(11.48)
44.05

(11.33)
56.77*

(12.35)
48.92

(12.03)
42.06

(43.69)
-190.8*

(44.70)
-87.54

(27.97)
-0.0222

(27.62)
-0.0214

(29.62)
-0.0276

(28.86)
-0.00511

(83.56)
-0.170*

(87.17)
-0.113

(0.0277)
1.076
(2.617)
7.738

(0.0273)
1.017
(2.578)
9.707

(0.0277)
3.828
(2.811)
10.47

(0.0270)
3.517
(2.730)
6.407

(0.0719)
1.942
(6.028)
-37.75*

(0.0747)
5.044
(6.262)
-2.609

(5.630)
-7.912*
(4.031)
1.168
(5.198)
-45.93
(23.75)
0.126
(0.401)
-225.8*
(99.40)
21.46***
(4.140)
12.21
(114.0)
1,040.2***
(213.3)
2,925.4***
(459.4)

(5.554)
-8.262*
(3.972)
-0.276
(5.126)
-51.18*
(23.41)
0.233
(0.395)
-260.0**
(98.07)
21.25***
(4.079)
7.496
(112.3)
973.2***
(210.4)
2,849.7***
(452.7)

(5.594)
-5.725
(4.088)
-2.947
(5.461)
-56.15*
(23.92)
0.363
(0.400)
-272.6**
(99.58)
22.41***
(4.072)
-6.651
(113.9)
845.5***
(211.3)
2,818.5***
(491.5)

(5.468)
-7.244
(3.984)
-0.906
(5.313)
-75.03**
(23.26)
0.665
(0.387)
-116.2
(97.60)
22.10***
(3.994)
-238.3*
(114.8)
818.6***
(207.5)
2,751.0***
(656.2)

(15.97)
4.012
(11.20)
18.77
(13.64)
561.4***
(154.1)
-15.18**
(5.432)
556.8*
(223.1)
2.327
(8.376)
249.5
(228.5)
-182.0
(565.5)
825.2
(1683.6)

(16.42)
5.338
(11.66)
4.478
(14.28)
436.5**
(159.5)
-10.82
(5.630)
-27.04
(232.3)
14.27
(8.364)
610.4*
(236.9)
181.4
(588.3)
1,400.4
(1761.4)

TAG before
ROD
TAG after ROD
Normalized
Home Value
Normalized
Income
Population
Density
Minority (%)
< College
Degree
Owner Occupied
Tenure > 5 years
OU count
OU Squared
Removal Action
HRS Score
PRP Site Dummy
Fed Facility
Constant

Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
OLS3 includes regional effects; OLS4-OLS6 includes regional and year effects
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effects), and OLS4 (adding year of discovery fixed effects) model the duration of the phase from
discovery (DS) through the issuance of the ROD (Phase I).
The average duration of Phase I is approximately 10.3 years (Table 7-1). The OLS
modeling demonstrates the award of a TAG before the ROD is issued has a significant impact on
the schedule and results in an increase in duration for Phase I (discovery to ROD) of
approximately 1300 days (3.7 years) including year ad region effects. The award of a TAG
increased the duration of Phase I by over 30 percent, supporting Hypothesis 5. The results also
demonstrate the impact of including EPA region and year of discovery fixed effects.
The average duration of Phase II (ROD to closure) is approximately 6.2 years (Table 71). The results of OLS5 (ROD to Closure Phase) show that a TAG awarded after the ROD
increases the duration of this Phase by 1,142 days (3.1 years or 50%), consistent with Hypothesis
6. The award of a TAG before the ROD has a small but statistically insignificant effect of the
duration of Phase II.
The average duration of the discovery to closure period is approximately 14.7 years
(Table 7-1). The results of OLS6 (Discovery to Closure) shows that a TAG awarded before the
ROD has a significant impact and results in an increased duration of 1145 days (approximately
3.1 years or 21%). Similarly, a TAG awarded after the ROD has a significant impact and results
in increased duration of 1003 days (2.7 years or 19%). These findings support Hypotheses 5 and
6.

7.3.3

Survival Analysis Modeling

The results of survival analysis modeling (using Cox analysis methods) are presented in
Table 7-6 (Discovery to ROD), Table 7-7 (for ROD to Closure), and Table 7-8 (Discovery to
Closure), for a dataset including one entry for each Superfund site. Each of these models are
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Table 7-6. Survival Analysis - Discovery to ROD
(Hazard ratios reported)

TAG Dummy

Cox2a
0.989
(0.0791)

Cox2b
1.039
(0.0837)

TAG before ROD

Cox2c

Cox2d

0.508***
(0.0583)

0.530***
(0.0610)

0.979***
(0.00489)

Probability of TAG

0.982***
(0.00497)

1.015

1.027**

1.019*

1.028***

(0.00803)

(0.00879)

(0.00791)

(0.00866)

0.977
(0.0183)

0.968
(0.0186)

0.969
(0.0180)

0.963*
(0.0183)

1.000
(0.0000162)

1.000
(0.0000167)

1.000
(0.0000161)

1.000
(0.0000166)

0.998
(0.00166)

0.999
(0.00167)

0.998
(0.00166)

0.998
(0.00168)

1.001

0.999

1.000

0.998

(0.00341)

(0.00348)

(0.00340)

(0.00346)

Owner Occupied (%)

1.004
(0.00244)

1.003
(0.00249)

1.004
(0.00244)

1.003
(0.00249)

Tenure > 5 years

0.998
(0.00324)

1.003
(0.00353)

0.998
(0.00326)

1.003
(0.00356)

OU count

1.060***
(0.0163)

1.142***
(0.0316)

1.066***
(0.0181)

1.144***
(0.0347)

1.000
(0.000388)

0.998*
(0.000693)

0.999
(0.000479)

0.998*
(0.000791)

Removal Action

1.183**
(0.0682)

1.352***
(0.0906)

1.203**
(0.0693)

1.346***
(0.0906)

HRS Score

0.983***
(0.00224)

0.985***
(0.00228)

0.982***
(0.00227)

0.984***
(0.00232)

PRP Site Dummy

1.196**
(0.0783)

1.327***
(0.0932)

1.214**
(0.0794)

1.325***
(0.0931)

Fed Facility Dummy

0.743*
(0.0934)

0.703**
(0.0903)

0.758*
(0.0963)

0.711**
(0.0934)

Normalized Home
Value

Normalized Income

Population Density

Minority (%)

Less than College
Degree (%)

OU Squared

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA region controls
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Table 7-7. Survival Analysis - ROD to Closure
(Hazard ratios reported)

TAG Dummy

Cox3a
1.181
(0.237)

Cox3b
1.200
(0.248)

TAG before ROD
TAG after ROD
Probability of TAG

Cox3c

Cox3d

1.314
(0.379)
1.103
(0.272)

1.345
(0.398)
1.120
(0.279)
0.995
(0.0131)

0.996
(0.0131)
0.932**

0.934*

0.932**

0.934*

(0.0250)

(0.0258)

(0.0250)

(0.0259)

Normalized Income

1.036
(0.0521)

1.032
(0.0531)

1.038
(0.0525)

1.034
(0.0534)

Population Density

1.000
(0.0000409)

1.000
(0.0000416)

1.000
(0.0000410)

1.000
(0.0000416)

1.002
(0.00363)

1.002
(0.00372)

1.002
(0.00362)

1.002
(0.00371)

0.996

0.996

0.996

0.996

(0.00838)

(0.00856)

(0.00839)

(0.00857)

Pct Owner Occupied (%)

1.007
(0.00634)

1.007
(0.00643)

1.007
(0.00635)

1.007
(0.00644)

Tenure > 5 years (%)

1.002
(0.00758)

1.003
(0.00836)

1.002
(0.00758)

1.003
(0.00836)

OU count

0.672***
(0.0510)

0.681***
(0.0569)

0.674***
(0.0512)

0.684***
(0.0572)

1.004***
(0.000961)

1.004***
(0.00105)

1.004***
(0.000961)

1.004***
(0.00105)

1.082
(0.149)

1.110
(0.175)

1.084
(0.150)

1.116
(0.177)

HRS Score

0.987*
(0.00521)

0.987*
(0.00534)

0.987*
(0.00523)

0.987*
(0.00536)

PRP Site Dummy

0.542***
(0.0797)

0.554***
(0.0907)

0.544***
(0.0799)

0.557***
(0.0914)

Fed Facility Dummy

0.816
(0.259)

0.812
(0.258)

0.812
(0.257)

0.808
(0.257)

Normalized Home Value

Minority (%)

Less than College
Degree

OU Squared

Removal Action

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA region controls
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Table 7-8. Survival Analysis - Discovery to Closure
(Hazard ratios reported)
Cox1a

Cox1b

Cox1c

TAG Dummy

Cox1d
1.004
(0.196)

Cox1e

Cox1f
1.028
(0.204)

Cox1g

TAG before ROD

0.805
(0.222)

0.826
(0.231)

TAG after ROD

1.235
(0.303)

1.252
(0.309)

Prob. of TAG

0.991
(0.0125)

0.992
(0.0126)

0.939*

0.940*

0.940*

0.940*

0.940*

0.941*

0.941*

(0.0256)

(0.0254)

(0.0254)

(0.0254)

(0.0254)

(0.0264)

(0.0263)

1.014

1.022

1.023

1.023

1.020

1.023

1.021

(0.0514)

(0.0509)

(0.0512)

(0.0513)

(0.0510)

(0.0522)

(0.0520)

1.000
(0.0000390)

1.000
(0.0000380)

1.000
(0.0000381)

1.000
(0.0000381)

1.000
(0.0000381)

1.000
(0.0000388)

1.000
(0.0000388)

1.002
(0.00349)

1.001
(0.00347)

1.001
(0.00348)

1.001
(0.00348)

1.001
(0.00350)

1.002
(0.00356)

1.002
(0.00357)

0.998

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.999

(0.00874)

(0.00842)

(0.00847)

(0.00849)

(0.00848)

(0.00862)

(0.00862)

Owner Occupied

1.012*
(0.00621)

1.012
(0.00611)

1.012
(0.00613)

1.012
(0.00613)

1.012
(0.00612)

1.011
(0.00621)

1.011
(0.00620)

Tenure > 5 years

0.999
(0.00737)

0.998
(0.00733)

0.998
(0.00733)

0.998
(0.00733)

0.998
(0.00734)

1.000
(0.00797)

1.000
(0.00799)

OU count

0.782***
(0.0447)

0.780***
(0.0444)

0.735***
(0.0481)

0.735***
(0.0489)

0.727***
(0.0491)

0.755***
(0.0568)

0.746***
(0.0570)

1.003***
(0.000869)

1.003***
(0.000881)

1.004***
(0.000889)

1.003**
(0.000974)

1.003***
(0.000986)

0.974
(0.125)

0.973
(0.126)

0.969
(0.125)

1.018
(0.152)

1.008
(0.151)

Normalized
Home Value

Normalized
Income

Pop. Density

Minority %

Less than College
Degree %

OU Squared

Removal Action

HRS Score

0.977***
(0.00483)

0.976***
(0.00468)

0.976***
(0.00471)

0.976***
(0.00472)

0.976***
(0.00470)

0.978***
(0.00489)

0.978***
(0.00488)

PRP Site Dummy

0.586***
(0.0803)

0.608***
(0.0816)

0.615***
(0.0827)

0.615***
(0.0829)

0.610***
(0.0824)

0.641**
(0.0946)

0.634**
(0.0938)

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA region controls
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based on a dataset that includes one entry for each site, along with start and end dates for each
process milestone. In addition, I constructed a panel dataset to include site information for each
year after discovery, to perform a more granular analysis of the data. This set included an entry
for each site and each year to evaluate the impact of TAG (approximately 45,000 observations
instead of approximately 1500 for the one-entry per site data set). Each observation in the
constructed panel included measures for whether a site had a TAG during that year and whether
the site completed the ROD or closure milestone. The results of this annual survival modeling
are included in Table 7-9.
The Cox survival models report hazard ratios for each of the independent variables.
Survival analysis is a failure model, with failure defined as achieving the milestone being
modeled (ROD or closure). A hazard ratio of greater than one signifies an increased probability
of completion at any given time, or a faster completion of that phase of the process. The larger
the hazard ratio the faster the phase is expected to be completed. A hazard ratio of less than one
indicates a slowing of the schedule and increase in completion time.
For Phase I (Discovery to ROD, Table 7-6), several Cox survival model runs are
performed with different model specifications; Cox 2a with the variable tagdum (gets a TAG
without regard to timing), Cox 2b which incorporates the predicted probability of TAG to
address possible endogeneity in the schedule and drivers for TAG award, Cox 2c which utilizes a
time dependent variable of TAG before ROD instead of tagdum, and Cox 2d which incorporates
the TAG probability with TAG before ROD. The time independent TAG variable (tagdum) is
not found to be statistically significant relative to the discovery to ROD schedule. When the
timing of the TAG is evaluated (Cox 2c and Cox 2d), the TAG before ROD is significant and
found to slow down the ROD issuance schedule, consistent with Hypothesis 5. The award of a
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Table 7-9. Survival Models (Annualized Data Set)
(Hazard ratios reported)
Cox4a
DS to Closure
0.705
(0.248)

Cox4b
DS to ROD
1.621**
(0.242)

Cox4c
ROD to Closure
0.892
(0.336)

Probability of TAG

0.989
(0.0124)

0.980***
(0.00477)

0.989
(0.0132)

Years from TAG

1.141***
(0.0440)

0.997
(0.0374)

1.070
(0.0431)

Normalized Home Value

0.942*
(0.0263)

1.024**
(0.00875)

0.937*
(0.0264)

Normalized Income

1.018
(0.0519)

0.971
(0.0186)

1.033
(0.0542)

Population Density

1.000
(0.0000391)

1.000
(0.0000167)

1.000
(0.0000439)

Minority (%)

1.003
(0.00356)

0.999
(0.00167)

1.003
(0.00371)

Less than College Degree

0.999
(0.00860)

0.999
(0.00345)

0.995
(0.00884)

Pct Owner Occupied (%)

1.012
(0.00624)

1.003
(0.00248)

1.006
(0.00658)

Tenure > 5 years (%)

0.999
(0.00805)

1.002
(0.00351)

1.006
(0.00858)

OU count

0.740***
(0.0562)

1.127***
(0.0269)

0.708***
(0.0588)

1.003***
(0.000979)

0.999*
(0.000534)

1.004***
(0.00104)

0.981
(0.147)

1.321***
(0.0882)

1.182
(0.191)

HRS Score

0.980***
(0.00487)

0.987***
(0.00229)

0.988*
(0.00541)

PRP Site Dummy

0.637**
(0.0939)

1.311***
(0.0923)

0.622**
(0.105)

Fed Facility Dummy

0.712
(0.213)
33,426

0.724*
(0.0913)
16,560

0.907
(0.291)
16,952

hasTAG

OU Count Squared

Removal Action

Observations

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All models include EPA regional controls
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TAG before ROD also has a greater impact on survival (duration) than any of the other
variables, increasing the schedule duration. Other factors that are significant (at the 0.05 level)
relative to the duration of Phase I are increased home value, increase in site complexity (HRS,
OU count and performance of a removal action) and the presence of a private party at the site.
Since Phase I is defined as the time from Discovery to the first ROD issued at a site; if multiple
RODs are issued (as is often the case with complex and private party sites) then the duration of
Phase I can be expected to be decreased. Future research to examine the schedule impact of
defining a site with multiple RODs in a more detailed manner is recommended.
For Phase II (ROD to closure, Table 7-7), several Cox survival model runs are performed
with different model specifications; Cox 3a with the variable tagdum (gets a TAG without regard
to timing), Cox 3b which incorporates the predicted probability of TAG to address possible
endogeneity in the schedule and drivers for TAG award, Cox 3c which utilizes a time dependent
variables of TAG before ROD and TAG after ROD instead of tagdum, and Cox 2d which
incorporates the TAG probability with TAG before/after ROD. The award of a TAG, either
before or after the ROD, was not found to be significant (at the 0.05 level) for Phase II survival
analysis. The only factors shown to significantly impact the expected duration were increased
home value, increased site complexity and the presence of a private party. Each of the factors
resulted in a significant increase in the expected duration of the ROD to closure phase. These
results indicate that site characteristics (complexity, risk and private party involvement) have a
bigger impact on schedule than does the community characteristic (home value).
The results of survival analysis modeling for the overall Superfund process (Discovery to
Closure) are shown in Table 7-8. Model specifications were Cox 1a (no TAG variable, regional
effects, year of discovery effects), Cox1b (no TAG variable, regional effects, no year effects),
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Cox 1c (additional of OU-squared term to account for non-linearity of that variable), Cox 1d
(tagdum variable), Cox 1e (TAG before ROD and TAG after ROD instead of tagdum), Cox 1f
(Cox 1d plus probability of TAG award to address possible endogeneity), and Cox 1g (Cox 1e
with probability of TAG award). Results show that the TAG award variables do not have a
significant impact on the schedule, contrary to Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6. While not significant, the
hazard ratios in Cox1f and Cox1g indicate a direction of impact for TAG awarded without regard
to timing (tagdum) and TAG after ROD to be consistent with the findings of the OLS predictions
(Table 7-4) and Hypotheses 4 and 6. The direction of impact for TAG before ROD (again not
significant) suggests a faster process for site closure, contrary to OLS predictions and Hypothesis
5. The only factors that significantly impact the schedule are increasing home value, increasing
site complexity and the presence of a private party, with each of these factors increasing the
duration.
For the annualized data set survival analysis (Table 7-9), one survival model was
performed for each duration interval; Cox 4a (discovery to closure), Cox 4b (discovery to ROD),
and Cox 4c (ROD to closure). The models included an entry for each site for every year after
discovery and the following variables were defined and calculated; hasTAG (a measure of
whether the site has a TAG award at the start of the year), probability of TAG (constant for each
year), years from TAG (a measure of the time the TAG was in effect), as well as similar endpoint variables (hasROD, hasClose) indicating whether the event of interest occurred. The results
of the annual survival models indicate that “Years from TAG” is significant and speeds up the
process from discovery to closure, which makes sense in that it predicts that the more mature a
TAG group is the more they positively affect the process. The variable “hasTAG” is also
significant and speeds up the process from discovery to ROD issuance. This is somewhat
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counterintuitive, but may support the premise that a TAG awarded earlier in the process may
help to avoid pitfalls and schedule delays associated with conflicts over remedy selection. The
same site and community variables as previous modeling are significant in the annualized
duration/survival modeling (home value, site complexity, risk, and private party involvement).

7.4

Impact of TAG Award on Remedy
Ordered Logit statistical modeling was performed as outlined in Section 6.1.4. The

model estimates the impact of the independent variables on the classification of the remedy
selection. The remedy selection variable is ordered from 0 (no action taken) to 7 (greatest
remedy) with increasing remedy/risk reduction for each category. The ordered logit reports the
odds ratio, or the odds of being in a higher group divided by the odds of being in lower group
with a value of greater than 1 indicating a variable that results in higher (more protective
remedy). The results of the remedy evaluation are shown in Table 7-10. Ologit1 includes the
probability of TAG variable to address potential endogeneity while Ologit2 includes only the
tagdum variable for the presence of TAG. As shown in Table 7-10, the award of a TAG does not
significantly impact the selection of remedy for the sites, consistent with Hypothesis 7. This
finding is further investigated in the multiple case study.
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Table 7-10 Remedy Selection-Ordered Logits
Odds Ratios Reported for Remedy Code Change

TAG Dummy
Probability of TAG
Normalized Home Value
Normalized Income
Population Density
Minority (%)
Less than College Degree (%)
Pct Owner Occupied (%)
Tenure > 5 years (%)
OU count
OU Count Squared
Removal Action
HRS Score
PRP Site Dummy
Fed Facility Dummy
cut1 - Constant
cut2 - Constant
cut3 - Constant
cut4 - Constant
cut5 - Constant
cut6 - Constant
cut7 - Constant

Ologit 1
0.954
(0.130)
0.978**
(0.00761)
1.019
(0.0134)
0.991
(0.0293)
1.000**
(0.0000316)
1.001
(0.00292)
0.994
(0.00553)
1.000
(0.00429)
1.005
(0.00616)
1.052
(0.0337)
0.999
(0.000467)
1.474***
(0.172)
1.002
(0.00406)
1.186
(0.154)
0.857
(0.181)
0.139***
(0.0674)
0.151***
(0.0736)
0.216**
(0.104)
0.257**
(0.124)
0.382*
(0.184)
1.285
(0.619)
5.700***
(2.758)

Ologit 2
0.903
(0.121)

1.005
(0.0122)
1.004
(0.0288)
1.000***
(0.0000305)
1.000
(0.00288)
0.996
(0.00548)
1.002
(0.00420)
0.998
(0.00566)
0.988
(0.0223)
1.000
(0.000360)
1.260*
(0.128)
0.999
(0.00397)
1.051
(0.128)
0.848
(0.178)
0.105***
(0.0504)
0.115***
(0.0550)
0.163***
(0.0778)
0.194***
(0.0922)
0.291**
(0.138)
0.970
(0.459)
4.231**
(2.010)

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Note: chi-squared test indicates that tagdum=1 is significant at the 0.001 level for both Ologit models.
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Chapter 8 - Case Study Findings
This section presents a summary of the findings from the multiple case study, or
qualitative, portion of the study. Interviews were conducted with community representatives,
EPA project managers and TAG technical consultants for each of six Superfund cases selected.
The sites are all located in central New York and were awarded a TAG; three were awarded
before the ROD was issued and three were awarded after the ROD was issued. Two sites (Sites
C and D) had the same TAG group, community representative and EPA project manager since
they were nearby properties with many shared community and technical issues.
Four EPA project managers were interviewed; one manager chose not to participate in
the interview and one manager covered two sites. Each of the EPA managers had been with
EPA and working on Superfund sites for fifteen years or more (in two cases more than 30 years),
managed multiple Superfund sites, and managed projects with and without TAG group
involvement.
Seven community representatives were interviewed including three representatives for
Site F. The community representatives were all female; some were employed and some were
retired; one was a tenured professor at a state university; and three were previously very active in
community advocacy projects, including a clean drinking water campaign, community recycling
efforts, organic farming, peace activities, planning and zoning, and at a nearby State Superfund
site.
Through the interview process, it was learned that one of the community members was
involved in some fashion at three of the other five sites. Prior to the interviews, I was only aware
of her involvement as the community representative for Site E. In my interview with her, she
spoke very briefly about other sites, but took much less credit for work on other sites than the
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primary community representatives gave her. The background of this advocate is quite
impressive. She was actively involved in ensuring that safe drinking water was provided for her
community before becoming involved at Site E. She was also heavily involved in NY State
Superfund programs and assisted in providing support to numerous communities on
environmental issues. Her experience and connection resulted in her becoming a sought-after
resource for communities, as well as EPA personnel to assist with community involvement
processes at NPL sites. Based on this finding of the importance of network connections, I
revisited the quantitative study and incorporated a variable to address the occurrence of a
previous, nearby TAG. As discussed in the previous chapter, this relationship was found to have
a significant impact, positively affecting the award of a TAG.
Two technical advisors were interviewed; one consultant worked on three sites and the
other consultant worked on the other three sites. One technical advisor was associated with a
local university and was familiar with one of the community representatives through common
task force work and the other advisor worked for a firm that provided environmental consulting
services and performed much of their work on Superfund sites.
The interviews were semi-structured, with a pre-determined list of questions that solicited
open-ended answers. Follow up questions were asked as needed for clarity or additional details.
The interview question decks are included in Appendix A. The results from the interviews were
captured and compiled in mind maps. The responses on a question-by-question basis are
included in Appendix B (for community representatives), Appendix C (for EPA representatives)
and Appendix D (for technical advisors/consultants. The thematic responses to interview
questions by community representatives and EPA are summarized in Table 8-1.
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Table 8-1
Drivers and Impacts
TAG Awards at Selected NY Superfund Sites

Themes
BENEFITS
Empowerment
Streamline Process
Educate citizens
Increase trust
EPA credibility
Comm credibility
Access to EPA
Question options
Understand options
Info from community
Info to community
Balance PRPs
DRAWBACKS
Admin burden
City resentment
Comm. resentment
Resources limited
Limited recipients
Expensive process
OUTCOMES
Slowed process
Sped process
Impacted remedy
No impact on remedy

Site A
Comm

Site B
EPA

Site C

Comm

EPA

X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

EPA

X

Site E

Comm

EPA

X

X
X
X

Site F

Comm

EPA

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

Site D

Comm

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Comm

X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
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Many of these responses are consistent with the theoretical bases presented in Section
3.1, regarding democracy (equity and power), resource dependency, network support and others.
8.1

Why do communities pursue a TAG award?
A summary of the reasons that individual community representatives decided to pursue a

TAG is presented in Figure 8-1.
The common themes among the responses are a lack of trust in the process and the
agency, dissatisfaction with the speed of the process or information flow, opposition to the
remedy being proposed and the influence of more powerful players, and the desire for more
information and transparency. At one site (Site E), the state agency was being replaced by EPA
as the lead agency and the community did not trust EPA to correct the missteps and adequately
address community concerns so action was driven by a history of inadequate involvement. At
two sites (Sites C and D), there were powerful private parties involved in the process and the
community felt that they needed to provide an alternate voice at the table and they needed to
“provide a spine to EPA” to stand up to the PRPs.
The understanding that the community needed technical expertise to better understand the
massive quantities of technical data was mentioned for every site. This included one site (Site B)
where the community representative had significant experience in dealing with similarly
complex data from a state Superfund site (where no TAG program was available) and still
realized that assistance was needed to assist in making informed decisions.
In addition, every community representative learned about the TAG program from a
representative of another site or from EPA introducing them to the TAG process. Even the
representative for Site E, who was involved in an assistance role at three of the other five sites,
learned about the TAG program from her involvement in a state-wide task force and from a TAG
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Rep 3 Speed up
process,
involved in TAG
group for Site E,
counteract PRP
influence

Rep 2 Lack of trust in
State and EPA,
lack of technical
knowledge,
opposed remedy

Rep 1 Unknown

Site F

Site E Obtain technical expertise,
voice concerns over State
remedy, learned from
another TAG

Why did
Group pursue
TAG?

Site D To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to EPA"

EPA = Environmental Protection
Agency
PRP = Potentially Responsible
Parties

Site A To obtain
information,
learned from
EPA

Site B Previous experience
with complex issues,
obtain information,
learned from another
TAG (Site E)

Site C To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to
EPA"

Figure 8-1. Why pursue TAG? Community rep. responses
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coordinator for a site that was not a part of this study, underscoring the importance of network
connections and support.
Dissatisfaction with the current rate of progress of the process was a stated driver for one
site (Site F). This supports the idea that slow progress can encourage mobilization and public
participation to address the concern. The community representatives for all but one of the sites
(Site A) had previous community advocacy experience and existing social capital to assist them
in the process. This ranged from direct NPL site experience to state Superfund site experience to
addressing local environmental concerns (drinking water, organic gardening and recycling) to
social outreach programs (such as the Salvation Army).
Table 8-2 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on
the question of why a community pursues a TAG. There is consistency on the responses and
both groups mention trust of the agency, lack of information flow, and an uneasiness with the
Superfund process. The community representatives also mention the need to counterbalance
PRP influence while the agency identifies agency procedural problems as drivers.
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Table 8-2
Why do communities pursue TAGs?

EPA

Community Group

Mistrust of state and EPA

Mistrust of state and EPA

Lack of information flow

Lack of information flow

Overall unease with Superfund

Need for technical knowledge

Government procedural problems

Balance PRP influence
Knew advocate with experience
Opposed proposed remedy
Learned about program from others

8.2

How did the TAG process work?
The TAG program does not, overall, embody the ideals of “good participation”. It is

technocratic, not a designed deliberative, solution to the participation question. A summary of
community representative responses on how the TAG application and process work is presented
in Figure 8-2.
Overall, community members were frustrated with both the application process and the
administrative burdens of the program, which may partially explain why the take-up rate for
TAGs is so low (~15%). The availability of a seasoned TAG veteran (the Site E representative)
was cited as a positive factor for three of the other five sites.
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Rep 3 Completed
application for
Site E, this site
took longer,
suspects reason

Rep 1 No recall

Rep 2 Used TAG recipient
for another site for
application, tedious,
difficult, confusing,
made a trip to EPADC, met with Lois
Gibbs (Love Canal)

Site F

Site E Steep learning curve
(group and EPA),
EPA's focus on
accounting (not
results) made it
difficult, discouraging

Site D Many obstacles, EPA
assisted with process
(only group with TAGs
for 2 sites), well
educated group

How did TAG
application
and process
work?

EPA = Environmental
Protection Agency
DC = Washington, D.C.

Site A Fairly smooth, hired
another TAG
recipient to write
application, lots of
paperwork

Site B Hired another TAG
recipient to write
application, administration
difficult, well educated
group (2 PhDs), lower
resource community would
have given up

Site C Many obstacles, EPA
assisted with process
(only group with
TAGs for 2 sites),
well educated group

Figure 8-2. How did TAG process work - Community rep responses
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While none of the groups stated that they would forego the TAG, they did express
concern that a group without access to the resources that they had may not pursue the TAG
award. Several groups referenced EPA’s assistance in the process as a positive, while others
stated dissatisfaction with EPA’s focus on accounting, not results. This may be partially
explained by the difference in dealing with EPA technical versus accounting personnel, but may
also be an indicator of the role of individual EPA project manager support for the program. In
addition, at Site F, one of the community representatives expressed the concern that EPA sped up
the ROD process to avoid dealing with the TAG consultant prior to issuing the ROD.
The two primary representatives for Site B were university professors with PhDs; the
interviewed representative stated that they joked that “it takes a PhD to administer a TAG and
they still had to hire someone to write the grant for them.” She also stated that she heard
anecdotes about groups that gave the grant back after recognizing the administrative burden of
the program. Most of the groups met the 10% matching fund requirement by providing “in kind”
services, such as photocopying, accounting, or administrative/technical services.

8.3

What are the benefits of the TAG program?
While the TAG process may have been a frustrating one for the communities,

interviewees also identified numerous benefits resulting from the TAG award and expressed
overall support for the TAG process. A summary of the benefits referenced by the community
are presented in Figure 8-3.
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RPM = Remedial Project Manager
EPA = Environmental Protection
Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental
Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
Rep 2 Empowered
community, gained
information,
understand
outcomes, credibility
with EPA and
community at large

Rep 3 Added leverage with
EPA and DEC, prodded
RPM to move things
along and include public
in decisions, balanced
PRP influence

Site A Community awareness,
PRP-compliance (fencing/
buyouts), improved
community credibility

Rep 1 No recall
Site F

Site E Credibility and legitimacy
with EPA, increased
information from EPA,
understand technical issues,
confidence to question
agency

Site D Better support of EPA,
serious support for underresourced community

What did TAG
add and what
were
downsides of
TAG award?

Site B TAG is critical, technical
expertise, identified
investigation gaps
(groundwater and
chemicals), gained
legitimacy with community

Site C Better support of EPA,
added remediation
components (removal
and groundwater)

Figure 8-3. What does TAG add? Community rep responses
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The findings show that the TAG process empowers and educates citizens, increases the
credibility of the community and governmental agency, increases trust in and legitimacy of the
agency and the process, gives citizens a voice in the process that matters deeply to them. The
problem, as postulated in Chapter 4 and confirmed in the quantitative research, is that the TAG
program is an underutilized resource; therefore, many of the potential gains go unrealized
because of the barriers.
Table 8-3 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on
the question of benefits of the TAG program. Both groups identified added credibility as a
benefit. Interestingly, each group focused on their own credibility, not the credibility of the other
party or the process in general. EPA and the community also agreed that the TAG increased the
flow of information to and from the public, streamlines communication, improves technical
understanding, and speeds the schedule by addressing conflict in a constructive manner.
Community groups also stressed their input being taken seriously and counterbalancing influence
of PRPs. One EPA manager also noted that the TAG improved the remedy selection process.

8.4

What are drawbacks of the TAG program?
There were observed problems or drawbacks with the TAG process as shown in Figure 8-

4. The heavy administrative and resource burden of the program was mentioned by most
participants. The TAG program requires that the group incorporate and provide 10% matching
funding to obtain the TAG. One group (Site F) ran the TAG through the group that formed for
another site (Site E) to share resources and spread the administrative burden. One group applied
for and received TAGs for two proximally located sites (Sites C and D). The representative
stated that her group was the only one that she knew of with two TAGs.

150

Table 8-3
What are the benefits of TAGs?

EPA

Community Group

Credibility for EPA

Credibility of TAG group

Citizen confidence in the process

Community input taken seriously

Increased info to and from public

Technical info to public

Coalesce the community

Means to inform EPA

Streamlines communication

Streamlines communication

Speeds up schedule

Speeds up schedule

Strengthens community voice

Balance PRP power/influence

Improves technical understanding

Improves technical understanding

Strengthened remedy selection

Provides access to EPA
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Rep 3 Administrative
burden

Rep 2 TAG awarded too
late in process, may
have slowed
progress

Rep 1 No recall

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental
Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
RPM = Remedial Project Manager

Site A Other group tried to coopt them, concerns over
property values
Site F

Site E Conflict with local
government, local business
resented, EPA focused on
administration, administrative
burden

Site D Perceived as outsiders (not long
time locals), perception of payoff, stress of responsibility for
whole community

What were
downsides of
TAG award?

Site B Administration of the
grant, very time
consuming

Site C Perceived as outsiders (not
long time locals),
perception of pay-off,
stress of responsibility for
whole community

Figure 8-4. What were downsides of TAG? Community rep responses
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There were several interesting consequences that were revealed. One participant
mentioned the attempt by another environmental (an anti-nuclear group) to co-opt the TAG
group once they found about its existence. Other group representatives spoke of resentment
from the community that the TAG group was given access to the process and other citizens felt
that group members “got a payoff” to go along with the agency. Other resentment from both the
local community and local government focused on the potential impact that aggressive
community involvement would have on the industrial and business community, either through
“attacks” on major employers or through an overall community stigma resulting from publicizing
the presence of an NPL site.
Table 8-4 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on
the question of the drawbacks of the TAG program. Again, most parties agreed that the program
comes with significant administrative burdens and that the bureaucracy of the program (or
accountability) tends to focus on resource utilization instead of process improvement or
outcomes. One EPA manager, who worked on two sites in the study, was a bit skeptical of the
TAG program and its implementation at the sites that they managed. The manager felt that the
TAG group was very limited and was not representative of the community and that the cost of
the TAG program was high to please such a small contingent of the population. These sites were
in a community where the major PRP was also one of the largest employers in the area and many
citizens were reluctant to get involved in the process, so the community representative felt the
TAG group gave voice to the public that would not have otherwise been heard. Interestingly, her
assessment of the success of the TAG process at the two sites (very beneficial) was in contrast to
the EPA manager’s assessment (too expense and focused on too narrow a group of citizens).
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Table 8- 4
What are the drawbacks of a TAG?

EPA

Community Group

Administrative burden for citizens

Administrative burden

Limited community resources

Cost sharing requirements

Inefficient process

Community and government resentment

Limited audience of impact

Burden of responsibility
Attempting co-opting from other causes

8.5

How does TAG award impact schedule and remedy selection?
Several questions were fashioned to elicit input regarding the impact of the TAG award

on schedule and remedy. I attempt to identify impacts to the process schedule separately from
the schedule for implementation of the selected remedy. These questions were difficult for many
of the community representatives to answer, since they had limited, or no, involvement at other
NPL sites and no real basis for comparison.
Community responses to the impact of the TAG on schedule issues are presented in
Figure 8-5.
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Rep 3 Selection - It seemed like
EPA sped up to get ROD
issued before TAG was
awarded
Remediation - Pretty
quick

Rep 2 Selection Seemed slow
Remediation Rapid

Rep 1 Selection - Not sure,
seemed long but no
comparison
Remediation - No
reference

Site F

What was
your
impression of
the remedy
selection
schedule?
Remediation
schedule?

Site E Selection - Fairly
quick
Remediation Quick

Site D Selection - Slower
than expected,
because of complexity
Remediation - Normal
for Superfund

Site A Selection - Very
slow
Remediation Normal to faster
than expected

Site B Selection - Normal
(did research to
confirm)
Remediation - No
recall

Site C Selection - Community
thought it was slow, TAG
coordinator thought it
was faster than normal
Remediation - Normal,
no impact from TAG

Figure 8-5. What was impact of TAG on schedule? Community rep responses
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While many respondents stated the TAG group streamlined the process, many perceived
the remedy selection schedule to be normal, but again had a limited frame of reference. One of
the representative for Site F felt that the remedy selection process went very quickly. This TAG
application process was underway during the selection time-period and was awarded after the
ROD. The representative expressed concern that the ROD was “sped up” to complete it before
the TAG was awarded. As it turns out, the remedy was changed after the ROD was issued from
incineration to a more palatable remedy (low temperature thermal desorption).
Table 8-5 presents a comparison of the findings from EPA and TAG group interviews on
the question of the schedule impacts of the TAG program.

Table 8- 5
What were the impacts of the TAG on remedy and schedule?

EPA

Community Group

Some observed no schedule impact

No perceived schedule impact

Some saw a streamlining

“It felt streamlined”

No impact of remedy

Perceived impact on remedy

Collaboration improved

Dependent on:
EPA manager
Timing of TAG award

Acceptance increased

The differences between EPA and community respondents illustrates the importance of
perspective and the operational lens through which one views the process. Most EPA managers,
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who had experience at many non-TAG sites for comparison, observed no impact on the selection
(ROD) or implementation schedules, although one manager did mention that the TAG
streamlined the process. While there may not have been schedule impacts, EPA managers still
recognized that the TAG (and resulting improvement in communication) resulted in better
conflict resolution processes. EPA managers, who are shaped by professionalism and technical
expertise, felt that the TAG had no effect on the remedy chosen. They took inputs of
information, processed the data, and made the selection of the proper response action. The
responses are like the “decide, inform and convince” model of decision-making. The role of the
TAG was to create a more knowledgeable public, get the but-in and support from a neutral third
party (the technical advisor), manage the conflict process and keep the program moving forward.
The community groups were convinced that the TAG resulted in a better remedy, either
by changing the remedy, providing a “spine” to EPA, or being a watchdog on the system. While
trust may have been improved in the process, it was not full confidence in the agency to act in
the best interest of the community. At the site mentioned above, where the TAG was awarded
after the ROD and the remedy was subsequently changes, views on the driver for that change
differed by respondent. The EPA manager stated that EPA made the decision based on new
technical information and convinced the community that the change was the right thing to do.
One community representative felt that the community pressured EPA to make the change and
one community representative felt that the PRPs forced the change because of significant cost
savings.
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8.6

Other observations
EPA managers, community representatives and TAG technical consultants all offered

insights into the TAG process that were general in nature and not a response to a specific
question from the interview deck.
The EPA manager for Sites C and D stated that they were involved in numerous sites
without TAGs where the community provided meaningful information and insight and could
impact the Superfund process and did not see that the TAG program added much to the process.
These two sites (Sites C and D) had a strong PRP presence and a limited number of community
members that were involved in the TAG and Superfund process.
The three sites where the community representative from Site E supported their efforts in
the TAG program all highlighted the importance of a strong support system to navigate the
process and attain success. Other observations from community members included a feeling of
being an “outsider” in the community, which is contrary to the findings of community and social
capital building expressed at other sites. Many of the community members stated that the
bureaucracy of the program would limit participation by many communities without educational
resources and assets to participate. One community member who was familiar with the
operations at multiple states mentioned the importance of a strong EPA manager to successful
inclusion of the community in the process.
The technical consultants also provided interesting insights into the process. The
consultant for Site B, C, and D was a professional environmental consultant with broad
Superfund experience, with and without TAGs. He observed that community members were
going to participate regardless of the TAG program, and once they were committed they went
out and found funding. While a TAG did not impact the quantity of communities that would
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participate in the process, it absolutely impacted the quality of participation. He also noted
several key aspects in the process, as follows:
•

Site setting (rural, urban/ suburban);

•

The interactions between the PRP group and the community;

•

The importance of trust building to success;

•

The TAG increases community acceptance of the chosen remedy;

•

Third-party technical review does impact the quality of investigation and remedy
selection at a site;

•

The TAG increases overall community awareness and knowledge, not just among active
group members; and

•

While $50,000 per site sounds like a lot, there is a lot of work performed by the
consultant and they must learn to be efficient to provide true value.

The consultant for Site A, E, and F was a university professor with technical knowledge
and insight into Superfund, but was not a full-time environmental consultant. He reiterated that a
TAG was not necessary for community involvement and he served in similar roles on sites with
no TAG. He also stated that in some ways the TAG created friction that increased the level of
effort to maintain a cohesive community.
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Chapter 9 – Conclusions and Synthesis of Findings
This research was performed to investigate the performance of public participation in
highly technical policy scenarios and the outcomes of this participation. A detailed evaluation of
community involvement at Superfund sites, a specific type of complex, highly-technical policy
problem, was performed using a mixed methods approach, incorporating a quantitative
econometric evaluation and qualitative multiple case study of selected Superfund sites. Public
participation within the Superfund program was evaluated via a detailed study of the Superfund
Technical Assistance Grant (TAG) program.
The existing literature on public participation presents that citizen involvement, while not
without its potential drawbacks, is central to democratic decision-making and is an important
part of the policy process. This study was rooted in a series of research questions about public
participation in technical settings. These questions addressed the attributes of successful
participation, the characteristics of technical policy issues that could lead to gaps in successful
participation, the expected impact of the Superfund TAG program in addressing these gaps, and
questions about the specific impacts of the TAG program at Superfund sites on outcomes
(schedule, remedy selected, and community perceptions and satisfaction with the outcomes).
The research began with a summary of the Superfund program and public participation
since the program’s inception in 1980 (Chapter 2), a detailed review of literature on public
participation theory and previous research on public participation (Chapter 3), and the
development of expectations about participation in complex, technical policy settings (Chapter
4).
Chapters 5 through 7 presented the research framework and the detailed procedures for
performance of the quantitative and qualitative studies. Chapters 7 and 8 present the results of
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qualitative analysis and quantitative evaluation, respectively, of the research questions. The
quantitative evaluation provides more definitive answers to environmental outcome based
questions with measurable results, while the qualitative assessment provides more detailed
understanding of the “why and how questions” and addresses topics of process outcomes and
community satisfaction and gains beyond the environmental outcomes. Previous public
participation research and theory have identified the importance of the process gains in
community and capacity building as well the enlargement of democracy.
Table 9-1 presents a summary of the integrated findings from the two major parts of the
study. There is strong agreement between the quantitative and qualitative studies, with the
biggest difference being the perception by community leaders that the TAG impacted the remedy
chosen. This finding from the case studies was not born out in the quantitative evaluation, which
showed no differences in remedies for TAG and non-TAG sites. This finding of no impact on
remedy was also consistent with the EPA project managers’ perception from the case studies.
The case studies added significant insight into the reasons for and results of TAG award
based on factors that were not measurable in the quantitative data set (such as trust, experience
and relationships of community advocates, desires to change the remedy, and previous activity of
the community at the site). The case studies also added knowledge about outcomes; the capacity
building within the community, the credibility gains for EPA and the community, and the
increased acceptance of the agency decisions.
The Superfund program is a highly technical and complex policy arena. It has the
hallmark characteristics identified in Section 4.1 – technical complexity, expensive solutions to
the problems, public involvement is expensive, the process is slow, and the technical parties
typically have better access to information than does the public. The TAG program is
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Table 9-1
Integrated Summary of Findings
Quantitative Study
Community Attributes
Driving TAG
Resources/assets
Education
Tenure/social capital
PRP present
Site complexity
Previous advocacy of
leader
Community already
active at site
Slow ROD process
Gain technical
knowledge
Influence decision,
concerns over remedy
Mistrust of agency
Nearby TAG
(awareness)
Schedule Impact of
TAG
Overall

Discovery to ROD
ROD to closure
Remedy Impact of
TAG
Impact on remedy
selected

> 5 years (+)
Yes (+)
Operable Units (+)
Removal (+)
NM

Qualitative Study
# of #, indicates how many cases met
criterion
Rural/urban/suburban and mostly middle- to
working-class
Sites were varied, education < mean value
Community leader typically well educated
Stable, long-tenured neighborhoods
6 of 6 sites
5/6 sites complex (groundwater, innovative
remedies)
5 of 6 sites

NM

6 of 6 sites

DS to ROD duration (?)
NM

3 of 6 sites
6 of 6 sites

NM

3 of 6 sites

NM
Nearby TAG

4 of 6 sites
6 of 6 sites

TAG before ROD (slower but not
significant)
TAG after ROD (faster but not
significant)
TAG before ROD (-)
TAG before ROD (faster but not
significant)
TAG after ROD (faster but not
significant)

One site closed – consistent with national
averages

Home value (+)
Income (-)
Some college (-)

Not significant

TAG before ROD (2 of 3 sites slower)
One site closed – consistent with national
averages

3 of 6 sites, community perceived that TAG
impacted remedy selection.
EPA stated no impact

Community Gains
Capacity
Technical knowledge
Trust and credibility
Voice and meaningful
input
Balance to Power
Notes:
+ = statistically significant positive impact
- = statistically significant negative impact
? = not statistically significant
NM = not measure in quantitative study

NM
NM
NM
NM

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

NM

Yes
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specifically designed to improve the participation process at Superfund sites. The case studies
provided support for the expectations presented in Chapter 4 – expectations about barriers to
public participation in complex, technical settings and expectations about the ability of the TAG
program to address some of the participation gaps.
It was expected that the presence of a TAG would alleviate problems with trust,
credibility, communications, differences in power in the decision-making process, and overall
satisfaction with the participation process. These hypotheses were supported by the findings of
the qualitative case study research. A problem is that only a small fraction (about 15%) of
communities near Superfund sites actually apply for and are awarded a TAG. The case study
interviews support the idea that this is a result of the financial and administrative burdens that
make a TAG infeasible or undesirable for many communities. This study has highlighted the
complexity of the Superfund process, the many factors that influence the schedule and
remediation decisions at these sites and the many facets of community involvement.
The following sections describe a number of findings from the study that can improve
public participation in complex policy decisions. The extrapolation from the TAG program to
other technical policy areas is an important and valid application. The findings are rooted in the
complexity of the policy issue are more widely applicable to complex, technical problems
beyond Superfund and the TAG program.
9.1

The Importance of a Technical Advisor and Communication
A number of interrelated findings are based on the availability and selection of a trusted,

independent technical advisor. The advisors improved the ability of the agency to communicate
with the public and vice versa, serving as both an advocate for the community and an
intermediary with the ability to interpret technical information and translate community
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preferences into the technical language of the agency representatives. This also served to
increase trust and credibility on both sides of the decision-making. The technical representatives
were also unbiased (or even biased toward the community views) increasing the public trust in
the process. The consultants also provided an interpretation of technical results in a manner that
non-technical community members could understand, removing potential power imbalances and
“leveling the field” for community involvement in decision-making. They were also able to
present community views in a way that was more readily incorporated into the process.

9.2 The Importance of Networks
The case studies identified the importance of established networks of support and
resource provision. Each of the TAG groups relied heavily on a “mentor” in the process to
identify the program and assist in navigation of the complexities and bureaucracy of applying for
and properly using a TAG. This also highlights the opportunity for government agencies to
assist in establishing the infrastructure for such resource networks and building the capacity of
citizens to participate and add to the process. Such programs could increase the availability of
resources for community involvement and the knowledgebase of available methods and actors to
assist in the process.

9.3 The Importance of the Citizen Advocate
The case studies also underscore the importance of previous community advocacy for
public participation in environmental policy decisions. All but one of the community leaders had
a strong track record of community involvement prior to pursuing the TAG. The one member
that did not have such experience relied heavily on another TAG leader to work through the

164

process. This finding supports the previous concept of the importance of a support network for
community involvement in technical issues.
A key question for public administration is how to cultivate this behavior and support the
growth and development of community leaders. Strong movements require strong leaders, and
as, EPA representatives stated, the process was streamlined through the informed and reasoned
action of a knowledgeable public.

9.4 Capacity Building within Public Administration
This research demonstrated that a capable and experienced public administrator provides
support, process structure, and enhances the opportunities for successful public participation.
The importance of a strong EPA manager was a constant thread throughout the interview
process. A strong and supportive manager made the TAG process meaningful, productive and
successful. The communities that referenced capable and experienced project managers also
mentioned that as a reason for satisfaction with the process and one of the keys to success.
While the motivation of an individual manager is important to support and enhance
public participation, sustainable improvements in the citizen involvement process require
organizational support. Individual managers can change jobs, be moved to other projects, or lack
the stamina to continue as the catalyst for public participation efforts. Organizational support
and programs, such as resource provision, managerial incentives, and public participation
training, can increase the likelihood that managers support public participation. This level of
organizational support can also signal the importance of citizen involvement to managers that are
not predisposed to encourage participation.
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EPA has community engagement personnel (Community Involvement Coordinators) who
are active in the planning of the public participation programs, and provide support and guidance
to the manager. This is one of the provisions of the TAG program to enhance public participation
at Superfund sites. Additional training and support to agency project managers, who are the
personnel most likely to interact with the public on a frequent basis, is also expected to improve
participatory programs. Public managers, who are often technically trained scientists, will benefit
from training in the skills in negotiation, conflict resolution, collaboration and facilitation, as
well as the temperament to “govern with instead of governing over” (L. Bingham, O'Leary, &
Nabatchi, 2005).

9.5

Areas for further research
There are a number of questions that were raised during this study that could benefit from

additional research. First, the case study research included only Superfund sites where a TAG
had been awarded. Expanding the case studies to include sites that did not receive a TAG would
provide useful information on the reasons why communities did not pursue and obtain a TAG.
Second, additional information from the community could be obtained by expanding the
interviews to include community members that were not active members of the TAG group. The
interviews included only community members who were leaders in the TAG group, introducing
potential bias to the case study findings.
Third, the interview program could be expanded to include additional personnel involved
in the process. This could include additional EPA personnel (the CIC), members of the PRP
community, and state and local government officials. This information would provide additional
perspectives on process outcomes.
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Fourth, the case studies could be expanded to additional geographic areas. This would
provide information about the potential regional, cultural or political differences. It would also
provide the opportunity to assess EPA regional and state regulatory differences.
Finally, the research program could be expanded to investigates a different highly
technical problem area. This would provide information to confirm (or refute) the findings
herein that relate to the extrapolation of the findings. It is also likely that the study of another
policy area will identify additional areas for improvement of the public participation process.
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Appendix A
Interview Questionnaires
TAG Case Study
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Appendix A-1
Interview Questionnaires
Community Representatives

169

C. Community Group Representative
.
1. How familiar were you with the Superfund process before you got involved
at this site?
2. Are you active in community involvement at other Superfund sites? Other
environmental sites? Other community advocacy projects?
3. How long have you been representing the community for this site?
4. At what stage of the Superfund process did you get involved in the site?
5. Based on your familiarity with the historical aspects of the site, is there
anyone else that I should talk to in the community group regarding earlier
time periods?
6. Are you familiar with the Technical Assistance to Support Communities
(TASC) program?
7. Have you ever utilized this program?
8. If so, what were the results?
TAG Process (for the Site)
9. Who are the stakeholders in the process at this site?
10. What were the community involvement activities at the site prior to the
TAG award?
11. When in the process did your group become involved?
12. What group received the TAG for this site?
13. Besides the group that holds the TAG, are there other citizens involved in
the process?
14. Why did the group decide to obtain a TAG?
15. How did the TAG application and award process work?
16. Tell me about the impact that you feel the TAG award has had at this site.
• What do you feel that the TAG adds at a site?
• Are there any downsides that you see resulting from TAG award?
Remedy Selection Process and Project Schedule
17. I understand the Superfund remedy decision process well but I am
interested in the specifics of the remedy selection process for this site.
• Who was involved in decision/negotiation process?
• Was there conflict surrounding the ROD? Lawsuits? ROD
amendments?
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18. If there were changes to the remedy (such as a ROD amendment), what
was the relative importance of the following in the decision to change the
remedy?
Use the following scale to rate impact.
1- No impact
2- Little impact
3- Not sure
4- Moderate impact 5- Significant impact
•

•
•
•

New technical information
a. About new remedies available
b. About site problems
c. About site risks
d. Public perception or involvement (TAG)
Private party involvement
Institutional precedent
Other

19. What is your impression of the schedule for the remedy selection process
for the site?
20. What is your impression of the schedule for remediation for the site?
21. Is there anything else that you feel I should know about the remedy
selection at this site?
Interaction between TAG and Remedy Selection
I am going ask questions now regarding the interaction between the TAG award
and remedy selection. The first question relates to the process and subsequent
questions relate to the specific outcomes.
22. What is your impression of the impact of the TAG award on the remedy
selection process for this site?
23. How did the TAG award influence the actual chosen remedy?
24. If there was a remedy change, was the revised remedy technically better?
25. Is the remedy more complex than it would have otherwise been as a result
of the TAG award?
26. If so, did the technical issues merit this more complex remedy? Was the
more complex remedy driven by public acceptance of the remedy?
Interactions between Community Involvement Programs
27. Are there other community involvement programs that are applicable to
this site (DOE, DOD, State)?
28. If so, have you worked within any of those programs?
29. Did the additional programs require more work on your part?
30. Do the programs work well together?
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Appendix A-2
Interview Questionnaires
EPA Representatives

172

A. Regulatory Project Manager (State and Federal).
This individual is the agency representative that is currently managing the
activities at the case site. This individual (or potentially a predecessor) should be
the most familiar with the technical details at the site. The goal of interviewing
this person is to obtain insight into the interaction between TAG award and the
remedy selection process and the implementation process. This individual will
hopefully have insight into both the technical aspects of remedy selection and
implementation and the role of public participation attributable to TAG award.
Project Manager Background
1. How long have you been with the agency?
2. How many Superfund projects do you manage?
3. At a typical site, tell me about your interactions with community
involvement coordinator?
4. Your involvement with the community?
5. What percentage of your sites is awarded TAGs?

Site Background
6. How long have you been the project manager at this site?
7. At what stage of the Superfund process did you get involved in the site?
8. Based on your familiarity with the historical aspects of the site, is there
anyone else that I should talk to at the agency regarding earlier time
periods?
TAG Process (for the Site)
9. Who are the stakeholders in the process at this site?
10. Were there any community involvement activities at the site prior to the
TAG award?
11. What group received the TAG for this site?
12. Do you know how the group has utilized the grant funds? If so, how?
13. Besides the group that holds the TAG, are there other citizens involved in
the process? Is this typical for your sites?
14. Did the award of the TAG to one group change the way that other groups
interacted?
15. Did you notice any change in the level of the group’s knowledge of the
technical issues after the TAG award?
16. Tell about the impact that you feel the TAG award has had at this site.
• What do you feel that the TAG adds at a site?
• Are there any downsides that you see resulting from TAG award?
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Remedy Selection Process and Project Schedule
17. I understand the Superfund remedy decision process well but I am
interested in the specifics of the remedy selection process for this site.
• Who was involved in decision/negotiation process?
• Was there conflict surrounding the ROD? Lawsuits? ROD
amendments?
18. If there were changes to the remedy (such as a ROD amendment), what
was the relative importance of the following in the decision to change the
remedy?
1 – No Impact
4 – Moderate Impact

2 – Little Impact
5 – Significant Impact

3 – Not Sure

•

New technical information
a. About new remedies available
b. About site problems
c. About site risks
• Public perception or involvement (TAG)
• Private party involvement
• Institutional precedent
• Other
19. What is your impression of the schedule for the remedy selection process
for this site? How does this compare with other sites with TAGs? Sites
without TAGs?
20. What is your impression of the schedule for remediation for the site? How
does it compare to other sites with TAGs? Sites without TAGs?
21. Is there anything else that you feel I should know about the remedy
selection at this site?
Interaction between TAG and Remedy Selection
I am going ask questions now regarding the interaction between the TAG award
and remedy selection. The first question relates to the process and subsequent
questions relate to the specific outcomes.
22. What is your impression of the impact of the TAG award on the remedy
selection process for this site?
23. How did the TAG award influence the actual chosen remedy?
24. If there was a remedy change, was the revised remedy technically better?
25. Is the remedy more complex than it would have otherwise been as a result
of the TAG award?
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26. If so, did the technical issues merit this more complex remedy? Was the
more complex remedy driven by public acceptance of the remedy?
Interactions between Community Involvement Programs
27. Are there other community involvement programs that are applicable to
this site (DOE, DOD, State)?
28. If there are other programs, which program took precedence?
29. Are the programs collaborative in nature or is there a different method in
complying with each?
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Appendix A-3
Interview Questionnaires
TAG Consultant Representatives
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E. Technical Assistance Grant Consultant
This individual is the representative from the firm that was hired by the
community group to serve as a technical advisor. This individual should be able
to identify technical issues that were most problematic at the site for the
layperson and identify areas in which the TAG award had the most impact.
Consultant Background
1. How long have you been performing technical activities at Superfund
sites? Tell me about your typical project. Who is your client and what is
your role?
2. How many Superfund projects have you worked on? What percentage of
your work is Superfund related?
3. How many TAG grants have you worked under? Which ones?
4. At the typical site with a TAG, tell me about your involvement with the EPA
RPM?
5. At the typical site without a TAG, tell me about your involvement with the
community advocacy leader?
Site Background
6. How long were you involved at this site?
7. At what stage of the Superfund process did you get involved in the site?
8. Based on your familiarity with the historical aspects of the site, is there
anyone else that I should talk to regarding earlier time periods?
TAG Process (for the Site)
9. Besides the group that holds the TAG, were there other citizens involved
in the Superfund process?
10. Did you notice any change in the level of the group’s knowledge of the
technical issues after the TAG award?
11. Tell about the impact that you feel the TAG award has had at this site.
• What do you feel that the TAG adds at a site?
• Are there any downsides that you see resulting from TAG award?
Remedy Selection Process and Project Schedule
12. I understand the Superfund remedy decision process well but I am
interested in the specifics of the remedy selection process for this site.
• What role did you have in decision/negotiation process?
• Was there conflict surrounding the ROD? Lawsuits? ROD
amendments?
13. If there were changes to the remedy (such as a ROD amendment), what
was the relative importance of the following in the decision to change the
remedy?
1 – No Impact
2 – Little Impact
3 – Not Sure
4 – Moderate Impact
5 – Significant Impact
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•

New technical information
a. About new remedies available
b. About site problems
c. About site risks
• Public perception or involvement (TAG)
• Private party involvement
• Institutional precedent
• Other
14. What is your impression of the schedule for the remedy selection process
for this site? How does this compare with other sites with TAGs? Sites
without TAGs?
15. What is your impression of the schedule for remediation for the site? How
does it compare to other sites with TAGs? Sites without TAGs?
16. Is there anything else that you feel I should know about the remedy
selection at this site?
Interaction between TAG and Remedy Selection
I am going ask questions now regarding the interaction between the TAG award
and remedy selection. The first question relates to the process and subsequent
questions relate to the specific outcomes.
17. What is your impression of the impact of the TAG award on the remedy
selection process for this site?
18. How did the TAG award influence the actual chosen remedy?
19. If there was a remedy change, was the revised remedy technically better?
20. Is the remedy more complex than it would have otherwise been as a result
of the TAG award?
21. If so, did the technical issues merit this more complex remedy? Was the
more complex remedy driven by public acceptance of the remedy?
Interactions between Community Involvement Programs
22. Are there other community involvement programs that are applicable to
this site (DOE, DOD, State)?
23. If there are other programs, which program took precedence?
24. Are the programs collaborative in nature or is there a different method in
complying with each?
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Appendix B
Interview Responses
Community
Representatives
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Question 1 - Comm Rep
Superfund Awareness

Rep 3Aware of SF,
no
experience

Rep 1Slightly
Aware

Rep 2Not at all

Site F
Site A Not at all
Site E Not
aware,
learned
later (via
Love
Canal)

Site D Aware of SF,
no
experience

SF = Superfund

How familiar
were you
Superfund
process?

Site B Aware of SF,
no
experience

Site C Aware of SF,
no
experience
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Question 2 - Comm Rep
Previous Community Involvement Experience
Rep 2 Slightly
Active Peace
activities

Site E Very Active - Safe
drinking water, planning,
Salvation Army
Site A None

Rep 3 Very Active - Safe
drinking water,
planning

Site F

What is your
previous
community
involvement
experience?

Rep 1 Active Environmental
issues

Site D Very Active Organic
farming, peace
activities,
development
planning

Site B Very
Active State
Superfund

Site C Very Active Organic
farming, peace
activities,
development
planning
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Question 10 - Comm Rep
Previous Community Involvement at Site
Rep 2 Information
gathering,
dumping ban
enforcement,
worked with
local professor

Rep 1 Community
meetings
Site F

Rep 3 Community
meetings,
information
gathering

Site E Communications
with local officials,
business
community not
supportive

CI = Community Involvement

Site D - Media
contact, local
meetings,
concerned
because PRP was
large employer

What was CI
at the site preTAG?

Site A Public
meetings,
information
gathering

Site B Required
access control
(fencing),
monitored

Site C - Media
contact, local
meetings,
concerned
because PRP
was large
employer
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Question 14 - Comm Rep
Why did group pursue a TAG
Rep 3 Speed up
process,
involved in TAG
group for Site E,
counteract PRP
influence
Rep 2 Lack of trust in
State and EPA,
lack of technical
knowledge,
opposed remedy

Site A To obtain
information,
learned from
EPA

Site F
Rep 1 Unknown

Site E Obtain technical expertise,
voice concerns over State
remedy, learned from
another TAG

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties

Site D To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to EPA"

Why did
Group pursue
TAG?

Site B Previous experience
with complex issues,
obtain information,
learned from another
TAG (Site E)

Site C To get involved,
influence decision,
provide a voice to
EPA, "Spine to
EPA"
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Question 15 - Comm Rep
How did TAG application and process work?

Rep 3 Completed
application for
Site E, this site
took longer,
suspects reason

Rep 2 Used TAG recipient
for another site for
application, tedious,
difficult, confusing,
made a trip to EPADC, met with Lois
Gibbs (Love Canal)

Site A Fairly smooth, hired
another TAG
recipient to write
application, lots of
paperwork

Site F
Rep 1 No recall

Site E Steep learning curve
(group and EPA),
EPA's focus on
accounting (not
results) made it
difficult, discouraging

Site D Many obstacles, EPA
assisted with process
(only group with TAGs
for 2 sites), well
educated group

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DC = Washington, D.C.

How did TAG
application
and process
work?

Site B Hired another TAG
recipient to write
application, administration
difficult, well educated
group (2 PhDs), lower
resource community would
have given up

Site C Many obstacles, EPA
assisted with process
(only group with
TAGs for 2 sites),
well educated group

184

Question 16 - Comm Rep
What did TAG add and what were downsides
Rep 3 Adds - Added leverage
with EPA and DEC,
prodded RPM to move
things along and
include public in
decisions, balanced
PRP influence
Downsides administrative burden

Rep 2 Adds - empowered
community, gained
information, understand
outcomes, credibility with
EPA and community at
large
Downsides - TAG
awarded too late in
process, may have
slowed progress

Rep 1 Adds - No
recall
Downsides No recall

Site F

Site E Adds - credibility and legitimacy
with EPA, increased information
from EPA, understand technical
issues, confidence to question
agency
Downsides - conflict with local
government, local business
resented, EPA focused on
administration, administrative
burden

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
RPM = Remedial Project Manager

Site A Adds - community awareness,
PRP-compliance (fencing/
buyouts), improved community
credibility
Downsides - Other group tried
to co-opt them, concerns over
property values

What did TAG
add and what
were
downsides of
TAG award?

Site D Adds - better support of
EPA, serious support for
under-resourced community
Downsides - perceived as
outsiders (not long time
locals), perception of payoff, stress of responsibility
for whole community

Site B Adds - TAG is critical, technical
expertise, identified
investigation gaps (groundwater
and chemicals), gained
legitimacy with community
Downsides - administration of
the grant, very time consuming

Site C Adds - better support of
EPA, added remediation
components (removal and
groundwater)
Downsides - perceived as
outsiders (not long time
locals), perception of pay-off,
stress of responsibility for
whole community
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Question 17 - Comm Rep
Who was involved in decision process and were there conflicts?
Rep 1 Decision
makers EPA and PRPs,
not public
Conflicts - No
recall

Rep 2 Decision makers EPA and community
Conflicts - No
lawsuits, but remedy
was changed during
process

Rep 3 Decision makers EPA and PRPs,
community smaller
role
Conflicts - Unknown

Site A Decision makers - EPA,
DEC, community,
congressman
Conflicts - ROD
amendment,
disagreement on remedy

Site F

Site E Decision makers - EPA, DEC,
community, higher education
group
Conflicts - no ROD
Amendments or lawsuits, there
was an ESD (explanation of
significant differences) to
explain remedy change

EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental Conservation
PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
ROD = Record-of-Decision

Site D Decision makers EPA, PRPs,
community
Conflicts - none

Who was
involved in
decision
making? Were
there outside
conflicts?

Site B Decision makers - EPA,
PRPs, community was "told"
about decision not involved
Conflicts - community wanted
groundwater treatment but
EPA went with MNA, no
lawsuits or ROD amendments

Site C Decision makers - EPA,
PRPs, community
Conflicts - no lawsuits or
ROD amendments, was
conflict between community
desires and PRPs
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Question 18 - Comm Rep
Were there remedy changes and why?

Rep 1 Remedy changed from
incineration to
removal/cap
Why? New information
(lab data to replace
State data),
Community opposition
to incineration

Rep 2 Remedy changed from
incineration to removal/
cap
Why? New information
(lab data to replace
State data), Community
opposition to
incineration

Site A Remedy changed from
LTTD to ISVE and PCB
cleanup limits were raised
Why? New information
(technolgy, site risks, TAG
group, PRPs (PCBs)

Site F
Rep 3 Remedy
changed from
incineration to
removal/cap
Why? PRPs
Site E Remedy changed from
incineration to LTTD.
Added freeze wall to dig
below water table.
Why? New information
(technology - LTTD and
freeze wall), TAG group,
PRPs

PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
LTTD = low-temp thermal desorption
ISVE = in-situ soil vapor extraction

Site D No remedy
changes

Were there
remedy
changes and
if so, what
influenced?

Site B No remedy
changes

Site C Remedy changed to
eliminate groundwater
treatment
Why? New information
about potential success of
remedy
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Questions 19/20 - Comm Rep
Your impression of remedy selection and remediation schedule?
Rep 3 Selection - It seemed like
EPA sped up to get ROD
issued before TAG was
awarded
Remediation - Pretty
quick

Rep 1 Selection - Not sure,
seemed long but no
comparison
Remediation - No
reference
Site A Selection - Very
slow
Remediation Normal to faster
than expected

Site F
Rep 2 Selection Seemed slow
Remediation Rapid
What was
your
impression of
the remedy
selection
schedule?
Remediation
schedule?

Site E Selection - Fairly
quick
Remediation Quick

Site D Selection - Slower
than expected,
because of complexity
Remediation - Normal
for Superfund

ROD = Record-of-Decision

Site B Selection - Normal
(did research to
confirm)
Remediation - No
recall

Site C Selection - Community
thought it was slow, TAG
coordinator thought it
was faster than normal
Remediation - Normal,
no impact from TAG
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Question 22 - Comm Rep

What was the impact of TAg on remedy selection process?
Rep 2 "Threat of
TAG" sped
up process

Rep 3 No recall

Rep 1 None, remedy
selection was
complete before
TAG awarded

Site F

Site E Free access to
EPA, enhanced
direct
communication

Site D Allowed EPA to stand
up for best remedy,
regardless of source
of issues (Site C and
D were adjacent)

PRP = Potentially Responsible Parties
EPA = Environmental Protection Agency
DEC = Department of Environmental Conservation

Site A Access (technical
knowledge, EPA/DEC
personnel), knew
questions to ask, push to
counter PRP influence

What was the
TAG impact
on the remedy
selection
PROCESS?

Site C Allowed EPA to stand
up for best remedy,
regardless of source of
issues (Site C and D
were adjacent)

Site B Remedy was less
"skimpy", support for
EPA to demand more in
the remedy, political
process to balance
PRPs
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Question 23 - Comm Rep
How did TAG influence the remedy chosen?

Rep 2 Influenced
away from
incineration
(working with
contractor
before TAG)

Rep 1 Not applicable,
remedy was
already chosen

Rep 3 Not applicable,
remedy was
already chosen

Site F

Site E Influenced the
change from
incineration to
thermal desorption

Site A Gave input, monitored
progress, became part of
process, weekly updates,
"watchdog"
How did TAG
influence the
CHOSEN
remedy?

Site D No influence on
final remedy

Site C No influence on
final remedy

Site B Kept EPA from selecting
"cheapest remedy", kept
the site in public eye
(media), added
additional investigation,
community education
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Question 23 - Comm Rep
How did TAG influence the remedy chosen?
Rep 1 Not applicable

Rep 2 Not sure. Looking for
perfect and there is no
perfect.

Site F
Site A More of a lateral
move, performed as
well and was safer.

Rep 3 Difficult to say,
much more
could have
been done.
Site E Yes, technically
better and more
acceptable to
public

If there was a
remedy
change, was
the new
remedy
technically
better?

Site B Not applicable

Site C Not applicable
Site D Not applicable
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Comm Rep
General Comments
Rep 2 1) Influenced
remedy before
TAG award
2) Site E TAG
rep was key

Rep 1 1) Support from
TAG rep from Site
E was key
2) Became
involved before
TAG

Site F

Rep 3 Difference between
Site E and Site F
highlighted the
importance of
strong EPA
manager

Site A 1) Support of TAG
representative from Site E
was key to success
2) EPA requirements are
tough for small
community

Miscellaneous
general
comments
Site E Assistance from
another TAG rep
was key

Site D New to
community, so
outsider status
was perceived

Site B 1) 2 PhDs on
committee were key
2) Hiring TAG rep
from Site E was key
to getting the TAG
3) Heard that there
were communities
that turned down
TAGs

Site C New to
community, so
outsider status
was perceived
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Appendix C
Interview Responses
EPA Managers
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EPA Q5
What percentage of your sites have TAGs?

Site A Unwilling to
interview

Site F
15-20 %

Site E 40%

What
percentage of
your sites
have TAGs?

Site B 1/8 (12%) now,
pretty typical
historically.

Site D 50%
Site C 50%

194

EPA Q10
Was there community involvement pre-TAG?

Site F
Yes, very active.
opposed the initial
remedy
(incineration)

Site E Yes, not happy
with State
proposed
remedy.

Site D Pre-dated
PM, so no
observation

Site A Unwilling to
interview

Was there
community
involvement
pre-TAG?

Site B Pre-dated PM,
so no
observation.

Site C Pre-dated PM,
so no
observation
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EPA Q15
Did you notice change in group's knowledge post-TAG?

Site F
Yes, more technically
knowledgeable,
questions improved.

Site E Yes, more comfortable in
dealing with the data,
understood technical
issues

Site D No noticeable
difference

Site A Unwilling to
interview

Change in
Group's
knowledge
post-TAG?

Site B No basis for
observation.

Site C No noticeable
difference
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EPA Q16A
What did TAG add at the Site?

Site A Unwilling to
interview

Site F
impartial technical
advisor added to EPA
credibility.

Site E Better understanding of facts;
improved trust;
organized community;
accelerated process b/c of
relationships

Site D TAG rep was sole
contact, seemed
"satisfied"

What did TAG
add at the
Site?

Site B Increased confidence in process
and agency;
community more organized;
increased trust in agency;
streamlined and coordinated
process

Site C TAG rep was sole
contact, seemed
"satisfied"
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EPA Q16B
Were there downsides to TAG?

Site F
Significant
administrative burdens
(on EPA and public)

Site E Not aware of any

Site D Expensive to make
one citizen more
comfortable

Site A Unwilling to
interview

Were there
downsides to
TAG?

Site B Not aware of any

Site C Expensive to make
one citizen more
comfortable

198

EPA Q19
TAG impact on remedy selection schedule?

Site F
No impact, normal
schedule for size and
complexity;theoretically
should have improved
schedule

Site E Early involvement
accelerated schedule,
community buy in and
ongoing dialogue

Site D No impact, normal
schedule

Site A Unwilling to
interview

What is
impression of
TAG impact
on Remedy
Selection at
site?

Site B No impact, normal
Superfund schedule

Site C Not applicable
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EPA Q20
TAG impact on remediation schedule?

Site F
No impact, schedule
was short but due to
low complexity, not
TAG

Site E Positive impact on
remediation schedule, field
changes more readily
accepted

Site D No impact, normal
Superfund schedule

Site A Unwilling to
interview

What is
impression of
TAG impact
on
remediation
schedule at
site?

Site B No impact, normal
Superfund schedule

Site C No impact, normal
Superfund schedule
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EPA Q22
TAG impact on remedy selection process (not schedule)?

Site F
None, TAG after
remedy selection

Site E Resulted in improved trust,
opened communication
and accelerated process

Site D No impact

Site A Unwilling to
interview

What was the
impact of the
TAG on
remedy
selection
process (not
schedule)?

Site B Strengthened process,
educated public, increased
communication, confidence and
trust, TAG group added value

Site C No impact
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EPA Q23
TAG impact on remedy chosen?

Site F
None, TAG after
remedy selection

Site E No impact, but EPA was
able to overcome
community skepticism and
agree on best remedy

Site D No impact

Site A Unwilling to
interview

What was the
impact of the
TAG on
remedy
chosen?

Site B Public supported the approach
proposed by EPA for multi-use
outcome, no impact but support

Site C No impact
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General Observations from EPA project manager

Site F
No additional

Site E No additional

Site D At sites without TAGs,
community able to have
impact on the process (2
concrete examples), didn't
really see that TAG added
much

Site A Unwilling to
interview

General
Observations

Site B No additional

Site C No additional
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Appendix D Interview
Responses Technical
Consultant
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Q1 Technical Consultant
How long have you performed technical support at Superfund Site?

Sites B,C, and D Since 1988 -1989

How long
have you
performed
technical
support at
Superfund
Sites?

Sites A,E and F Since the late 1970s
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Q2 Technical Consultant
How many Superfund Sites have you worked on?

Sites B,C, and D About 20

How many
Superfund
Sites have
you worked
on?

Sites A,E and F 3 or 4
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Q3 Technical Consultant
How many Superfund Sites have you worked on?

Sites B,C, and D About a dozen, 3 sites in this
study (Sites B, C, and D)

How many
Superfund
Sites have
you worked
on?

Sites A,E and F Three, all three in this study (Sites
E and F, a little on Site A)
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Q7 Technical Consultant
At what stage of Superfund process did you get involved?

Sites A,E and F Sites B,C, and D Site B - RI/FS stage
Site C - At ROD
Site D - RI/FS stage

At what stage
of Superfund
process did
you get
involved?

Site A - don't recall details
Site E - NPL listing
Site F - just before ROD
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Q10 Technical Consultant
Did you notice a change in Group's knowledge post-TAG?

Sites A,E and F Sites B,C, and D Yes, community developed a
better understanding, asked
better questions, critiqued EPA
methods and plans

Did you notice
a change in
Group's
knowledge
post-TAG?

Yes, community was noticeably
more in tune with what EPA was
doing and involved
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Q11A Technical Consultant
What did the TAG add?

Sites A,E and F Sites B,C, and D Yes, community developed a
better understanding, asked
better questions, critiqued EPA
methods and plans

What did the
TAG add?

Site E - agency closer to the
public, EPA more deliberative
Site F - community more satisfied
that problem was solved, focused
community efforts.
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Q11B Technical Consultant
What were TAG downsides?

Sites A,E and F Sites B,C, and D Administrative burden, seemed
like it may have been EPA's
attempt to "kill the program"

What were
TAG
downsides?

Few downsides, perception that it
negatively affected property
values, some pushback from City
government
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Q14 Technical Consultant
What was your impression of TAG impact on schedule for remedy selection process?

Sites B,C, and D Process was slow, but unsure
whether this was TAG impact.

What was
your
impression of
TAG impact
on schedule
for remedy
selection
process?

Sites A,E and F No impact, "the schedule was the
schedule"
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Q15 Technical Consultant
What was your impression of TAG impact on schedule for remediation?

Sites B,C, and D No observable impact.

What was
your
impression of
TAG impact
on schedule
for
remediation?

Sites A,E and F No impact
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Q17 Technical Consultant
What was your impression of TAG impact on remedy selection process (not schedule)?

Sites B,C, and D Impacted degree of
investigation and added areas
to look at. Identified hot spots
and added chemicals to
analyses

What was
your
impression of
TAG impact
on remedy
selection
process (not
schedule)?

Sites A,E and F No impact, Group was already
going to do what it was doing or
there were limited options
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Q18 Technical Consultant
How did TAG affect remedy chosen?

Sites B,C, and D Site B - No specifics
Site C - No specifics
Site D - better delineation of
source areas and addressing
wetlands, incorporating
groundwater treatment

LTTD - low temperture thermal desorption

Sites A,E and F How did TAG
affect remedy
chosen?

Site E - change to LTTD from
incineration
Site F - No impact
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General Observations from technical consultants

Sites B,C, and D Important aspects:
- Site setting (rural/urban)
- PRP/community interaction
- Activism of community
- Trust building
- TAG increases acceptance
- TAG did not increase participation, funded
what would already occur
- Third Party review increased quality of
investigation and selection
- TAG increased community awareness and
knowledge
- Lots of work for the compensation, must be
efficient

General
Observations

Sites A,E and F - TAG not required for
community involvement
- TAG may increase the
work to keep the group
together
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